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This thesis analyzes the rise and fall of Masyumi during the era of the provisional 
parliament in Indonesia (1950-1956).  As the largest of the pre-Suharto Islamic political 
parties in a country with an overwhelming Muslim majority, Masyumi was poised in 
1955 to achieve political ascendancy, and thus to achieve its primary objective of 
establishing an Islamic state.  Ultimately, Masyumis leaders failed to unify Indonesian 
Muslims, and they consequently lost much of their moral and political authority.  In an 
important demonstration of the malleability of Islamic and ethnic identity politics, 
Masyumis struggle was eventually submerged within a greater struggle by the Javanese 
to assert cultural hegemony over the entire Indonesian archipelago. This thesis describes 
Masyumis role in precipitating not only its own fall, but also in helping to bring about 
the collapse of Indonesias first attempt at parliamentary democracy.  
Indonesias Islamist past contains many important lessons for US policymakers 
dealing with this largest of all Muslim countries, particularly in light of the war on terror.  
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This thesis examines the role of Indonesias largest post-independence Islamic 
political party, Masyumi, during the period of the provisional parliament (1950  1956).  
This relatively brief era remains an important subject of analysis for contemporary 
scholars because its lessons can help shed light on the multifaceted role of Islam in 
Indonesias modern political discourse.  It can also point towards a better understanding 
of the potential influence that Islam might yet have on Indonesias emerging democracy 
in the post-Suharto era.  Although Masyumi was disbanded over forty years ago, a careful 
study of the roots of the political conflict between it and its secular opponents, as well as 
between it and the other Islamic political alternatives, remains relevant today because it 
offers a window on what might have been and what might yet still be.   
As in the era under consideration, the inability of the political representatives of 
the modern Indonesian ummah, or Muslim community, to achieve consensus regarding 
the appropriate role of religion vis-à-vis politics continues to hamper their attempts to 
make significant gains against entrenched secular interests.  The subsequent failure of the 
Islamist political parties to pose a serious challenge to their secularist opposition in the 
years since Indonesias first democratic elections in 1955 has caused many observers to 
speculate regarding the existence of a widespread cultural antipathy in Indonesian society 
towards the admixture of politics and religion.  To this sociopolitical proclivity is 
attributed the decline and ultimate fall of Masyumi during the 1950s.  The analysis 
outlined in this research suggests that this cultural view is in reality far more contingent 
and variable than usually assumed. 
Indonesia is a complex society in which religion, especially Islam, continues to 
have a profoundly influential role in all facets of life, including politics.  However, as is 
demonstrated in this research, the failure of the Islamists to successfully call upon 
Indonesias overwhelming Muslim majority to sweep them into power in the 1955 
general elections had less to do with inherent Indonesian affinities towards secular 
governance than it did with the fractious nature of the Indonesian ummah.  The process of 
Islamization, which began in the 13th century in the Indonesian archipelago, produced a 
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bifurcation of socio-political culture and produced a fault line between the Islamic-
entrepreneurial societies of the Javanese pesisir and outer island entrepots and the inland 
agrarian societies of Java.  The absorption and synchretization of Islam within the pre-
existing Hindu-Buddhist cultures of the latter produced a stream of Islamic political 
thought that manifested into a worldview quite different from that subscribed to by the 
entrepreneurial societies.  The cleavage between these groups has been long-lasting and 
decisive in shaping Indonesian politics.   
This Islamic cleavage became further pronounced with the importation of 
modernist doctrine during the latter half of the 19th century and early 20th century as 
Indonesians began to travel more frequently to the Hejaz and other centers of Islamic 
study in India, Arabia and Persia.  The development of a native Indonesian modernist 
movement was most prolific in the Javanese pesisir and in the seberang communities, 
especially in West Java and Sumatra.  This movement ultimately became manifest in the 
founding of the Muhammadiyah, a religious and educational organization dedicated to 
dakwah along the modernist model.  The orthodox Islamic leaders, most of who came 
from East and Central Java, responded by forming the Nahdatul Ulama, an organization 
established with the principle aim of defending traditionalist Islamic values in the face of 
modernist gains. 
The Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama coexisted relatively peacefully, if not 
somewhat grudgingly, under the close supervision of the Dutch colonial authorities, but 
the arrival of the Japanese occupation forces in 1942 upset the delicate balance between 
these two entities.  In an effort to co-opt Islamic leaders in support of the war effort, the 
Japanese military authorities formed Masyumi as an umbrella organization for both the 
modernist and traditionalist elements of the Indonesian ummah.  The traditionalists of the 
Nahdatul Ulama initially dominated Masyumis leadership structure, but with the 
surrender of the Japanese and the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945, the 
modernists moved to the fore and the influence of the traditionalists receded. 
The years following independence were marked not only by an intense struggle 
between Islamists and the secularists to assert their own particular vision for Indonesia, 
but also between the modernist and now-marginalized traditionalist elements of Masyumi 
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to achieve primacy within the party.  This struggle came to a climax in April 1952 with 
the disaffiliation of Nahdatul Ulama from Masyumi and its formation as a separate 
political party.  The fracturing of Masyumi along the modernist-traditionalist cleavage 
was catastrophic for the political aspirations of the Islamists because it divided the 
Indonesian ummah not only along socio-political lines, but along ethnic lines as well.  
The Javanese-dominated traditionalists of the Nahdatul Ulama allied themselves with the 
other Javanese parties, which were predominately secular in orientation, while the 
modernist-dominated Masyumi became identified with the outer island constituencies.  
The struggle to assert Islam as the guiding principle of Indonesian politics was 
subsequently submerged beneath an equally virulent struggle to assert Javanese ethnic 
supremacy manifested in the primacy of the abangan cultural worldview.  This thesis 
describes that struggle and Masyumis failure to measure up to the challenge.   
The Javanese socio-political culture would eventually prove victorious in this 
ethnic struggle, and the political voices of the seberang, notably Masyumi and its allies, 
would be silenced for the remaining years of Sukarnos Old Order and for the duration of 
Suhartos New Order regime.  The re-awakening of democracy in Indonesia after nearly a 
half-century of slumber has also re-awakened the potential for the Islamists to regain the 
political ascendancy their forefathers forfeited when the Javanese political worldview 
became dominant.  Any success by the modern Islamist leaders will be contingent upon 
their collective ability to reunify the Indonesian ummah in the face of ethnic, cultural and 
theological differences, rather than upon any need to overcome an innate societal 
antipathy towards religious-based politics.  This goal was unachievable for Masyumi and 
has so far been unachievable by its political successors, but the repeated failure of 
Indonesias secular governments since 1999 to overcome economic malaise, separatist 
agitation, communal violence, and systemic corruption has left their continued political 
dominance increasingly vulnerable.              
The lessons of Masyumis rise and fall within the context of the era of the 
provisional parliament provides modern observers with numerous points of reference 
with which to analyze the political machinations of Indonesias modern political actors, 
particularly as they relate to the future electoral potential of political Islam in that 
 xv
country.  Much of this context is reflective of the modern political environment in 
Indonesia, in terms of domestic and international factors, each of which have influenced 
the political discourse and shaped both the policy and propaganda of Masyumi and its 
opponents.  Masyumis leaders did not have a comparable historical case study against 
which to weigh their political decisions.  In effect, they were blazing a new political trail 
where others had not yet tread, and their missteps, although inevitably catastrophic, were 
understandable in light of their collective political inexperience.  However, todays 
Islamist leaders have no such excuse for their own frequent missteps: Whether they avail 
themselves of the lessons of their own past in order to avoid similar mistakes remains to 
be seen.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 Indonesia has been an independent state for over a half century, but its citizens 
have tasted the bittersweet joys of democracy for but two brief periods of its history.  
During the thirty-two years between the Orde Lama (Old Order) and the present era, 
former President Suharto ruled Indonesia with fear and political oppression.  Although 
elections were periodically and methodically conducted under his regime, the results 
were usually a foregone conclusion.   
 For almost the entire duration of Suhartos Orde Baru (New Order), political 
participation in Indonesia was limited to a relatively modest slate of anemic political 
parties tolerated in great part for their inability to pose a serious challenge to the ruling 
elites.  After the general elections of 1971, Suharto took drastic steps to restrict Islamic 
political expression to a single government-approved party.  The four Islamic political 
parties that had survived the turbulent events of the 1950s and 1960s were merged under 
the banner of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party PPP).  
By forcing them together in this manner, Suharto had hoped that the internal divisions 
among its constituent parts would serve to keep the PPP perpetually weak.  In the early 
1980s, Suharto further homogenized political expression by decreeing that all state 
organizations, including the PPP, had to affirm a common, predominately secular guiding 
ideology.  Islam was no longer considered an acceptable basis for political expression.   
 Since the collapse of Suhartos Orde Baru in May 1998, Indonesia has once again 
experienced a flowering of political parties.  During the 1999 general elections, which 
were the first truly free national elections held since 1955, some forty-eight parties were 
approved to contest for seats in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Peoples Representative 
Council -DPR).  These parties represented the entire spectrum of Indonesian political 
interests, except for Communism, which had remained a banned ideology since 1966.  
Among the many new parties to rise from the ashes of the Orde Baru during this era of 
reformasi were a half-dozen or so Islamic parties hoping to take advantage of the 
loosening of the reins on the participation of religious organizations in politics.   
 Of the many developments to arise from the 1999 general elections, one of the 
most interesting was the role played by those political parties that had endeavored to 
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employ Islamic symbols and rhetoric to define their image.  Islamism is the belief that 
Islam can and should form the basis for the development of political ideology.  In that 
sense, religion can serve as a blueprint for political engagement (Barton, October, 
2002, p. 5).   Although a significant number of the new parties formed after 1998 adopted 
the Islamic label, it would be unwise to assume that all of these parties were Islamist, 
that they based their respective political agendas on the strict implementation of Sharia, 
or that all were unanimous in calling for the establishment of an Islamic state.  Some of 
these parties merely wished to use the core values and principles of Islam as a light by 
which to guide good and effective governance.  For these parties, secularism was not 
mutually exclusive with Islam.  Although the agendas and aspirations of these parties 
were surprisingly diverse, most of them failed to find substantial support from the 
Indonesian electorate.   
 Of the four political parties that did achieve support in the double-digit 
percentages, only two can be regarded as having Islamic roots of any consequence; the 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party PKB) and the Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party -PPP).  Interestingly, although 
the former was the primary political vehicle for the leadership of Nahdatul Ulama 
(Renaissance of the Religious Scholars), it strictly affirmed the Pancasila as its sole 
guiding ideology.  Conversely, the PPP, which was a remnant of the Suharto era 
discarded Pancasila entirely, and instead claimed Islam as its basis.    
 Of the remaining seventeen parties that won seats in the DPR, eight of these 
employed Islam in some manner to distinguish themselves from their competitors, and all 
but one claimed Islam as their fundamental political ideology.  The remaining party, the 
Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party PAN) carefully distanced itself 
from Islamism, and like the PKB, chose instead to use Pancasila as its guiding ideology.  
Together these ten Islamic parties captured nearly thirty-five percent of the seats in the 
DPR, and despite significant ideological rifts amongst them they were able to ally 
themselves long enough to win the Presidency for Abdurrahman Wahid, the head of 
Nahdatul Ulama.  Since then, this Central Axis of Islamic parties has again splintered, 
and several of its constituent parties have themselves fragmented into smaller parties.  
Questions remain as to whether they will ever again be able to overcome the fundamental 
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political and theological difference among them to compete effectively against the 
secular parties in the upcoming 2004 general elections.  ORourke has suggested that 
such a potential still exists if these parties can effectively capitalize on the political 
fragility of the secular parties, many of which continue to be plagued by corruption 
scandals and their own internal instability (ORourke, 2004, p. 2).   
In many ways, the conditions that characterize the political situation in modern 
Indonesia are eerily reminiscent of those that were prevalent in the years leading up to 
Indonesias first general elections in 1955.  Like its historical predecessor, the Indonesia 
of today is wracked by pervasive corruption, economic instability, and separatist unrest, 
while its fragile democracy lives under the unspoken threat of intervention by an army 
uninspired by its civilian leadership.  Because of the similarities between these two 
periods in Indonesian history, any lessons that can be distilled from an examination of the 
earlier era may help us clarify the potential for political Islam to rise again in the years to 
come.  Thus, the lessons of Masyumis decline and fall remain relevant for those seeking 
to understand the modern relevance of political Islam in shaping contemporary political 
discourse in Indonesia. 
 
A. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: LOOKING BACK IN ORDER TO LOOK 
FORWARD  
At the dawn of Indonesias independence in 1950, Masyumi was not only the 
most important Islamic political party in Indonesia; it was arguably the most important 
political party of all.  Ward has argued that Masyumi was perhaps the only truly national 
party at that time because its support came from both Java and the outer islands (1970, p. 
13).  Yet in spite of its vast organizational power in 1950, by 1958 Masyumi would find 
itself fighting and loosing a rearguard action against a growing cast of enemies as it 
struggled to preserve the remnants of Indonesias first democratic experiment against the 
rising political triumvirate of President Sukarno, the army and the Partai Kommunis 
Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party PKI).  By 1962, Masyumi would become an 
outlawed organization, and its principal leaders would be hunted as criminals. 
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The results of the following analysis suggests that the decline and subsequent 
proscription of Masyumi in 1962 need not have been a foregone conclusion, but rather 
that it was instead the avoidable consequence of a string of poor strategic and tactical 
political decisions made by its leadership over the span of the previous decade.  A careful 
study of these errors is important because although forty-five years have passed since the 
collapse of Indonesias first flirtation with democracy, the contours of Indonesias post-
Suharto political landscape continue to be largely shaped by the events and experiences 
of that era.    
Although the full import of Islamic politics remains an unknown quantity for 
modern Indonesias still immature democracy, conventional wisdom opines that the 
majority of Indonesians are religiously tolerant, secular-leaning, and traditionally 
ambivalent to the intermingling of religion and politics.  The relatively weak showing of 
Islamic political parties in the 1999 general elections is often held up as proof that the 
Indonesian voting public is not likely to support religiously-based parties in the near 
future.  However, conventional wisdom on the eve of the 1955 general elections 
suggested Indonesian voting habits that were of a vastly different stripe.  In those days 
pundits were confident that the majority of Indonesian voters would in fact largely be 
influenced by their religious sympathies, and this perception in turn gave rise to their oft-
repeated predictions that the three main Islamic political parties (Masyumi, Nahdatul 
Ulama, and the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) would win a decisive majority in both 
the parliamentary elections of September 1955 and in the elections for the Constituent 
Assembly conducted three months later (Feith, 1954, p. 246;Bone, 1955, p. 1084).  The 
fact that the largest of these parties, Masyumi, ultimately received far less popular support 
than the pundits had predicted begs an explanation that can only come from a careful 
study of the actors and issues that dominated the political scene in the critical years 
leading up to those elections.  Did the partys ideology fail to resonate with the public, or 
are other reasons at the root of Masyumis failure?     
An explanation for why the conventional wisdom of the 1950s proved so grossly 
mistaken has profound relevance for those who hope to divine the future course of 
Indonesian politics.  Many political observers continue to question the relative 
significance of political Islam in Indonesia because of tenacious perceptions that 
Indonesians will continue to reject Islamism as somehow incompatible with their secular 
sympathies.  The research outlined in subsequent chapters, however, will suggest that the 
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cause for the failure of political Islam to coalesce into a decisive political force is far 
more complex than that proffered by the purveyors of conventional wisdom. 
 
B. ROOTS OF POLITICAL DISUNITY AMONG THE INDONESIAN 
UMMAH 
Despite the existence of relatively small pockets of Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, 
Confucians and animists, Indonesia is today a predominately Muslim country.  It is in 
fact the worlds most populous Muslim country, and yet to say that Indonesia is roughly 
90% Muslim is to miss the cultural complexity that underlies such a broad demographic 
generalization.  In reality, Indonesias Muslim polity is as diverse as any other large 
multi-ethnic community, and perhaps even more so.   
Before independence, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) was a disparate 
collection of regencies, sultanates, and kingdoms that served as home to a vast assortment 
of ethnic, linguistic, and religious variations appropriate to a swath of territory 
encompassing well over 740,000 square miles.  Although the long struggle for 
independence helped to graft the idea of a singular Indonesia as a thin veneer of 
nationalism around an amalgam cauldron of diverse cultural identities, the concept 
espoused by Indonesias national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), 
could neither quickly nor easily erase centuries of divergent development.    
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Almost forty years ago, noted anthropologist Clifford Geertz cautioned scholars 
not to confuse the almost total Islamization of Indonesia with either cultural or political 
homogeneity (1960, p. 7).  If anything, religious diversity is the central characteristic that 
defines Indonesian society, and a nuanced discussion of the origins of that diversity can 
help explain the influence of cultural and regional differences on the full breadth of the 
political landscape.  The process through which Islam first came to the Indonesian 
archipelago and began to expand led to bifurcation of Islamic socio-political culture, and 
these patterns were subsequently hardened as a consequence of both the Dutch 
colonization and the Japanese wartime occupation.  Political discourse in the 1950s was 
in large part grounded in these divisions, and the 1955 elections reflected them 
demographically.  A study of Islams contributions to Indonesias socio-political culture 
is all the more important if we are to understand that religions failure to transform itself 
from a widespread cultural phenomenon into a commensurately powerful political one.       
Chapter II provides the background necessary for understanding the origins of the 
cleavage between the traditionalist and modernist wings of the Muslim constituency.  It 
would be this very schism that would serve as an obstacle to Masyumis attempts to unify 
the ummah under its party banner throughout the era immediately following 
independence.  That chapter also traces the development of Indonesian Islam as a social 
and political force from its introduction into the archipelago in the 13th century, until the 
dawn of full independence in December 1949.  It identifies those key events that have 
subsequently contributed to Indonesian Islams fragmentation over the centuries, and it 
draws out the causes that contributed to the failure of Muslim political parties to rise to 
the challenge of leadership in the era of the post-independence provisional parliament.  
 
C. THE DECLINE OF MASYUMI IN THE ERA OF THE PROVISIONAL 
PARLIAMENT 
Chapter III provides a detailed discussion of Masyumis role during Indonesias 
first brief experiment with democracy (1950-1957).  It also provides a discussion of the 
complex web of interaction between Masyumi and the other important actors on 
Indonesias political stage during that tumultuous period.  As the party with the largest 
share of seats in the 1950 provisional parliament, as well as the largest grassroots 
organization of any party in Indonesia, Masyumi was ideally positioned at the dawn of 
independence to seize the mantle as the preeminent political force in Indonesia.  It was in 
recognition of this factor that Masyumi was given the privilege of assembling Indonesias 
first post-independence cabinet.  Its chairman, Mohammed Natsir, would subsequently be 
appointed as the Republic of Indonesias first Prime Minister.  However by late 1962, the 
parliament would cease to exist, Masyumi would be outlawed, and two of its former 
Prime Ministers would be imprisoned.  It would be a long, hard fall for Masyumi, made 
all the more dramatic because of the power and prestige it had once enjoyed. 
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Of the numerous political parties that came into existence at the dawn of 
Indonesias independence, Masyumi was by far the least intuitive of them all.  It was after 
all a residual fabrication of the Japanese occupation; an organization welded together 
from the disparate wings of the ummah, not of their own accord, but rather as an 
extension of self-serving Japanese occupation policies.  Masyumi was founded not to 
unify the Muslim leadership for the sake of giving political power to the Indonesian 
people, but instead to mobilize the labor capacity of the Indonesian population to support 
Japanese wartime aims.  As such, it was from the beginning an unstable organization.  
The mutual antagonisms that had characterized relations between its various constituent 
parts before World War II were only held in check during Masyumis early years by a 
collective fear of the Japanese.  After the war, Muslim leaders continued to set aside their 
own factional conflicts in order to present a unified front in the struggle against Dutch 
attempts to retake to Indonesia.  With the attainment of partial independence in 1945, 
however, the fractures within the leadership began to widen again, and Masyumi slowly 
began to come apart at the seams. 
Because its support had come not only from the Javanese heartland, but also from 
throughout almost the entire archipelago, Masyumi had been the only truly nationalist 
party at the beginning of the parliamentary period (Ward, 1970, p. 13).  This source of 
strength, however, depended on the maintenance of all of its constituent factions, 
especially the Nahdatul Ulama constituencies of Central and East Java.  When Nahdatul 
Ulama withdrew from Masyumi in 1952, the latter became almost exclusively a party of 
West Java and the seberang (outer islands).  Although the socio-political discourse in 
Indonesia had long reflected the dichotomy between Javanese and seberang interests, 
Masyumi had always been well-positioned to speak for both because of the broadness of 
its constituency.  The 1952 split with Nahdatul Ulama altered this pattern, and Masyumi 
subsequently began to be identified as the most prominent voice of the seberang. 
The dominant secular parties, including both the Partai Nasional Indonesia 
(Indonesian Nationalist Party PNI) and the PKI, overwhelmingly represented 
Javanese interests, which frequently proved to be at odds with those of the seberang 
communities, particularly in the economic sphere.  The relative equality in parliamentary 
influence between Masyumi and those parties prior to 1952 ensured that neither could 
gain complete dominance, but the withdrawal of Nahdatul Ulama from the Masyumi fold, 
and the subsequent alignment of Nahdatul Ulama with the Javanese secular parties 
shifted that balance of power decisively against Masyumi.   
From 1952 on, Masyumi was forced to rely on two sources of strength to keep its 
enemies at bay.  The first was the almost universal fear among secularist parties that 
Masyumi was poised for a landslide victory in the 1955 elections, and the second was the 
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close, almost symbiotic, relationship between the senior army leadership and Masyumis 
leaders.  Both of these sources of strength became increasingly vulnerable throughout the 
mid-1950s, until both would eventually evaporate in the wake of the 1955 elections.  The 
web of relationships between Masyumi and the President, the army, the opposition 
parties, among Masyumis own political allies, and even between its own constituent 
factions, holds the key for understanding the complex chain of events that led to its 
failure to attain the expected landslide victory in the 1955 general elections.  In that web, 
we may also find the causes for Masyumis growing political isolation as its former allies 
abandoned it on by one as the light of democracy was extinguished all across Indonesia. 
 
D. FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION IN APPLYING THE LESSONS OF 
THE MASYUMI EXPERIENCE 
The reasons for the decline of Masyumi can be found wrapped up in the multi-
layered web of relationships between it and the numerous other significant actors on the 
political stage in the decade that followed World War II.  The causes for partys ultimate 
destruction can also be traced through a long and complex chain of events whose origins 
can be found in the development of competing conceptions of Islams role in society and 
politics.  Reverberations from the centuries-old modernist/traditionalist schism shaped the 
debate within the ummah, and the inability of its political leaders to come to a consensus 
sapped the party of its political strength and doomed it to failure in the face of 
increasingly hostile opposition.    
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Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis have said that emerging democracies are 
almost always intrinsically fragile (1996, p. 1).  Indonesias nascent democracy was no 
exception to this rule.  The provisional parliament of 1950-1957 provided representation 
from across the entire spectrum of Indonesian diversity, but because almost none of the 
political parties were truly national parties they tended to represent very narrow 
constituencies.  Masyumi, which began as the only truly national party, rested on a very 
unstable alliance between traditionalist and modernist Muslim organizations, the most 
prominent of which were Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama.  Masyumis 
organizational leadership was in a near constant state of flux as various factions contested 
for control over the partys leadership council and its agenda.  Modernists generally 
resented the traditionalists control over the organization during the period of the 
Japanese occupation, and the traditionalists likewise became increasingly bitter as they 
became sidelined in the wake of the modernists rise after Japans surrender.   
The vast disparity in the experiences, perspectives and ambitions of these two 
groups made their alliance difficult even under the best of circumstances, but the inability 
(or unwillingness) of their leaders to seek compromises by which to hold the party 
together in the face of secularist hostility was remarkable.  The decision by Masyumis 
modernist-dominated executive council to appoint its own favorite to the post of Minister 
of Religion in February 1952 was perceived as simply the most egregious of a long list of 
insults against the leadership of the Nahdatul Ulama.  The Nahdatul Ulamas leadership 
was already chafing as a result of what they perceived as the slow marginalization of 
their influence within the party, but depriving of them of their one source of bureaucratic 
patronage was an unforgivable insult (Barton & Fealy, 1996, pp. 22-23).  The modernist 
wing under Mohammad Natsir may have had good, practical reasons for wanting to make 
the change, but their collective failure to see the ramifications of this action was 
catastrophic for the partys unity.   
The slow, but steady, alienation of Masyumis traditionalist elements by its 
modernist leaders culminated in the disaffiliation of Nahdatul Ulama from Masyumi, and 
with one fell swoop turned Masyumi from a national party into one thats support came 
mainly from the seberang (outer islands) and West Java.  The 1955 general elections 
aptly illustrated the extent not only ethnic-regional cleavages, but also the persistence of 
socio-religious divisions (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, p. 101).  Because the seat of 
government power was located in Jakarta and the levers of government were controlled 
primarily by the Javanese, Masyumis constituency, and thus Masyumi itself, was put at a 
distinct disadvantage by this development.     
While the issue of whether Indonesia would remain a secular state or become one 
based on Islamic principles would continue to dominate the political discourse, the real 
issues that separated Masyumi from the opposition parties were primarily economic.  
Both the modernist and traditionalist elements of Masyumi were generally in agreement 
on the proposition that Islam should play a significant role in shaping the character, if not 
the institutions of the state, but they differed greatly when discussions turned toward 
economic matters.  In these mattes, Nahdatul Ulamas predominately ethnic-Javanese 
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leadership had much more in common with their fellow Javanese-dominated parties, 
especially the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party PNI).   
Because of the exploitative nature of the economic relationship between the 
Javanese and the seberang, the latter would grow increasingly resentful of the dominance 
of the former.  With the withdrawal of Nahdatul Ulama from its ranks, Masyumi became 
almost exclusively identified with seberang interests.   Conversely, the Javanese political 
parties would seek common ground amongst themselves in order to maintain an 
economic relationship that preserved their hegemonic influence, while taking measures to 
marginalize an opposition that had the potential to jeopardize the status quo.  The 
collapse of the economic situation in Indonesia following the end of the Korean War 
boom put further stress on this relationship and worsened relations between the center 
and the seberang to an even greater extent than ever before.  Within a matter of years, 
dissatisfaction in the seberang blossomed into full rebellion as regional military leaders 
joined with local politicians to contest with the central government for greater economic 
and political autonomy.  Masyumi inevitably became entangled in these uprisings and 
suffered the consequences of their failures (Federspiel, 1973, p. 409). 
The results of the elections of 1955 also dealt a severe blow to Masyumi, not only 
by marginalizing its most important political ally, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia 
(Indonesian Socialist Party PSI), but also by obviating the softness of its support in 
the Javanese heartland.  The conventional wisdom that had predicted a Masyumi 
landslide victory was proven grossly overestimated and the opposition parties that had for 
so long feared the inevitability of Masyumi dominance became emboldened.  In 
particular, the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party PKI), which 
had achieved tremendous success winning votes throughout Java and parts of Sumatra, 
began to agitate for greater recognition of its now-demonstrated political clout.  The PKI 
had contributed significantly to the wave of campaign attacks on Masyumi, painting it as 
an extremist and exclusionary organization out of touch with average Indonesians.  In 
truth, Masyumis staunch unwillingness to divorce itself ideologically from the Darul 
Islam movements in West Java and Aceh did little to assuage these fears among more-
secular inclined Indonesians.            
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In addition to the complex dynamics within the immediate sphere of the political 
parties, Masyumis inability to maintain positive relationships with extra-parliamentary 
forces, especially with the presidency and the army, also bear some of the responsibility 
for its fall.  If indeed the institutions of Indonesian politics formed a triangle with the 
parties at its apex, then the army and the presidency formed the other two critical points.    
President Sukarno had never been an avid supporter of Masyumi.  During the 
deliberations of the Badan Pĕnyĕlidik Usaha Pĕrsiapan Kĕmĕrdekaan Indonesia 
(Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence  
BPUKI), he had stood firm against Masyumis efforts to make Indonesia an Islamic state.  
His pressuring of the Muslim leaders to excise the Jakarta Charter from the 1945 
Constitution on the morn of independence cast a pall of bitterness over their subsequent 
relations.  Relations were further strained by the divergence in their visions over the 
direction of the Indonesian revolution.  For Masyumi, that event was complete by 1950, 
and the time had come to settle in for the business of nation building.  For that effort to 
succeed, however, Indonesia needed foreign investment, and foreign investment would 
only come if the West developed confidence in the stability of Indonesias political, 
judicial and security institutions.  Conversely, Sukarno believed that the revolution had 
not yet reached its culmination point (Feith & Castles, 1970, pp. 111-116).  For him, the 
struggle was an ongoing one to erase the last remaining vestiges of colonial domination, 
and those who sought to extend the hand of friendship to their former oppressors were 
traitors to the cause.  The fact that Masyumi was perhaps one of the most pro-West of all 
of the parties in the spectrum of Indonesian politics certainly did not serve to endear it to 
Sukarno.    
Ultimately, Masyumi became the biggest obstacle to Sukarnos efforts to 
refashion the Indonesian political apparatus to one more suited to his personal tastes.  
With the aid of the army and the other main political parties, the President succeeded in 
jettisoning the western-style, liberal-democratic constitution of 1950, and replacing it 
with the 1945 Constitution, which gave him strong executive powers and legitimized his 
concept of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy).  Masyumis efforts to stave off 
these efforts were ineffectual because by that point, they had become politically 
irrelevant.   
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The Indonesian armys complicity in the subversion of the democratic process 
was pivotal not only to Sukarnos success, but also to the fall of Masyumi (Lev, 1963, p. 
355).  In the past, the army leadership, especially General A.H. Nasution, had stood by 
Masyumi, but in the wake of Masyumi-supported regional unrest and political bickering 
in the parliament, they had lost faith in the parliamentary process.  The softening of the 
economy, rampant corruption, and regional unrest, all of which were made worse by the 
instability of a string of ineffectual cabinets, served to de-legitimatize the entire system of 
government in Nasutions mind.  Following his return to the post of Army Chief of Staff 
in 1955, Nasution began to move closer towards Sukarnos views, and by 1957 he was 
openly expressing the need to complete the unfinished revolution (Penders & 
Sundhaussen, 1985, pp. 106-108).  The narrowing of Nasutions and Sukarnos visions 
for Indonesia deprived Masyumi of its last powerful ally, and weakened it considerably.  
The progressive isolation of Masyumi as its allies abandoned it one by one throughout the 
1950s weakened it to the point where it was unable to effectively respond to Sukarnos 
assault on parliamentary democracy.   
Chapter IV provides a detailed analysis of these political relationships and 
describes how they helped shape the events that contributed to Masyumis decline 
throughout the 1950s.  An understanding of these dynamics, and how Masyumi interacted 
not only with its own political allies, but also with the parliamentary opposition, the 
army, and the President, remains essential for understanding the ebb and flow of their 
political alliances in a period of rapid and unpredictable transformation.  Lessons gleaned 
from this analysis can help interested parties develop a more nuanced picture of the 
myriad reasons for the collapse of political Islams influence during the transition from 
the Orde Lama to the Orde Baru.  In a contemporary context, those lessons can also help 
clarify the relationship between modern, post-reformasi Indonesian voters and those new 
Islamic parties that have emerged since 1999.   
The potential for the development of a powerful Islamic alternative to the secular 
political parties perhaps hinges less on the conventional wisdom, which in the past has 
postulated an inherent incongruence between religion and politics in Indonesian society, 
than it does on the ability of the various factions under the umbrella of Islam to find and 
maintain common ground.  As a consequence of my research, I argue in the text below 
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that Islamic politics in Indonesia is far less inherently constrained by innate societal 
preferences than might be presumed from a cursory review of the few electoral 
precedents to date.  Indonesians have historically rejected political Islam not because of a 
pervasive cultural disaffinity, but rather because Islam has yet failed to offer a 
compelling, well-defined alternative to the secular model.  Despite past rejections, I 
believe that Indonesians remain intellectually and emotionally open to the idea of a 
greater role for Islam in shaping the political discourse.  The failure of the secular parties 
to effectively solve the nations most pressing problems since 1999 merely amplifies the 
attraction for an alternative model.  The natural extension of this conclusion compels 
observers to be more circumspect in quickly dismissing the potential future electoral 
success of the many Islamic parties that have emerged in the wake of Suhartos fall.   
The Islamic parties heading into the 2004 general elections have many difficult 
challenges before them, but none of these are insurmountable.  Their collective success or 
failure will be in great part dependent on their ability to adapt to the exigencies of the 
domestic and international political environment in a manner that politically unifies, 
rather than alienates the Indonesian ummah.  Indonesias Muslim leaders would do well 
to study the history of Masyumi in the era of the provisional parliament, if for no other 
reason than to identify and avoid those same pitfalls that had led to the failure of their 
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN INDONESIA 
PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Of all of the political forces at play in post-independence Indonesia, those with 
distinctly Islamic origins have perhaps the deepest roots.  With a presence in island 
Southeast Asia reaching back to at least the early 13th century, Islam had established a 
foothold in the region long before the first Christian Europeans arrived in force in 1511.  
The establishment of trading routes throughout the early centuries of the second-
millennium A.D., and the intermarriage and settlement of Arab, Chinese, and Indian 
Muslim traders in the various ports of call along these routes, accelerated the adoption of 
the Islamic faith among the native populations.  Eventually, pesantren (religious 
boarding schools) were established to educate the children in these emerging Muslim 
communities, and the success of these institutions further hastened Islams expansion.  In 
areas largely unaffected by the trading impulse, itinerant Sufi missionaries proselytized 
on behalf of their orders, often finding receptive students in the Hindu-Buddhist villages 
of the interior.  By the end of WWII, Indonesia had a population of almost 80 million 
people, of which nearly 90 percent identified themselves as Muslims (Van der Kroef, 
1953, p. 121).  In Indonesias fertile soil, the seed of Islam had taken root and flourished.    
Regardless of the exact means of Islams florescence, within the course of a few 
centuries it had become firmly entrenched as the dominant cultural and religious 
framework throughout the coastal regions.  With the conversion of the Mataram Sultanate 
in the 17th century, Islam eventually expanded beyond its coastal enclaves to also 
become an important social and political feature of the interior regions as well.  Today 
Indonesia is predominately Muslim, though very small pockets of Christians, Confucians 
and animists still thrive.  Yet with some 90% of its population professing the Islamic 
faith, one might reasonably expect that religion above all else would serve as the 
culturally and politically unifying force par excellence.  The truth, however, is far 
different, and this chapter will explain why. 
To say that the Indonesia of today is roughly 90% Muslim, though statistically 
correct, is to miss the complexity that underlies the demographics.  In reality, Indonesias 
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Muslim community is as diverse as any other, and perhaps even more so.  Before 
independence, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) was a disparate collection of regencies, 
sultanates, and kingdoms with the full spectrum of ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
economic variations appropriate to a swath of territory that encompasses well over 
740,000 square miles.  Although the struggle for independence helped graft the idea of 
Indonesia atop a seething cauldron of stark ethic differences, such simple political 
sloganeering could not simply erase centuries of divergent development.   The diversity 
of Indonesian Islam is a case in point, and its study is all the more important if we are to 
understand its failure to transform itself from a widespread cultural phenomenon into a 
commensurately powerful political one.  As noted anthropologist Clifford Geertz once 
opined, ...much variation in ritual, contrast in belief, and conflict in values lie concealed 
behind the simple statement that Java is more than 90 per cent Moslem. (1960, p. 7).  
This commentary on Javanese society can be applied to the whole of Indonesia without 
altering the tenor of Geertzs caution. 
This chapter will trace the development of Indonesian Islam as a social and 
political force from its introduction, until the dawn of full independence in December 
1949.  The objective is not to provide a history lesson for historys sake.  Rather, this 
chapter seeks to identify the key events that have contributed to Indonesian Islams 
fragmentation over the centuries, and to draw out the causes that have contributed to the 
failure of Muslim political parties, especially Masyumi, to rise to the challenge of 
leadership in the post-independence era.  
 
B. THE IMPACT OF ISLAM ON SOCIETY IN MARITIME SOUTHEAST 
ASIA 
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Centuries of relatively unimpeded Islamic expansion in maritime Southeast Asia 
eventually gave rise to a bifurcating trend in the maturation of the regions Islamic 
societies.  As Islam inevitably collided with various other cultural traditions within the 
archipelago, it either replaced them entirely, or else it subsumed those existing pre-
Islamic beliefs and practices that people were unwilling to discard.  Consequently, a 
gradual process of replacement and syncretism produced two distinct socio-cultural 
strains within the first few centuries of Islams arrival.  In his seminal anthropological 
analysis of society in the east central Javanese village of Modjokuto, The Religion of 
Java (1960), Geertz presents the three categories of santri, abangan and priyayi to 
describe what he believes are the three fundamental Javanese socio-cultural divisions that 
have developed as a result of the shaping dynamics of both domestic and international 
forces on the process of Islamization.   
Leaving discussion of the priyayi aside for the time being, this section 
concentrates on the other two divisions, the santri and abangan aliran (socio-cultural 
streams).  Together these two streams describe the two fundamental worldviews of 
Indonesian religious thought that had emerged as a result of the different ways in which 
Islam was introduced and assimilated into different communal pockets in maritime 
Southeast Asia.  Although Newland has recently criticized Geertzs model for failing to 
adequately describe the nuanced complexity of the contemporary Indonesian social 
landscape, his ideas continue to provide a valuable model for understanding the origins of 
important cleavages in modern Indonesian politics (2000, pp. 1-3).  Geertz warns us, 
however, that the lines between these categories are not always distinct (1960, pp. 5-7).  
Crossover between the various aliran can and do occur, further complicating 
generalizations concerning the contours of Indonesias political landscape. 
 
1. Abangan 
The abangan variant is most often associated with the villages of the interior 
regions of Java where exposure to orthodox Islam had by virtue of their remoteness been 
very limited in the early years of Islamization, and thus imperfectly assimilated.  The 
populations of inland communities such as these often developed hydraulic bureaucracies 
that were heavily dependant on irrigation-intensive wet rice agriculture, rather than on 
trade with the outside world.  As a consequence of the relative infrequency of contact 
with the Muslim traders who plied the coastal regions, these societies were left to 
synchretize what they learned of the Islamic faith in ways that accommodated their long-
held Hindu-Buddhist traditions and practices.   
Formal exposure to Islam likely came via itinerant Sufi mystics who passed 
through the area, and who occasionally took up positions in court circles (Ricklefs, 1993, 
p. 5).  The mystical teachings of the Sufi tarekats, more so than the fundamentals of 
Islams five pillars, likely found a receptive audience in those who already had a 
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background in Buddhist and Brahmanical thought.  Yet with little reason to tow the line 
of religious orthodoxy more characteristic of coastal entrepôt societies, the Islamic 
practice of the interior domains retained a deeply ingrained amalgam of spirit beliefs, 
rituals, and mystical thought that most orthodox Muslims today find distasteful, if not 
heretical.    
 Indonesians within the abangan aliran have historically been an integral part of 
the agrarian economies of the densely populated, rice-producing regions of the interior 
regions of Java.  In later years, they would also become essential labor for the Javanese 
and Sumatran plantation economies of the Dutch colonial administrations of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries.  Although this substratum of Indonesian society continues to 
remain a predominately rural and Javanese phenomenon, the sheer size of Javas 
population ensures that the abangan have wielded tremendous political power by virtue 
of their numbers alone.  Geertz, however, is clear in cautioning that not all rural Javanese 
peasants follow abangan norms, and that due to population trends that began in the early 
20th century, significant numbers of abangan can also now be found in urban areas 
(1960, p. 5).  
Feith has ascribed the peculiar political weltanschauung of the abangan aliran to a 
combination of factors, including a state organization born of the constraints of a wet-rice 
agricultural economy, shallow Islamization, and the eventual long-term impact of the 
Dutch colonial occupation (1962, p. 31).  The Javanese-aristocratic political culture 
that emerged from the convergence of these factors produced what he further notes as an 
abiding contempt of entrepreneurship and a tendency towards secularism.  In the late 
colonial era, this distinctly abangan view of society, politics and economics would 
become identified with secular nationalist and the Marxist movements. 
 
2. Santri 
In contrast to the abangan, the santri are known for not only a careful and 
regular execution of the basic rituals of Islam  the prayers, the fasts, the pilgrimages  
but also of a whole complex of social, charitable, and political Islamic organizations. 
(Geertz, 1960, p. 6).  The strict dogmatic practice of Islam, as opposed to the abangans 
loosely composed amalgam of Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, Sufi, and animist traditions, is 
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what predominately concerns the typical santri.  The word santri itself is derived from 
the Javanese word for a student of Islam, and unlike the abangan, whose social 
organization revolves around the immediate household, the focus of the santri is upon the 
entire ummah (Islamic community) with its locus at the village mosque (Geertz, 1960,  
p. 128).   
Santri influence has historically dominated in those regions where direct contact 
with Muslim trading influences was sustained and recurrent, such as along the eastern 
and northern coasts of Sumatra, in the outer islands, and along the northern and western 
coasts of Java.  For that reason, the Santri have traditionally been associated with the 
merchant populations of the coastal entrepôts and port cities.  The development of the 
santri weltanschauung, described by Feith as Islamic-entrepreneurial, was shaped in 
large part by a process of thorough and sustained Islamization that was subjected to a 
relatively light European counter-influence (1962, p. 32).  The nature of the 
predominately entrepreneurial economies of the coastal regions, as opposed to the largely 
agricultural economies of the interior, fostered in the santri a healthy respect for 
merchant activities.  As a result, until the late 19th century, santri tended to be almost 
exclusively associated with commerce. 
According to Feith, the santri also tended to display much less anti-Dutch 
sentiment, and considering the light impact of the colonial establishment on much of the 
santri-dominated regions in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, this is not entirely surprising 
attitude (1962, p. 32).  From 1830 to the 1860s, the Dutch colonial policy of 
cultuurstelsel (cultivation), essentially a program of forced cultivation, was particularly 
onerous on those coffee, sugar, rice and indigo producing areas largely populated by 
abangan, however it left santri populations generally unaffected (Ricklefs, 1993, pp.  
119-124).        
Despite being heavily concentrated in the coastal areas, over the course of 
centuries a sizable santri presence also developed in the interior.  Geertz has noted that 
the strongest santri elements in many villages centers around those wealthy merchants 
and landowners who had been able to make the Haj to Mecca, and who later returned to 
establish pesantren in their communities (1960, p. 6).  The expansion of pesantren 
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networks as graduates moved on to establish their own schools further spread santri 
influence into the interior regions.   
Any over-simplification of abangan and santri divisions using geographic or 
employment characteristics alone can be misleading, because since the late 19th century 
the merchant class has no longer been exclusively santri, nor are the abangan a 
predominately rural agrarian phenomenon.  Urbanization and transmigration trends of the 
early 20th century have shifted populations to the point where santri and abangan are not 
as geographically segregated as they once were.  In many abangan dominated villages 
and towns it is not usual today to find a kampung kauman (place of the pious) where 
the santri reside. 
 
3. Priyayi 
Geertz also noted the existence of a third aliran, that of the priyayi, although this 
social grouping had begun to exert less and less influence as the colonial era receded into 
memory.  The priyayi were the hereditary and/or bureaucratic aristocracy that had been 
co-opted by the Dutch during the era of colonial administration, especially after the 
collapse of the Mataram Sultanate in the mid-18th century.  The power and prerogatives 
of this hereditary aristocracy increasingly came to be dependent upon the patronage of a 
colonial administration that kept the native elites on a very short leash.  In the absence of 
any real power within their domains, the priyayi tended to turn inward, concentrating 
their energies on the refinement and preservation of their Javanese court traditions 
(Crouch, 1980, p. 40).   
During the later era of the Dutch colonial administration, and particularly during 
the implementation of the Ethical Policy of the early 20th century, the aristocratic elites 
were slowly replaced by a new variation of priyayi whose origins were to be found in a 
growing bureaucracy of western-educated, native Indonesians in the service of the Dutch.  
By and large, the younger priyayi often proved to be the most bureaucratized, 
secularized, westernized, and anti-traditional of all of three segments of Indonesian 
society (Geertz, 1960, p. 6).  The priyayis close and rather self-serving relationship with 
the oppressive and much-detested colonial regime helped reinforce the particularly 
unfavorable image that many of the abangan and santri populations had of them.     
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Geertz describes the priyayi as a distinct socio-political aliran, but other scholars 
have taken issue with this opinion (Newland, 2000, p. 1).  Much of this criticism centers 
on the observation that both the abangan and santri were also frequently represented in 
the ranks of the priyayi establishment, particularly in the later years of the Dutch colonial 
bureaucracy.  Regardless, the priyayi distinction remained an important one during the 
decades leading up to independence because of the pivotal role played by the younger 
generation of western-educated priyayi bureaucrats in establishing the secular-nationalist 
movements of the 1920s and 1930s.  After the dislodging of the Dutch regime in 1949, 
the priyayi distinction became increasingly irrelevant in Indonesian politics. 
 
C. THE ISLAMIC AWAKENING 
From its first penetration into island Southeast Asia, Islam had always had a 
tendency to exhibit distinctly political overtones.  By the dawn of the 17th century it had 
not only supplanted other deeply-ingrained traditions to become the dominant cultural 
and religious framework in the region, but it had also become widely embraced as the 
official state religion of many of the entrepôts and coastal kingdoms along the trade 
routes.  Within a century, it had also moved inland to displace the entrenched Hindu-
Buddhist cosmology upon which the rulers of the great kingdoms of Srivijaya, Majapahit 
and Mataram had for centuries traditionally based their legitimacy.  Yet, in spite of its 
latent potential to become a unifying force among the disparate sultanates and kingdoms 
of the archipelago, particularly in the face of an increasingly hostile European presence, 
the idea of a greater Islamic ummah encompassing peoples beyond the rulers immediate 
domains never really took hold.  It would take the Islamic reform efforts of the 19th 
century to produce Indonesias first proto-nationalistic, Islamic political movements.  
Almost from the very beginning of Islams flowering in island Southeast Asia, 
local-born Muslims endeavored to make the arduous pilgrimage to the holy sites and 
centers of learning associated with Islams birthplace.  The eventual arrival of both the 
Portuguese and the Spanish in the 16th century, and shortly thereafter the Dutch and 
English, served only to encourage an even closer relationship between Southeast Asias 
emerging Muslim-dominated states and the international Islamic community.  By the 16th 
century, the Sultanate of Aceh on Sumatras northern coast had become widely known as 
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the Veranda of Mecca because of the large number of vessels leaving its ports for the 
commercial centers of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea (Reid, 1993, p. 144).  Yet, 
despite Aceh perhaps being better known than other areas of Sumatra, Malaya and Java 
for its role in nurturing the development of orthodox Islam during these years, the 
Minangkabau kingdom of central western Sumatra proved to be the catalyst for a reform 
movement that was ultimately to have a profound political impact across the entire 
archipelago. 
 
1. The Padri Movement (1803-1838) 
The Padri Movement, which began as an internal socio-economic conflict 
between santri and priyayi (penghulu) elements of Minangkabau society, had profound, 
long-reaching consequences for the subsequent development of Indonesian Islamic 
thought throughout the entire region.  More importantly, it sparked the beginning of 
Islams transformation from a cultural, educational and social force into a political force 
as well.  Historian A.H. Johns has called the Padri Movement the watershed of the 
Islamic modernist movement in Indonesia. (Reid, 1967, p. 272).  What had begun as a 
relatively localized conflict over the apportionment of economic resources among 
factions of Minangkabau society rapidly escalated into religious-based warfare, and then 
into an anti-colonial uprising that would shake the Dutch colonial administration to its 
core, and confirm its emerging suspicions of the potential danger of political Islam.   
The Padri movement itself takes its name from Orang Pidari (men of Pĕdir), 
a nickname given to Muslim pilgrims who had begun the Haj from the Achenese port of 
Pĕdir (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 141).  The main leaders of this movement had been influenced 
by events they witnessed while undertaking the Haj pilgrimage in the aftermath of 'Abd 
al-'Aziz Is capture of the Hejaz (holy cities of Islam) under the banner of Wahhabism 
in the late 18th century, and the later expansion of the Saudi dominion in the early 
decades of the 19th century under his son, Saud I. 
The Wahhabi movement was founded by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-
92) in the Najd region of central Arabia.  Abd al-Wahhab traced the roots of the 
divisiveness and political frailty that had plagued and weakened the ummah to the 
compromise of fundamental Islamic values.  Consequently, his movement sought to 
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purge the ummah of all bidah (heterodox religious beliefs or practices) in order to 
restore the Islamic faith to its original grandeur and purity.  In a return to the 
fundamentals, his followers would usher in the re-emergence of a renewed Islamic 
community.  In the reformist theology of the al-Muwahhidun ("unitarians"), as the 
followers of Abd al-Wahhab styled themselves, the returning Minangkabau Hajis 
(pilgrims who have completed the Haj) recognized a means to remedy the pre-Islamic 
and Sufi accretions that had crept into native Islamic practice, had sullied its purity, and 
corrupted its leadership.  They may not have been Wahhabis in the strictest sense, but 
they certainly drew inspiration from Wahhabs message (Reid, 1967, p. 272).   
Although subsequent generations have characterized the Padri Movement as 
essentially a war between the supporters of adat (customary law) and those who 
supported the primacy of the Sharia (religious law), the divisions were often much 
more complex and ambiguous (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 141).  Often, the conflict was not 
particularly idealistic, having taken on the nature of intra-desa (village) warfare over 
economics and political power rather than one steeped in religious principles (Taufik, 
2002, p. 1).  Despite the ambiguity of its seed causes, the relatively egalitarian ideas of 
the Padri leaders quickly proved to be attractive to many of the poorer highland villages, 
and the hills surrounding the penghulu domains rapidly came almost entirely under Padri 
control.   
As parts of the Minangkabau kingdom fell to the Padri forces in rapid succession, 
the remaining penghulu aristocracy appealed in desperation to the Dutch for protection.  
Having just returned to the important Sumatran coastal trading port of Padang following 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch colonial administration became alarmed that 
the Padri Movement had the potential to compromise Hollands vast economic interests 
in Western Sumatra.  This concern was further heightened by the close proximity of the 
hostile Islamic Sultanate of Aceh, and the possibility that it would seek to take advantage 
of any possible Dutch misfortune.  Consequently, Dutch forces moved rapidly to 
undercut the Padris progress, and in 1821 they negotiated a treaty with the penghulu that 
ceded much of the Minangkabau kingdom in exchange for further Dutch protection of the 
royal court.  The war was finally brought to its conclusion in 1837 with the capture and 
exile of the Padris senior leader, Tuanku Imam Bonjol.  With the removal of its 
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charismatic leader, the Padri Movement was finally shattered, and the Minangkabau 
kingdom was ultimately subdued and absorbed into the Dutch colonial sphere.   
Besides the obvious military and economic costs, the Padri Movement had a 
rather substantial impact on Dutch colonial policies throughout the entire Netherlands 
East Indies (NEI).  As a result of the Dutch colonial administrations deepening 
suspicions regarding the political unreliability of the native aristocracy they imposed a 
Javanese model of secularized-bureaucratized administration upon the penghulu that 
stripped them of any remaining autonomy.  Similarly because of Dutch sensitivity to the 
potentially de-stabilizing nature of Islam as a political force, they encouraged (and in 
some cases enforced) reliance on the use of customary adat, while actively discouraging 
recourse to Sharia.  The effect of these policies was to create artificial distinctions that 
further marginalized the remaining penghulu and isolated religious leaders from further 
influence in the administrative bureaucracy (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 142).  Efforts to reinforce 
the division between secular adat and Islam often proved counter-productive, and they 
ultimately contributed to the erosion in the perceived legitimacy of any political or 
religious leaders associated with the colonial administration (Taufik, 2002, p. 2).   
Instead of insulating society from Islam, Dutch policies inadvertently pushed 
Islams center of gravity to the village level where the ulama (religious scholars) 
became even more involved in every aspect of society and education.  Although the 
priyayi exercised authority in the name of the colonial establishment, religious leaders 
typically exercised the real authority for many villagers.  In 1889, the Dutch relented 
slightly on their draconian repression of Islam by implementing what Heffner has 
referred to as the "crown jewel" of their colonial policy (2000, p. 32).  At the urging of 
one of the most renowned European Islamic scholars of the period, Dr. Christian Snouck-
Hurgronjie, the Dutch relaxed controls on Islam with the intent of encouraging the 
flowering of "cultural" Islam, while they simultaneously stepped up efforts to suppress 
further manifestations of "political" Islam.  Such efforts were doomed to fail because of 
the Islamic belief in tawhīd (the unity of God), which rejects human attempts to 
distinguish between secular and religious aspects of life.  Dutch efforts did, however, 
serve to encourage a trend of polarization among religious leaders.  Some Muslim leaders 
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were willing to abide by enforced distinctions between "cultural" and "political" Islam, 
while others were more apt to challenge them. 
Following the Padri uprising, and the even more costly war to subdue the 
Achenese Sultanate (1873-1903), the NEI government attempted to severely curtail travel 
to Egypt and Arabia in the hopes of further insulating Indonesian Muslims from the 
reformist and Pan-Islamic movements beginning to emerge in the centers of Islamic 
scholarship.  Despite Dutch efforts to limit the number of Indonesians making the Haj, 
many still continued to make the arduous voyage.  By the end of the 19th century, the 
relaxation of pilgrimage controls, combined with the increasing availability of steam-
powered maritime transportation and the opening up of the Suez Canal in 1869, ensured 
that many more Indonesians would be able to study in Cairo and Mecca (Von der 
Mehden, 1993, p. 3).  Consequently, in the last three decades of that century, Indonesian 
pilgrims accounted for nearly 15% of the total overseas pilgrims visiting the Hejaz (Reid, 
1967, p. 269).  According to Snouck-Hurgronjie, the Indonesian enclave in the 1880s was 
by far the largest and most dynamic in the city (Geertz, 1960, p. 125).  Ricklefs estimates 
that the number of pilgrims who traveled from Indonesia to the Hejaz grew from around 
1,600 annually in the 1850s to upwards of 7,000 by the turn of the century (1993, p. 130).   
Von der Mehden writes that the number grew to in excess of 120,000 by the late 1920s 
(1993, p. 4).     
The experience of the pilgrimage during these years made a substantial impact on 
many of the Indonesian Islamic scholars who would subsequently return to their 
homeland to teach.  For the first time since perhaps the early period of the Southeast 
Asian Islamic kingdoms when Melaka, Aceh and Johor had formed close relationships 
with the Ottoman Empire, Indonesian Muslims began to feel like they were again part of 
a larger Islamic community that was equal in grandeur and accomplishment to any 
western power.  Some Indonesian Islamic scholars returned home with more than just a 
renewed sense of larger purpose and self-worth, for some had inevitably fallen under the 
sway of prominent Islamic teachers who espoused modernist interpretations of Islam that 
seemed to provide the solution to Indonesias problems.  Where the Padri had failed in 
their quest to reform the ummah by violence, others would in turn succeed by working 
within the Dutch proscriptions against political Islam. 
25 
D. THE INTRODUCTION OF ISLAMIC REFORMIST THOUGHT INTO 
THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES 
During the 19th Century and early 20th century, thousands of Indonesians visited 
and studied in the Hejaz, Cairo, Yemen, and Istanbul.  By the 19th century Indonesia had 
already produced a small cadre of Islamic scholars of international caliber in residence in 
Mecca and Cairo (Dhofier, 1999, p. 64).  As noted above, Dr. Snouck-Hurgronjie had 
described Meccas Indonesian enclave in the late 19th century as one of the largest and 
most dynamic in the city, and many of these scholars were at its center. 
For the most part, those scholars whom Indonesians came to study under taught 
relatively orthodox and conservative views of Islam.  Shaykh Ahmad Khatib Sambas, 
who was a native of Kalimantan, had moved to Mecca in the early 19th century, and 
eventually became one of the most well-known of the resident Indonesian ulama.  He 
was particularly influential in his efforts to integrate the Qadiriyya and Naqshabandiyya 
tarekat orders under the umbrella of a new Sufi order, the tarekat Qadiriyya wal 
Naqshabandiyya, which would eventually become the single most important Sufi 
throughout Java (Dhofier, 1999, p. 64).   
Most of the important traditionalist scholars of the later 19th and early 20th 
centuries had studied within Shaykh Ahmad Khatib Sambas circle of students at one 
time or another.  Many eventually went on to become prominent scholars in their own 
right, though perhaps none would have as important an impact in Indonesia as Kyai Haji 
Muhammad Hashim Ash`ari, the resident kyai of the Tebuireng pesantren in Central 
Java.  He studied under one of Khatib Sambas most influential students, Shaykh al-
Nawawi al-Jawi al-Bantani al-Tanari before returning home to Java to eventually found 
the Nahdatul Ulama (Renaissance of Islamic Scholars) in 1926.   
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Another prominent Indonesian scholar, Shaykh Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabau, 
an imām (prayer leader) at the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, was particularly influential 
on those Indonesian hajis of a less conservative bent.  As a native of Minangkabau, he 
had exerted tremendous influence over those Indonesian scholars who came to study 
under him.  Most of his students came from Sumatra, and they tended to be much more 
open than their Javanese cousins to the theological and ideological reformist ideas then 
beginning to percolate in both Cairo and Mecca (Dhofier, 1999, p. 73).  Shaykh Ahmad 
Khatib al-Minangkabau was himself firmly opposed to the tarekat practices so prevalent 
on Java, and he likewise encouraged his students to undertake idjtihad, the process of 
reading and analyzing the scriptures for oneself in order to apply them to the 
contemporary world.  He re-ignited the old Padri debate over the incompatibility of 
secular adat and the Sharia, and he encouraged the younger generation of Indonesian 
Muslims to re-examine their cultural, social, and political milieu in light of modernist 
Islamic teachings.   
Many of Ahmad Khatibs students went on to study the teachings of prominent 
Islamic reformers, such as Muhammad Abduh of Cairos al-Azhar University, the 
Iranian-born scholar Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and the Indian scholars Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan, Sayyid Amir Ali and Mohammad Iqbal (Benda, 1958, p. 46).  Upon returning 
home, these students would occasionally challenge the traditional authority and prestige 
of the local kyai (religious teacher), and in doing so they inevitably introduced tension 
in the ummah (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 130).  This tension would eventually produce the 
modernist-traditionalist schism that has become the defining characteristic of 20th 
century Indonesian Islam. 
One of Ahmad Khatibs students, Shaykh Tahir bin Jaluddin, went on in 1906 to 
found the first Islamic paper in Southeast Asia, the al-Imam (The Religious Leader) 
(Ricklefs, 1993, p. 169).  In 1910, a respected Minangkabau religious leader by the name 
of Haji Abdullah Ahmad followed suit and established the first locally-published 
modernist periodical, the al-Munir (The Illuminative) (Van Niel, 1980, p. 121).  Based 
in Padang, this Malay-language newspaper became widely available throughout much of 
the western archipelago, and it consequently fed the intellectual and religious hunger of a 
younger generation of Muslim students looking to discover the means to overcome the 
dialectic between preserving their faith and modernizing their communities.  Ahmad also 
went on to establish Padangs Adabiyah School, the first modernist Islamic school in the 
NEI.  Out of this schools initial crop of graduates was borne the first modernist Islamic 
movement of 20th century Indonesia, the kaum muda (young group). 
Working within the framework of contemporary, yet faithful interpretations of the 
Quran and Hadith, the kaum muda sought to develop modernist Islamic solutions to 
inconsistencies that existed between the sharia and the customary social and legal system 
of adat.  As a result of growing tensions between the kaum muda, who were 
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predominately Sumatran, and the kaum tua ("old group"), comprised mostly of 
conservative Javanese ulama, an ideological and theological schism developed that 
would eventually take on profound political overtones.  Both the kaum muda and kaum 
tua provided the roots for the factions that are today typically characterized as the 
modernist and traditionalist camps of Indonesian Islamic thought.  The mass 
movements that sprang from these factions in the first decades of the 20th century further 
widened the divide between the modernist camp and that of the traditionalists, and set the 
pattern for an ideological schism that would eventually hamstring Muslim political 
aspirations in the years immediately following Indonesian independence. 
 
E. MODERNIST VS TRADITIONALIST ISLAM: TWO SIDES OF THE 
SAME COIN 
The Islamic reformation that swept through Indonesia in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, and which led to a substantially more pronounced divide between 
adherents of orthodox Islam and those with a more modernist outlook, was not the first of 
it kind to reach the archipelago.  The Islamization of Indonesia has been periodically 
marked by attempts to purify the faith from the accretions of syncretism, bidah, 
ignorance, and heresy.  During the reign of Iskandar Thani (1637-41), Aceh underwent a 
period of reform under the influence of the Indian scholar Nurud-din ar-Raniri.  Ar-Raniri 
sought to expunge the then dominant mystical Sufi teachings of Hamzah Fansuri and 
Sjamsuddin as-Sumatrani that had grown to prominence under Sultan Thanis 
predecessor, Iskandar Muda (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 51).  For the most part, however, earlier 
reformations such as this one were generally limited to specific areas, and they did not 
have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the region.  The reformation of the 19th 
century, however, was perhaps more important than all previous iterations precisely 
because of its impact on the subsequent development of Islam across the entire region.   
This section will summarize the development of modernist Islam in Indonesia 
in the decades immediately preceding the formation of proto-nationalist Islamic mass 
movements of the 20th century.  It will also describe the fundamental characteristics that 
differentiate the modernist movement from the orthodox or traditionalist variant.  An 
examination of the nature of these divergent ideological streams is important for 
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understanding how this split that would eventually erode the spirit of cooperation that 
would briefly unify the ummah throughout the years of revolutionary struggle.   
The traditionalist or orthodox outlook associated with the kaum tua, while not 
disregarding the need for social modernization, is more apt than Islamic modernism to 
place a higher value on the teachings and commentaries of the prominent Islamic scholars 
of past ages.  For the traditionalists, the ideology of ahl al-sunnah wal jamaah (the 
followers of the Prophets tradition and the consensus of the ulama) is what separates 
them from the modernists (Dhofier, 1999, p. 157).  While both camps recognize the 
centrality of the Quran and Hadith to the faith, the traditionalists also study the 
teachings of the madhhab (school of law or thought) associated with the four main 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Safii).  Accordingly, the 
study of scholarly interpretations of the Quran and Hadith accrued from previous 
generations of ulama are considered a fundamental prerequisite for understanding the full 
import of Islam.  As Federspiel notes, Members of this group deny that religious 
principles need review; those principles simply need to be applied. (1995, p. 124).  
Everything that needs to be known has been provided by those who came before, and 
there is no need for further interpretation.  
For the traditionalist, the transmission of knowledge that began with the Prophet, 
and was then passed from the sahabat (companions), to the tabi`in (followers of the 
companions, the al-tabi al-tabi`in (followers of the followers), and onwards through 
successive generations of ulama is critical to ensuring an accurate and faithful 
understanding of Islam in contemporary context (Dhofier, 1999, p. 159).  The concept of 
taqlid (the following of the opinion of authoritative ulama without questioning the basis 
of their arguments) is central to traditionalist scholarship.  This does not mean that 
conservative ulama do not accept the need for the ijtihad, but rather that a firm 
foundation of traditional scholarship must be achieved before one can even begin to 
consider modern interpretations.      
Traditionalists also differ from modernists in their embracing of mystical 
teachings and practices associated with particular Sufi tarekats, (Dhofier, 1999, p. 158).  
Particularly disquieting to modernist Muslims are the traditionalist practices of zuhud 
(asceticism), dhikir (recollection or remembrance of Gods names), and the 
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veneration of keramat (shrines and graves), none of which modernists claim have any 
foundation in either the Quran or Hadith, and are thus at best bidah, and at worst shirik 
(heresy).   
The most important distinction between the two streams of thought, and the one 
that perhaps has had the most influence on the development of their distinct political 
orientations, concerns the relationship between Islam and man in this world, as well as 
the nature and consequences of his actions in it.  Both traditionalists and modernists 
believe in the monotheistic aspect of God, in his Prophet, as well as in the centrality of 
the five pillars of faith (shahada, salat, zakat, haj, and sawm).  Both are in agreement 
concerning the indivisibility of tauhid (oneness of God), as are they in the eventuality 
of the al-ākhirah (the hereafter or afterlife).  Additionally, both share a belief in takdir 
(divine determinism) and kadar (the omnipotent power of Gods will), but where 
modernists diverge from their traditionalist brethren is over the nature and consequences 
of human free will and the mechanistic nature of Gods justice.  
Modernists generally believe that men are wholly responsible for their own 
decisions and actions on account of iktiyar (free will), and that God will unswervingly 
reward good acts, and punish evil acts according to his immutable law.  For the 
traditionalist Indonesian Muslim, Gods justice is neither deterministic, nor mechanistic.  
While the salvation of man is hindered by his evil acts, and aided by those that are good 
in Gods eyes, it can never be attained simply by ones own exertions.  Similarly, one 
cannot escape the damnation of jahannam (hell) by good works alone.  Mans success 
in this world (and the next) is not determined by his ingenuity, resourcefulness or 
determination, but by Gods will alone.  For the traditionalist, Gods grace is ultimately 
necessary for both worldly success and eventual salvation, but man being man, he is apt 
to forget this, and as a result he will tend to neglect to show appropriate gratitude and 
reverence to his creator (Dhofier, 1999, p. 170).  The performance of rituals and the 
practice of asceticism is simply meant to remind man of his obligation to God, to instill in 
mans mind a constant remembrance of Gods expectations, and to hopefully win Gods 
favor and grace.  In the end, progress in this transitory world will mean nothing come the 
Day of Judgment.  Rather than being life-denying, traditionalists consider themselves 
to be the ultimate pragmatists. 
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In the eyes of the modernist Muslim, traditionalists have tended to be overly 
preoccupied with the afterlife at the expense of not fulfilling the important social 
obligations of this world.  As a result of this compulsiveness with earning Gods grace 
through activities beyond those prescribed by the five pillars, the ummah had declined 
into a state of jahiliyyah  (ignorance) over the centuries, while western civilization had 
progressed.  Only by throwing off the shackles of medieval scholastic obscurantism 
and reformulating Islamic thought in the light of modern thought could Muslim 
civilization ever hope to compete with the western civilization (Benda, 1958, p. 46).  In 
returning to the pure fundamentals of Islam, unencumbered by both superstition and 
hostility to change, Muslims would then become free to adapt what was good about the 
west, while discarding the chaff.  By succeeding materially, Muslims would then also be 
able to better defend their faith against the forces of Christianity and secularism.         
Modernist and traditionalist religious views have never been entirely mutually 
exclusive of each other.  Yet in spite of a raft of commonly shared beliefs and aspirations, 
it has been the differences that have historically been accentuated by both groups.  These 
differences have in large measure shaped how both traditionalists and modernists came to 
approach politics and social activism in the early 20th century, and how they alternately 
succeeded or failed to work together to achieve common goals. 
 
F. INTIAL EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
1. Sarekat Islam 
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The first modern, Islamic mass movement in Indonesia was established in 1911 as 
the Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah (Islamic Mercantile Association).  It was founded in 
Surakarta by Haji Samanhudi as an Indonesian Muslim self-help organization on the 
model of the Jammyat Chair, an Arab-immigrant organization formed in 1905 to advance 
the dual agenda of propagating modernist Islam and protecting Muslim merchants from 
their Chinese competitors.  The Sarekat Dagang Islamiyahs principle purpose was to 
fend off increased foreign competition in batik production, and in this regard, Islam was 
simply a means to differentiate native Indonesians from non-indigenous Chinese 
merchants (Van Niel, 1980, p. 124).  Under the threat of dissolution by the Dutch 
government for its stridently militant, anti-Chinese activities, a new leader was brought in 
1912, the name was shortened to Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), and new bylaws were 
drawn up.  This new leader was Umar Sayed Tjokroaminoto, a santri/priyayi who had 
graduated from the Dutch OSVIA (School for Training Native Administrators), but had 
become disillusioned and left government service.  Although originally wary of the 
Sarekat Islams expansion to other cities, the NEI government eventually relented and 
accorded official recognition to the organizations chapters in 1913 and to its central 
leadership committee in 1915.    
Under Tjokroaminotos aggressive leadership, the Sarekat Islam began to grow, 
opening new chapters, and recruiting eager young Indonesians to its ranks.  The 
organizational bylaws published in September 1912 listed among the Sarekat Islams 
primary objectives as the advancement of the economic interests of indigenous 
Indonesians, charitable work, and spiritual development.  Yet, as a result of the influence 
of Tjokroaminoto and other western-educated modernists at the level of the central 
leadership, the original economic and religious aims of the Sarekat Islam had within the 
span of a few years begun to give way to a more politicized agenda.  By 1918, the 
original core of merchants who had founded the Sarekat Islam had discovered that the 
establishment of independent trade and labor unions was a far more effective vehicle to 
achieve their economic goals, and thus their influence became less and less pronounced 
on the Sarekat Islams message (Von der Mehden, 1958, pp. 338-339).   
Despite rapid membership growth at the village level, the aims of the Sarekat 
Islams central leadership and those of the local chapters were never really in consonance 
(Van Niel, 1980, pp. 125-126).  Villagers tended to view the Sarekat Islam as a means to 
channel their restless energies into a fight against all non-indigenous influences, 
including both the Chinese and the Dutch, whereas the western-educated Sarekat Islam 
leadership was far more accommodating of the need to work with the NEI government 
leadership to effect gradual change.  Although the organization continued to grow 
throughout the first decade of its existence, it rested on an increasingly unstable 
ideological foundation.  Sarekat Islams future seemed bright as the 1920s approached, 
but the introduction of Marxist ideologies into the organization by the Semarang branch 
of Sarekat Islam set the movement on the path to internal dissolution. 
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Marxism had gained a foothold in the NEI as early as 1914 with the founding of 
the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging (Indonesian Social Democratic 
Union), but the movement had soon thereafter split into evolutionary and revolutionary 
factions.  The leader of the radical, revolutionary wing was a young Indo-European by 
the name of H.J.F.M. Sneevliet.  Sneevliet quickly came to view the Sarekat Islam as a 
useful weapon in the class struggle against colonial capitalist groups (Von der Mehden, 
1958, p. 342).  Initially, these Marxists were quite willing to play down any inherent 
incompatibility between Islamic and Marxist ideologies, but over time they became more 
strident in their anti-religious sentiments.  Although the anti-capitalist message of the 
Marxists proved to be a bit too disquieting for the santri merchants who still dominated 
the Sarekat Islams leadership positions, it did tend to resonate favorably with those 
Indonesians in the village chapters, mostly abangan peasants involved in the plantation 
economy or employed as low-wage earners in the burgeoning cities.  As a consequence 
of the rising popularity of this Marxist call to revolutionary action, the Sarekat Islams 
central leadership was forced to increasingly seek compromises between Islam and 
Marxism, and in the process they watered down their Islamic message.  Yet, as the 
Marxists became more demanding and less tolerant of Sarekat Islams fundamentally 
religious theme, a schism became inevitable.               
 The Sarekat Islams third congress, which convened in September 1918, marked 
a significant and ominous shift to the left for the organization as a whole, and most 
notably for the central leadership.  Religion was relegated to the background as calls for 
socialism, revolution and independence began to take the center stage of Sarekat Islams 
platform (Von der Mehden, 1958, p. 343).  For the first time, the Sarekat Islams 
leadership hinted that non-parliamentary means might be necessary to achieve the 
organizations goals.  Shortly thereafter, however, the Sarekat Islams leadership began 
to recognize the danger of their new position: The renewed interest of the NEI 
government in the organizations activities, and losses in membership of those Muslims 
who felt alienated by the Sarekat Islams increasingly secularized slant had begun to 
awaken the old leaderships eyes to the threat to Sarekat Islams future.  In attempting to 
revert back to a more modernist Islamic and evolutionary approach, the senior Sarekat 
Islam leadership set itself on a collision course with the more diehard Marxist elements.   
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By 1920, the radical Marxist factions had reorganized and renamed themselves 
the Perserikatan Kommunis di India (Communist Association in the Indies -PKI), later 
to be changed to the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesia Communist Party -PKI).  As 
their links with the newly established (1919) Communist International (COMINTERN) 
deepened, their relationship with senior Sarekat Islam leaders worsened.  A last attempt 
at compromise between the radical Marxist and Islamic wings occurred at the congress of 
the Sarekat Islam in 1921, but these fragile agreements rapidly broke down, and Islam 
was in the end again declared the movements one, true ideology.  More importantly, a 
resolution was passed that declared that Sarekat Islam members could no longer also be 
PKI members.  The PKI leadership unsuccessfully attempted to heal the breach, but the 
effect was irreversible.  Within the span of a few years, the Sarekat Islams membership 
rolls had dwindled drastically.  The large numbers of members that had left the 
organization in the previous years because of Sarekat Islams drift away from Islam had 
joined other organizations, such as the Muhammadiyah, and most had failed to return to 
the fold as the leadership optimistically expected.  Similarly, those who had stuck with 
Sarekat Islam because of its increasingly revolutionary, anti-capitalist agenda saw little 
reason to remain, and simply left when the PKI cadres went their own way.          
In the end, the success of the senior Sarekat Islam leadership in re-orienting the 
organization toward a more overt Islamic agenda proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for it 
never really recovered its former prestige or influence (Von der Mehden, 1958, p. 350).  
In trying to mimic some of the hardline dynamism of the PKI factions, the Sarekat Islam 
eventually adopted a non-cooperative stance toward the NEI government in its later 
years, but by then the Sarekat Islam had become such a hollow and impotent organization 
that the Dutch no longer took much notice of its rantings (Van Niel, 1980, p. 143).  In 
1929, Sarekat Islam even went so far as to ban its members from also being members in 
the apolitical Muhammadiyah movement because of the latter organizations willingness 
to simply accept government subsidies for its Islamic educational programs (Ricklefs, 
1993, p. 177).  The Sarekat Islams later adoption of a stridently Pan-Islamic agenda, 
combined with its increasingly hardline position regarding the incompatibility of Islam 
not only with secular-nationalism, but with all forms of nationalism, would serve to keep 
it on the margins of mainstream political legitimacy throughout the waning years of the 
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colonial era.  Sarekat Islams Pan-Islamic aspirations became linked with the Ottoman 
Caliphate until the latters collapse in 1924, and following ibn Sauds failure to assume 
the Caliphate mantle, the Sarekat Islams agenda was left without much international 
leverage.  In 1923, the Sarekat Islam created the Partij Sarekat Islam (PSI), which after 
1926 would later become known as the Partij Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), but by 
then, the movement for change in Indonesia was becoming increasingly defined by the 
western-educated native elites who had begun to take up the cause of secular nationalism.  
In 1938, remnants of the Sarekat Islam created the Partai Islam Indonesia (Islamic Party 
of Indonesia  PII), the first overt political party organized with an Islamic agenda.  
According to Benda, the founding of the PII signaled the final demise of the artificial 
division between religion and politics, and ushered in a new era of political Islam (1958, 
p. 90).     
In trying for too long to be all things to all Indonesians, santri, abangan and 
priyayi alike, the Sarekat Islam had throughout the 1920s frittered away both its prestige 
and potency.  In the years leading up to the Japanese invasion and occupation, the PSII 
would turn spectacularly uncooperative not only with the Dutch, but also with secular-
nationalist leaders, the Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.  Its rigid Pan-Islamic vision 
was bound to be unacceptable to a great majority of Indonesians, who while also 
agitating for independence, favored a specifically Indonesian approach.  With the 
marginalization of both the PSII and the surviving remnants of Sarekat Islam, it would 
soon be left to both Muhammadiyah and the Nahdatul Ulama to carry forward the banner 
of political Islam. 
 
2. Muhammadiyah 
The Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad) was founded on November 18 
1912 by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, a devout Muslim scholar who had studied in Mecca 
for several years, and had subsequently been inspired by the writings of the Egyptian 
reformist Muhammad 'Abduh of Cairos Al-Azhar University.  'Abduhs ideas 
concerning modern Islamic education were to have a substantial impact among many 
modernist Muslims in Indonesia, but the movement founded by Kyai Haji Dahlan was to 
become the most significant expression of those ideas transformed into action.  From its 
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very inception, Muhammadiyah would prove to be the single most important educational 
and cultural movement of the modernist santri community, if not of the entire Indonesian 
ummah, precisely because it eschewed overt involvement in politics (Peacock, 1978, p. 
23).  Its consistent apolitical outlook no doubt had much to do with the fact that of all the 
social and proto-nationalist movements founded contemporaneously with 
Muhammadiyah, none was able to outlast it.      
The organization was first established in the central Javanese town of Yogyakarta, 
where Dahlan was employed as a chatib (the deliver of sermons) in the Great Mosque 
of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta.  The movement had its roots in the kampung kauman 
(place of the pious), the santri ghetto located near the Sultans palace, and a virtual 
island of modernist piety in a sea of traditionalist santri and abangan Javanese.  Upon 
returning from overseas studies in the Hejaz, Dahlan had come to recognize that the 
enemies of native Indonesians were many, and included not only colonialism and the 
quasi-feudalism of the priyayi bureaucracy, but also the mystical and Hindu-Buddhist 
accretions that had perverted Islam into a search for an inner life at the expense of 
solving the practical social problems of this life (Peacock, 1978, pp. 34-35).  Unlike his 
contemporaries in Sarekat Islam, however, Dahlan realized that for Islam to serve as a 
beacon of hope and progress for the Indonesian masses, it would first need to be purified 
and reformed.  To Dahlans credit, his was a rather bold prescriptive to be undertaken in 
the traditionalist santri and abangan stronghold of central Java where modernist ideas 
had not yet found fertile ground, and it was thus bound to meet with resistance.   
 Muhammadiyahs initial efforts reflected its founders belief that the struggle to 
reform Indonesian Islam must follow a systematic and goal-oriented evolutionary 
program.  Consequently, initial goals were limited to the spheres of religious 
proselytization, social work, and education, with the organizations overall aim being to 
improve and strengthen the work of Allah and mans fate in the afterlife. (Peacock, 
1978, p. 38).  The movement began with a modest program of building mosques and 
establishing schools that taught a modern syllabus featuring both western subjects and 
Islamic studies.  As this latter goal coincided with the intent of an overall liberalization of 
Dutch education policy in the NEI at that time, the Muhammadiyah found modest support 
for its activities from the Dutch colonial administration.  After 1915, the Muhammadiyah 
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began to receive government subsidies for its education activities, beginning a 
relationship that would eventually cause the Sarekat Islams leadership to question 
Muhammadiyahs commitment to its Islamic agenda.  Despite such criticisms, however, 
Muhammadiyah was spectacularly successful in its endeavors, and was able to quickly 
expand it organizational program to also include charitable work and publishing.   
One of Dahlans most notable accomplishments during this period was the 
establishment in 1916 of a womans auxiliary to Muhammadiyah.  Named for Aisjijah, 
a wife of the prophet Muhammad, this organization was specifically intended to organize 
Muslim women that they might undertake the same types of activities already carried out 
by Muhammadiyahs male members, notably proselytization, mosque-construction, 
education, and charitable work.  Women were encouraged to study Islam, and to execute 
these social duties with enthusiasm and diligence.  Although Dahlans ideas about the 
role of women in Indonesian society were rather forward-looking for his time, they 
remained completely in concert with reformist Islamic conceptions regarding the position 
of women.  Dahlan neither encouraged nor tolerated any sense of familiarity between the 
genders, and while Muhammadiyah made allowances for womens activism in the 
community, it was practiced on a strictly segregated basis.  Still, his ideas were often met 
with shock, dismay and criticism by more conservative santri, many of whom were apt to 
see any role for women outside of the home as scandalous.             
When Dahlan died in 1923, Muhammadiyah was still a relatively small 
organization, if not a highly organized and active one.  Within a decade of its founding, 
however, it had expanded to five branches, and it continued to grow exponentially, so 
that by the time the Japanese had invaded in 1942, Muhammadiyah was comprised of 
well over a thousand branches.  With a membership of slightly less than four thousand 
men and women at the time of its annual congress in 1923, its activities were still almost 
entirely limited to the vicinity of Yogyakarta.  By 1950, however, it could boast of a 
membership of nearly 160,000 across much of the archipelago.  Today, Muhammadiyah 
remains one of the largest Islamic organizations in Asia, if not the world.  
Besides its contribution to the empowerment of female Muslims, Muhammadiyah 
had an equally important and far-reaching influence on the nature of Islamic education in 
Indonesia.  Prior to the 1920s the primary method of Islamic education throughout much 
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of Indonesia, and particularly on Java, was the pesantren system.  Literally, pesantren 
means the place of santri in Javanese, and these Islamic boarding schools had been for 
many centuries the most important training ground for young traditionalist santri.  
Pesantren students typically studied the Quran and Hadith, but with an emphasis on rote 
memorization, and with characteristically strict obedience and reverence for the resident 
kyai (religious teacher).   
For the typical Javanese village, the pesantren, along with both its pondok 
(student dormitory) and mosque, are the central features, and the local kyai serves as 
the communitys teacher, informal leader, and exemplar of piety.  The kyai is expected to 
explain what Islam stands for, and to train the community to be good Muslims. 
Consequently, much of the education received at a pesantren has traditionally 
concentrated on instilling both the moral virtues and requisite piety necessary to make for 
good Muslims (Dhofier, 1999, p. 3).  Upon graduation, the successful student would 
usually earn from his kyai an acknowledgment of the his understanding of Islam, and this 
ijazah (report regarding the bearers qualifications to transmit information about the 
words and behavior of the Prophet) would in turn qualify the young santri to establish 
his own pesantren, and thus become a kyai in his own right.  Students were expected to 
remain loyal and obedient to their kyai throughout their entire life, and as students fanned 
out over the countryside, networks of interrelated pesantren were established.  These 
pesantren networks contributed enormously to the florescence of Islam in the initial 
centuries of its penetration into the archipelago, and during the colonial era they provided 
a separate translocal leadership network that operated alongside the colonial 
administration and its priyayi-dominated bureaucracy (Heffner, 2000, p. 34).  Despite 
their moral and spiritual value to the ummah, however, pesantren usually offered an 
extremely narrow curriculum of use only to future Islamic scholar (Kelabora, 1976, p. 
231).     
Muhammadiyahs most important innovation in the field of Islamic education in 
Indonesia was to establish schools based on the madrasah (Islamic School) model 
rather than the traditional pesantren model.  The most significant difference between 
these two models was that secular subjects, including specifically western subjects, were 
added to the madrasah curriculum to supplement traditional Arabic and religious studies.  
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The rationale behind this adaptation lies in the modernist assumption that for Indonesian 
Muslims to succeed to their rightful place in society, they must not only seek to be pious, 
but they must also seek to be educated in modern ways.     
By 1939, Muhammadiyah had 1,744 schools in operation, about half of which 
were strictly secular, while the other half operated on the madrasah model (Peacock, 
1978, p. 53).  In addition, it ran 834 mosques, 31 libraries, and oversaw the activities of 
nearly eight thousand muballigh (missionaries) involved in dakwah (propagation of 
Islam). After independence, it would further expand its educational activities to also 
include religious- teacher schools, technical schools, and a college.  For the time being, 
however, Muhammadiyahs rapid organizational successes not only in the field of 
education, but in proselytization and social work as well, met with stiff resistance from 
conservative santri who resented the implication that their own understanding of Islam 
was somehow imperfect, and needed to be rectified (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 171).  By 
challenging the traditional pesantren system and their powerful kyai, Muhammadiyah 
contributed to the escalation of tension between the traditionalist and modernist elements 
of the santri community.  An outgrowth of this tension was the establishment in 1926 of 
the Nahdatul Ulama (Renaissance of the Religious Scholars), a santri organization 
whose aim it was to explicitly defend the interests of traditionalist Muslims against a 
perceived expansion in modernist influence in the Javanese heartland. 
 
3. Nahdatul Ulama 
Nahdatul Ulama was founded in Jombong, East Java in 1926 by Kyai Haji 
Muhammad Hashim Ash`ari at the urging of a group of conservative santri.  Their 
principal objective was to stem the rising tide of modernism that they believed was 
threatening the foundation of traditional Javanese Islamic beliefs, as well as the long-
standing primacy of village kyai as the preeminent Islamic scholars in Indonesia.  These 
kyai and their santri were alarmed at the rapid expansion into the orthodox heartland by 
modernist organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam.  More ominously, 
the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, and the capture of Mecca by Ibn Saud 
and his Wahhabi followers, seemed to signal that the very survival of the old order was at 
stake (Benda, 1958, p. 50). Connections between Indonesian modernist organizations and 
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international reformist, Wahhabi and Pan-Islamic movements, however tenuous they 
might be, seemed to give credence to this concern, and encouraged the proverbial circling 
of the traditionalist wagons.       
From its inception, Nahdatul Ulamas activities primarily concerned the support 
of traditional Islamic pesantren, social work, and the facilitation of economic 
development for Muslims.  As Van Niel notes, The Nahdatul Ulama advanced the 
religious and economic interests of the Javanese traditionalists who felt themselves still 
integrated into Javanese life and were repelled by the firm separation from these 
traditions which many modernist leaders in SI were propounding. (1980, p. 142).  Just as 
the Muhammadiyah had successfully adapted the instructional methodologies of Dutch 
and Christian missionary schools, the Nahdatul Ulama in turn copied those of 
Muhammadiyah.  Unlike their modernist rivals, however, the Nahdatul Ulama had a 
ready-made pool of members in the Javanese pesantren system.  Consequently, it grew 
fairly rapidly, and by 1942, it had expanded to 120 branches in both Java and 
Kalimantan.  Its dakwah activities continued to gain ground throughout many of the outer 
islands, although East Java would continue to remain Nahdatul Ulamas heartland 
throughout much of its history.  Likewise, Muhammadiyah would similarly remain strong 
in West Java and in the outer Islands.     
In the first years of its existence, Nahdatul Ulamas relationship with both SI and 
Muhammadiyah was strained and acrimonious, but with the increasing radicalization of 
Sarekat Islams Pan-Islamic message following the ejection of Marxist elements from its 
ranks in the early 1920s, Nahdatul Ulamas traditionalist kyai began to forge an uneasy 
working relationship with the Muhammadiyah.  The final split between Sarekat Islam and 
Muhammadiyah in 1929 over the issue of cooperation with the Dutch NEI government, 
drove Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah even closer together, and paved the way for 
a cooperative relationship within the framework of the Majelis Islamil alaa Indonesia 
(Great Islamic Council of Indonesia -M.I.A.I).  This rapprochement between modernist 
and traditionalist forces was further aided by a marked increase in the overall level of 
repression by the Dutch NEI government in the aftermath of World War I and the PKI 
uprisings of 1926-27.  By the mid-1920s, the Dutch had finally begun to realize that 
Islamic movements like Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah were fast becoming the 
40 
single most potent force for Indonesian unity despite their predominately apolitical 
agendas (Benda, 1958, p. 90).  As a result, they took a more hardline stance with even 
ostensibly apolitical organizations such as these.  
Despite its late start relative to the Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam and the latters 
offshoots, the Nahdatul Ulama was able to quickly make up much ground before the 
Japanese military invasion in 1942.  Its ability to capitalize on existing pesantren 
networks, as well as the resonance of its conservative message among many rural 
Javanese, gave the Nahdatul Ulama an organizational edge that matched the headstart 
achieved by competing movements.  By the time the Japanese had arrived, the Nahdatul 
Ulama had achieved peer status with Muhammadiyah.  In short order both would prove 
their usefulness to Japanese ambitions. 
 
G. INITIAL STEPS TO UNIFY THE UMMAH 
In the years leading up to 1942, the various Indonesian political movements, 
whether secular or religious in orientation, had learned to tolerate each other, even if only 
grudgingly.  The increased repressiveness of the Dutch in the wake of both the PKI 
uprisings of 1926-27 and the worldwide economic depression that had followed close on 
the heels of WWI had forced the native political movements to not only forge alliances 
amongst themselves, but to change their tactics as well (Van Niel, 1980, p. 155).  In 
observing how overt hostility towards the Dutch regime over the preceding decades had 
resulted in the exile or imprisonment of many of the Islamic and nationalist movements 
senior leaders, the remaining secular and religious leaders opted for a more gradual and 
cooperative approach.  
After the dissolution of Sarekat Islam in the early 1920s, the role of Islamic 
parties had been almost exclusively apolitical, and as a result, it was the secular-
nationalists who gained prominence for their aggressive propagandizing on behalf of 
Indonesian nationalist aspirations.  Although many of these leaders were ultimately 
exiled or imprisoned, their audacity inspired the Indonesian people, and earned for them a 
sense of popular legitimacy as the mouthpieces of the independence movement.  While 
the Islamic parties membership rolls exceeded those of all the other parties several times 
over, they were as yet in the words of Benda, politically inarticulate. (1955, p. 353).  
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For the better part of the 20th century, and certainly up to 1942, these parties had been 
relatively content with concentrating on issues of economic development, education, 
proselytization, and social justice.  Ironically, it would be the Japanese army that would 
provide the Islamic parties with an opportunity to realize the vast political potential of 
their substantial, but latent grassroots support (Benda, 1958, p. 353).      
In 1927, the head of Indonesias most successful nationalist movement, Ahmad 
Sukarno, attempted to unify the nationalist, socialist and Islamic movements under the 
banner of the Permufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia 
(Consolidation of Indonesian National Organizations - PPPKI), but his efforts met with 
little success, and any sense of unity achieved was superficial at best (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 
184).  In May 1937, the Marxist-Socialist groups formed the Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia 
(Indonesian Peoples Movement  GERINDO) as a united front.  Similarly, in 
September of that same year, most of the Islamic parties joined together to establish the 
M.I.A.I.  In 1939, both GERINDO and the M.I.A.I merged to form the Gabungan Politik 
Indonesia (Indonesian Political Union  GAPI) to further the common goal of 
achieving parliamentary governance for Indonesia.  By 1942, however, little forward 
movement had been achieved by any of these groups, and the Dutch, secure in their hold 
on the NEI, had only become more intransigent in their unwillingness to compromise 
with native movements striving for greater political autonomy. 
 
H. JAPAN’S CONTRIBUTION: MASYUMI AND THE LESSONS OF MASS 
MOBILIZATION 
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The Japanese invasion of the NEI in the early months of 1942 changed everything 
not only for the Dutch, but for the native Indonesians as well.  As part of a larger military 
and economic strategy, the NEIs abundant supplies of petroleum, bauxite, rubber and 
manpower figured largely in Japans design for the establishment of political and 
economic hegemony throughout Asia, euphemistically dubbed the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere.  Expansion into Manchuria led Japan to rely more and more on 
Southeast Asias raw materials to fuel its rapidly growing industrial and military might, 
and Dutch unwillingness to grant preferred trade relations with the Japanese, followed by 
U.S. actions to restrict Japanese access to petroleum products, put the Japanese on the 
horns of a dilemma, virtually assuring war in the Pacific (Dudden, 1999, p. 163).  By the 
end of March, the Dutch in the East Indies had surrendered to Japanese forces on Java, 
and most of the colonial establishment had either fled to Australia, returned home to the 
Netherlands, or been taken prisoner. 
As a result of Japans need to rapidly extract as many resources as possible from 
the islands, the occupation forces crafted policies that would aggressively court not only 
the various nationalist and Islamic party leaders, but also the native elites who had been 
almost obsequious in their loyalty to the Dutch (Reid, 1975, p. 50).  While the Japanese 
proved eager to utilize every possible source of indigenous support for their regime, the 
Islamic parties were among those that early-on benefited most from their close 
association with the Japanese military.  It was after all members of Acehs Persatuan 
Ulama Seluruh Aceh (All Aceh Ulama Association - PUSA) that had first approached 
the Japanese in Malaya with offers of assistance should they ever invade the NEI (Reid, 
1975, p. 54).   
The Japanese occupation forces divided the NEI into three distinct administrative 
regions: The Navy was responsible for Kalimantan and East Indonesia, the 25th Army 
was given responsibility for Sumatra, and the 16th Army occupied both Java and Madura.  
It was in the region controlled by the 16th Army that the most far-reaching socio-political 
changes took place during the occupation.  As Ricklefs notes, the area under the control 
of the 16th Army was the least economically valuable of all the NEI territories as a result 
of its lack of mineral or agricultural resources, however it did have other resources that 
could be exploited for the Japanese war machine (1993, p. 199).  Javas most abundant 
resource was people, and so the policies of Japans 16th Army on Java were designed to 
gain the cooperation of the native elites in order to maximize the amount of labor that 
could be extracted from a seemingly inexhaustible labor pool.  Japans ultimate goal was 
to mobilize an entire population to support its war goals, and no stone was left unturned 
in the search for potential quislings.    
Unlike the Dutch NEI governments wary position toward Islam, the Japanese 
aggressively courted the support of religious leaders.  The Japanese were familiar enough 
with the structure of Indonesian society to know that it was not the priyayi elites whose 
support was essential for mass mobilization, but rather that of the village kyai and ulama.  
If the religious leaders gave the command, whole villages would toil.  Conversely, if their 
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religious leaders told them to sit idle, villagers would also do that.  Understanding as they 
did the central role of religion in the life of the Indonesian people, the Japanese 
established the Kantor Urusan Agama (Office of Religious Affairs) in order to 
coordinate efforts to win the favor of the ulama and kyai in the rural areas.  The 
preferential treatment afforded to Muslim leaders in the early years of the occupation no 
doubt stemmed from the Japanese realization that only Islam could claim the allegiance 
of nearly all Indonesians, whereas both the nationalists and priyayi elites each relied upon 
a very small base of urban support (Benda, 1955, p. 357).   
Despite their hopes for mobilizing the Indonesian masses with the assistance of 
rural religious leaders, the Japanese were not nearly as enthusiastic about those pre-war 
Islamic parties that were primarily urban and modernist in composition (Benda, 1955, p. 
355).  In the first weeks of the occupation, the Japanese even went so far as to ban the 
PSII and the PII.  Politically-astute, urban modernist Muslims had proven themselves to 
be noticeably less pliable and far more troublesome to the Japanese than the rural kyai, 
and thus the army took pains to ensure that the two factions were kept as isolated from 
each other as possible (Ricklefs, 1993, pp. 204-205).  The Japanese forces frequently 
scuttled attempts by urban elements to link up with their rural brethren, lest the former 
turn the latter against their patrons. 
In late 1942, the Japanese established two umbrella organizations for native 
political parties.  Putera was intended to encompass all of the western-educated 
nationalist elites, and the re-establishment of M.I.A.I was to include all of the Islamic 
parties.  By 1943, both of these organizations were faltering, and the Japanese, who had 
by then shifted their patronage almost exclusively in favor of the Muslim leaders, 
permanently dissolved Putera.  They did, however, soon after create a successor Islamic 
umbrella organization called Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council 
of Indonesian Muslims - Masyumi). 
Masyumi was probably the most important consequence of Japans policies 
toward Indonesian Islam during the three and a half years of its occupation.  Unlike the 
defunct M.I.A.I, the Japanese took pains to ensure that Masyumis leadership was drawn 
from the more apolitical and cooperative rural elements of Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul 
Ulama.  Kyai Haji Muhammad Hashim Ash`ari, the leader of Nahdatul Ulama, was 
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appointed to lead Masyumi, while the more strident and hardline of the urban modernist 
leaders were relegated to decidedly less influential positions.  Not long after, senior 
Masyumi members were also appointed to important positions in the Office of Religious 
Affairs, where they were put in charge of political indoctrination courses in the villages.  
The influence of these Muslim leaders was further enhanced when regional branch 
offices of the Office of Religious Affairs were established in the summer of 1944 (Benda, 
1955, p. 356).  These developments were all the more important because they provided 
yet another means for Muslim leaders to extend their influence to every corner of Java.  
 In addition to Masyumi, in October 1943 the Japanese also established the 
Pembela Tanah Air (Protectors of the Fatherland - PETA), an Indonesian volunteer 
army that by wars end had nearly 37,000 men in Java, and perhaps another 20,000 in 
Sumatra (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 206).  Unlike previous incarnations of auxiliary military 
forces, PETA was not attached to the Japanese army per se, but was a distinct entity 
officered by native Indonesians.  Hundreds, if not thousands of kyai and ulama gained 
practical experience in military leadership as a result of their participation in PETA 
during these years.  In November 1944, a specifically Islamic auxiliary military unit, the 
Barisan Hizbullah (Forces of God), was established and placed directly under 
Masyumis supervision.  This was to be only the first instance in a subsequently long and 
bloody history of paramilitary militias put at the disposal of political parties.    
Japans seduction of the Muslim leaders came to symbolic fruition in 1944 with 
Masyumis declaration the Japans cause qualified as jihad (holy war), and that all 
Muslims were now required to rise up to support them against the Allies.  For its part, 
Masyumi had been able to capitalize on the flexibility of movement afforded it by the 
Japanese to expand its effective reach to the smallest villages across much of the 
archipelago.  Furthermore, through the tutelage of the Japanese, they had developed a 
keen appreciation for organization, discipline, and propaganda, all of which would serve 
them in good stead in the years to come. 
When it became obvious that they were losing the war, and that the allies would 
eventually re-take Indonesia, Japans attitudes toward the native leadership gradually 
began to change.  Beginning in late 1944, the Japanese began to shift their favor from 
Masyumi and the Muslim leadership, to nationalist leaders like Sukarno and Mohammad 
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Hatta.  This switch should not have been entirely unexpected in light of the fact that 
Japans war aims had also begun to change in the closing months of WWII.  No longer 
were they focused on coordinating resource extraction and the mobilization of labor 
forces, tasks that the Muslim leadership had excelled at.  Instead, they realized that they 
would have to abandon Indonesia sooner than later, and that the best course of action lay 
in the establishment of a reasonably capable indigenous administration that would be 
friendly to Japanese post-war interests.  Consequently, the Japanese forces began to move 
farther away from the Muslim leadership and closer to those nationalist leaders that had 
received a modern western education, and who had some exposure to the bureaucratic 
workings of the Dutch colonial administration.  In the final calculus, the Japanese came 
to the conclusion that these Indonesians would have the best chance of establishing a 
viable government after the inevitable withdrawal of the Japanese military.   
As the secular nationalist leaders regained their grip on the overall Indonesian 
leadership, they struck back at the Muslim leaders who had for years enjoyed the 
patronage of the Japanese at the expense of the secularists.  In March 1945, many of the 
nationalist leaders openly advocated for the abolishment of Masyumi (Benda, 1955, p. 
359).  Although the Japanese at first resisted this suggestion, by summer, they were 
willing to entertain the idea of merging both Masyumi and the equivalent nationalist 
umbrella organization, the Jawa Hōkōkai (Java Service Association) into a single 
entity, the Gĕrakan Rakyat Baru (New Peoples Movement).  This idea, however, 
would remain stillborn because of the Japanese surrender in August, and the declaration 
of Indonesian independence on August 17.    
In November 1945, Masyumi voted to continue its existence as a political party in 
the newly independent Indonesia that had emerged at the end of the war.  Its already 
sizable membership rolls further swelled with the addition of those Islamic parties that 
had been excluded by the Japanese because of their less than cooperative attitudes 
towards the occupation.  Notably, both PSII and PII now joined the core member 
organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, to make Masyumi a truly inclusive, 
pan-Indonesian Islamic organization.  Despite its numerical advantage over the various 
nationalist parties, the exclusion of Masyumi leadership from the apex of the Indonesian 
political hierarchy in the closing days of the Japanese occupation left them at a distinct 
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disadvantage in the coming years (Benda, 1955, p. 360).  The nationalists proved adept at 
consolidating their grip on power, and also did their best to exclude Muslim leadership 
from meaningful participation in shaping the new government. 
 
I. THE STRUGGLE FOR DASAR NEGARA  
In March 1945 the Japanese authorized the convening of a Badan Pĕnyĕlidik 
Usaha Pĕrsiapan Kĕmĕrdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for Preparatory 
Work for Indonesian Independence - BPUKI).  With an eye towards facilitating a stable 
and peaceful transition, the Japanese tried to ensure that the BPUKI was composed of 
men from the older and more experienced generation of leaders associated with the 
different pre-war nationalist and Islamic movements (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 209).  The 
fundamental challenge of the BPUKI was to decide upon a Dasar Negara (State 
Ideology), the principles which would define the shape of the emerging Indonesian state.  
The members of the BPUKI largely supported the creation of a republic that would 
include all of the territories within the boundaries of the former Netherlands East Indies, 
although the Japanese restrained them from endeavoring to also include Irian Jaya, 
Timor, the Malayan Peninsula, and all of Kalimantan, including its British territories 
(Van Neil, 1980, pp. 164-165).  It was also decided that this republic would be a unitary 
state, rather than a federal structure.  Progress stalled, however, when it came to deciding 
the ideological basis on which the unitary republic would ultimately rest.   
Schwartz describes the ideological debate as having been shaped by the 
integrationalist ideas of senior nationalist leaders, such as Sukarno and Supomo, both 
of whom had been positively influenced by the disciplined nature of Japanese fascism 
during the wartime occupation (2000, p. 8).  Both traditionalist and modernist Muslim 
leaders by and large hoped to found an Islamic state, which would find its legitimizing 
principles in the Quran and Hadith.  Finally, a small group of liberal constitutionalists 
led by the likes of Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir sought to create political 
institutions more akin to those of western European nations, and which would guarantee 
the protection of individual liberties while commensurately checking the unrestrained 
power of government.  Ramages examination of this period indicates that the 
constitutionalist position had rather little support even at the early stages of this debate, 
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and negotiations very quickly became a contest between the establishment of a state 
defined in accordance with Islamic principles and a negara integralistik (integralist 
state) (1995, pp. 11-12).  
During the last year of the Japanese occupation, the secular-nationalist leaders 
were handed a decisive political advantage over the Muslim leaders, and consequently, 
they were able to dominate much of the BPUKIs efforts.  Both the integrationalists and 
constitutionalists were deeply concerned about the negative impact that overt references 
to Islam would have on the decision of predominately Christian areas in the eastern 
archipelago to join the Republic.  Still, the desires of the Muslim leaders could not be 
brushed aside with impunity, and so the BPUKI was forced to produce a compromise 
agreement.  On June 1 1945, Sukarno gave a speech subsequently called the Lahirnya 
Pancasila (Birth of Pancasila) in which he detailed his personal vision for a state 
ideology that could accommodate all groups.   
The ideology of Pancasila was essentially the product of an attempt to weld 
together the various ideals of the nationalist movement into a core set of principles that 
all of the various secular and religious factions could agree on.  The five principles of 
Pancasila included kebangsaan (national unity of Indonesia), kemanusiaan (just and 
civilized humanity), kerakyatan (democracy guided by inner wisdom and consensus), 
keadilan sosial (social justice), and ketuhanan (belief in God).  Sukarnos attempt to 
seek the least common ideological denominator did not, however, move the debate any 
further forward. 
In late June 1945, a subcommittee of eight members, composed of four from the 
Islamic camp and four from the secular camp, met with Sukarno to discuss the matter of 
the dasar negara further.  The consensus that emerged from their discussions was to 
become known as the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter), which was essentially a short 
expansion and re-ordering of the Pancasila principles.  The fifth principle of ketuhanan 
(belief in god) became the first principle, and it was expanded to ketuhanan yang 
Maha Esa (belief in one God).  This principle was amended with an additional clause 
that proclaimed the attendant obligation for all Muslims to abide by the Sharia.  The 
section of the constitution that dealt with religion was also amended to include a rejoinder 
that all Muslims must abide by Islamic law.  To soothe the fears of minority religious 
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groups and secularists, assurances were also given for the protection of religious choice 
for all citizens.  While the Jakarta Charter was far from the ideal of an Islamic state 
pursued by many of the Muslim leaders, those who had served on this subcommittee 
ultimately ratified it as an acceptable compromise.   
When the Jakarta Charter was raised again in a second series of BPUKI meetings 
in July 1945, various leaders not involved in the earlier negotiations balked at the 
compromise.  In the working group assigned to draft the actual text of the constitution, 
Christian representatives from the Moluccas argued that the priority of place given to 
Islam and the Sharia in the constitutions preamble was divisive.  On the other hand, 
Muslim representatives argued for additional amendments that would not only recognize 
Islam as the state religion, but which would also stipulate that only a Muslim could 
become President or Vice-President.  Some of the more traditionalist Muslims even 
argued for further amending of the clause concerning the obligation of Muslims to adhere 
to the Sharia in order to make Islamic law applicable to all citizens.  Others argued for 
the establishment of an Islamic High Court to hear cases regarding the Sharia, and a 
Ministry of Religion to oversee specifically Islamic affairs, such as dakwah, the 
collection of the zakat, and the building of mosques.  Muslims were themselves split on 
these issues with some, such as the Masyumis Dr. Sukiman, supporting the amendments, 
while others worried that further debate would only serve to endanger the hard-won 
compromises already achieved (Van Dijk, 48-49).  As Van Dijk further notes, most of the 
resistance to the Jakarta Charter came not from secular representatives, but from the more 
strident proponents of an Islamic state (1981, pp. 52-55).      
It had become obvious to just about everyone by late July 1945 that the issue of 
Islams place in the new Indonesian state was holding up the progress of the BPUKIs 
other tasks.  Arguments between the secular nationalists and Muslim nationalists, as well 
as between the traditionalist and modernist wings of Masyumi, had slowly ground the 
process to a halt.  Sukarno stepped into the fray once again, urging Muslim leaders to 
accept the compromises already reached, including the Jakarta Charter and the new 
requirement that the President must be Muslim.  He reminded them that they could try to 
amend the text at a later date through constitutional procedures.  To his credit Sukarno 
was able to convince even the most ardent opponents of the Jakarta Charter to lend their 
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support, and as a result the draft constitution was unanimously accepted.  Unfortunately, 
the era of the military occupation came to a more abrupt end than anyone had anticipated.  
With the surrender of Japanese forces to the Allies on August 14, 1945, the Indonesians 
found themselves unprepared for their next step.    
During the evening of Japans surrender, Indonesian youth leaders apprehended 
both Sukarno and Hatta under the pretense of securing them from harm.  Upon realizing 
that the intent of their captors was to force them to declare independence, Sukarno 
appealed for guidance to Vice Admiral Tadashi Maeda, the head of the Japanese Army-
Navy Liaison Office in Jakarta.  Maeda urged the youths to release their captives, and he 
gave assurances that he would neither take measures to prevent a declaration of 
independence, nor would he take retaliation.  Consequently, Sukarno and Hatta were 
released, and on the morning of August 17, 1945 Sukarno formally declared Indonesias 
independence.    
On the day following the Proklamasi Kemerdekaan (independence declaration), 
the twenty-one members of the Panitia Pĕrsiapan Kĕmĕrdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory 
Committee for Indonesian Independence  PPKI) met to discuss the draft constitution.  
Unlike that of the BPUKI, the PPKIs representatives were intended to reflect regional 
diversity rather than ideological diversity, thus they were of a very different character 
than those who had debated the draft constitution (Van Dijk, 1981, p. 60).  Sukarno was 
appointed as chairman of the PPKI, and Mohammad Hatta was selected as its vice-
chairman.  The PPKIs representatives were predominately secular in orientation, and 
they set their sights on redressing the imbalances of the draft constitution, particularly 
those which had given the document too much of a religious color.  Mohammed Hatta 
met with the prominent Muslim leaders and explained to them that the secular majority of 
the PPKI, many of whom came from the Christian areas of eastern Indonesia, would 
likely only vote for a secular constitution, or at least one that did not overtly favor Islam 
(Ramage, 1995, pp. 14-15).  Muslim leaders were thus implored to make yet another 
compromise in order to preserve the territorial integrity of the new state (Suryadinata, 
2002, pp. 10-11).   
The emergency conditions under which the PPKI was meeting likely encouraged 
the willingness of the Muslim leaders to acquiesce to Hattas urgings despite the 
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attendant cost to their ideological position.  They also likely reached the conclusion that 
Indonesias overwhelmingly Muslim majority would easily be able to make the necessary 
constitutional amendments following the elections anticipated to take place in the near 
future.  To their credit, the Muslim leadership chose to put the states immediate survival 
ahead of their long-range political goals.  Consequently, most of the Muslim leaders 
agreed to Sukarno and Hattas demands that references to the Jakarta Charter be removed 
from the preamble, that the related clause in the section on religion be excised, and that 
the stipulation that the president be a Muslim be dropped.  These changes were accepted 
by the PPKI, and Sukarno and Hatta were elected as President and Vice-President, 
respectively.   
When the Undang-Undang Dasar (Constitution) of 1945 (UUD 45) came into 
force on August 29, 1945, it was an entirely secular document with no mention of Islam.  
It included the principle of keTuhanan yang Maha Esa in the preamble, and the statement 
The State shall be based on Belief in the One and Only God. as the only token 
recognition of religious interests (Van Dijk, 1981, pp. 61-62).   The heavy-handedness 
with which the secular nationalists had urged the abrogation of agreements arrived at 
through the long deliberations of the BPUKI created a sense of betrayal among the 
Muslim leadership, and this resentment would cast a pall on relations between secular 
and religious groups for at least the next two decades (Heffner, 2000, pp. 42-43).  The 
question of the Jakarta Charter would re-emerge at the end of the parliamentary period, 
and it would still remain a divisive issue even in the wake of the fall of Suharto in 1998, 
nearly half a century after it was first proposed.      
 
J. THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 
(1945 – 1949) 
1. The Institutions of Governance 
With the implementation of the UUD 45, the PPKI was dissolved and replaced by 
a 150-member Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National 
Committee  KNIP).   This body was comprised of prominent leaders from the various 
factions that had been involved in the pre-war independence movement, and, thus in 
many ways it was similar in composition to the All-Indonesian National Congress first 
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proposed by GAPI in 1939 (Kattenburg, 1946, p. 290).  The KNIP was intended to fulfill 
the role outlined in the UUD 45 for the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (Peoples 
Consultative Assembly- MPR).  As the highest organ of the Indonesian government, the 
MPR was required to meet at least once every five years in order to select both a 
President and Vice President, as well as to promulgate broad guidelines for state policy.  
However, because elections could not reasonably be held in the near future, it was left to 
the President and Vice President to appoint the KNIPs full membership.   
Initial efforts to establish a one-party system using the Jawa Hokokai as its core 
were strongly resisted by those who resented the dominance of the secular-oriented 
collaborationists within that organization (Ricklefs, 1993, pp. 213-214).  Consequently, 
by late October 1945 the government had thrown open the doors for the organization of 
new political parties, and in the span of a few months several were founded.  Sukarno and 
Hatta then simply estimated the strengths of the various parties in order to determine the 
number of seats that each would receive in the KNIP.  Party leaders were then asked to 
provide lists of representatives from within their own organizations, and in this way it 
was hoped that the KNIP would accurately represent the relative strength of the various 
interest groups within Indonesian society (Feith, 1962, p. 123).  Over time the fact that 
representatives to the KNIP had achieved their positions as a result of the good fortune of 
a Presidential appointment rather than by a free election began to cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of this institution.     
The first Republican government formed in August 1945 under the direction of 
President Sukarno was to be short-lived.  By November, it had become increasingly 
apparent that the Dutch, as well as the British and Americans, were unwilling to seriously 
negotiate in good faith with those Indonesian leaders whom they viewed as Japanese 
wartime collaborators.  This period coincided with the vesting of legislative powers in the 
KNIP in November 1945 and the shifting of the center of power away from Sukarno, 
Hatta and the other senior pre-war leaders.  The Republics leadership made a strategic 
political decision to shift the responsibility for further negotiations to a Prime Minister 
selected by the KNIP.  Though both Sukarno and Hatta would retain the positions of 
President and Vice-President, respectively, this change in leadership represented a major 
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shift away from the strong presidential form of government outlined in the UUD 45, and 
towards a parliamentary form of governance.  The latter model would remain the 
predominant model until 1959. 
With the expansion of the KNIP and its assumption of legislative powers, a Badan 
Pěkěrja (working group) was created to assist in the day-to-day affairs of governance 
pending the election of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives  
DPR), the lower legislative organ provided for by the UUD 45.  The UUD 45 also 
provided for the establishment of eleven ministerial portfolios.  An additional portfolio, 
the Ministry of Religion, was added shortly thereafter to placate Masyumi.  At the 
regional and local levels, Indonesians who had served in the Dutch and Japanese 
bureaucracies discretely changed hats and took over as Republican government 
administrators (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 213). 
As the head of a strong presidential form of government, the President was 
intended to be the focal point of governmental power, but in practice this proved to not be 
entirely the case.  With the appointment of Sutan Sjahrir as Prime Minister on November 
14, 1945, the focus of authority and power shifted away from President and towards the 
KNIP.  In practice, Prime Minister Sjahrir and his cabinet of youthful non-
collaborationists were responsible to the KNIP, rather than to the President, though both 
Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta continued to exert tremendous political influence by 
virtue of their great prestige.  This influence was aptly demonstrated by the successful 
ratification of the Linggadjati Agreement in 1947 despite misgivings by many serving in 
the KNIP (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 225).  When ratification of this cease fire agreement with 
the Dutch appeared threatened by militant opposition within the KNIP, government 
supporters simply increased the authorized strength of the KNIP from 188 to 514 
members, and then appointed additional supporters of Sjahrir from among the Sayap Kiri 
(The Left Wing) parties to ensure a majority.   
While the combination of the above measures assured the ratification of the 
Linggadjati Agreement, the rapid growth of leftist leaning factions within the KNIP only 
seemed to worsen the governments inherent instability.  The KNIP was increasingly 
polarized between those who wished to negotiate with the Dutch and those who wanted 
to fight until the Dutch surrendered unconditionally.  With the rancor of the BPUKIs 
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deliberations still hanging thick in the air, it wasnt surprising that bitterness continued to 
characterize the policy debates between the governments secular and religious factions.  
All of these groups also had their own internal divisions, which only served to exacerbate 
the governments inability to achieve consensus of any sort.  Both the fall of Sjahrirs 
cabinet in June 1947, and the subsequent collapse of Sjarifuddins cabinet in January 
1948, witness to the negative impact that a string of ad hoc institutional adjustments had 
on the efficacy of the Republican government during this period. 
 
2. Power Dynamics in the Revolutionary Period (1945-1949)  
Sukarnos August 17th declaration notwithstanding, by late 1945 Indonesias 
independence still remained an unresolved question for much of the international 
community, if not for the leaders of the Republic themselves.  The prospects for the 
fragile, young state were uncertain at best in the shadow of the Netherlands eagerness to 
return to their colonies and begin the process of extracting the profits that would be 
essential for Post-WWII reconstruction in Europe (Gardner, 1997, p. 29).  By early 1946, 
the Dutch had returned in force with an unbridled determination to stamp out what they 
believed to be a collaborationist rebel government with little popular support.  What they 
found, however, proved to far more broad-based and resilient.   
Within months, the former NEI territories had become partitioned into two 
unequal entities.  The Republic of Indonesia, with its capital and leaders re-located to 
Yogyakarta, maintained control over much of the heavily populated, rural interior areas 
of Java and Sumatra.  On the other hand, the Dutch moved quickly to re-establish their 
authority in Jakarta.  They took possession not only of most of the urban areas on Java, 
but almost all of the outer island territories as well.  However, any simplistic description 
of the partitioning between Dutch-held and Republican territories can barely account for 
how complex and unstable the situation remained on the ground, particularly as one 
moved farther away from the centers of authority and into the hinterlands.   
The first casualty of the Japanese surrender had been law and order, and not long 
after their withdrawal old social cleavages remerged to rent the fabric of society; between 
santri and abangan; between modernist and traditionalist Muslims; between commoner 
and aristocrat; and between those who resisted and those who had collaborated with the 
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Japanese.  These cleavages became fertile ground for the blossoming of social 
revolutions, which led to the destruction of the social order in many areas (Ricklefs, 
1993, pp. 218-219).  The ulama of Aceh took advantage of the power vacuum that 
followed the Japanese withdrawal to rise up and wipe out the ruling uleëbalang class 
(priyayi) that had for so long ruled at the behest of the Dutch (Kell, 1995, p. 9).  Similar 
uprisings also occurred in the Batak areas of north and east Sumatra, while on the north 
coast of Java, young communist-sympathizers rose up against traditionalist santri village 
headmen who had cooperated with the Japanese.  It almost seemed as if the Republican 
leaders were fiddling in Rome, whilst their kingdom burned down around them 
The years immediately following the Japanese surrender were a time of palpable 
tension between the older nationalist leaders, such as Sukarno and Hatta, and a younger 
generation led by the likes of Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin.  The former group had 
worked extensively with the Japanese to further the political goals of the Indonesian 
nationalist movement, but not without great cost to the lives and liberty of the native 
peoples.  Although these older leaders still enjoyed tremendous prestige among their 
countrymen, their international reputation was understandably tarnished.  Conversely, the 
latter group of younger revolutionaries had been stridently anti-Japanese, and many had 
even gone underground to fight the occupation.  Several had been captured and 
imprisoned by the Japanese, notably Sjarifuddin himself, who had not only been captured 
by the Japanese in early 1943, but whose narrow escape from a death sentence was due 
only to the timely intercession of Sukarno and Hatta (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 203).   
During the early months of Indonesias post-WWII struggle for independence, the 
political dominance of the older generation of collaborationists was undermined, at least 
temporarily, by the reluctance of the Allies to negotiate with them.  Sukarno and Hatta 
wisely chose to retreat from the center of the political stage shortly after the formation of 
the first presidential cabinet in August, and by November 14, a new cabinet had been 
named with Sutan Sjahrir as Prime Minister.  By the end of November 1945, the young 
Republican leaders were in a position of strength in the KNIP, and Sjahrir had appointed 
a cabinet under his leadership that was directly responsible to the KNIP, rather than to the 
President.  As Ricklefs points out, after less than three months, the 1945 constitution 
was suspended in practice, although in theory it remained in force. (1993, p. 218) 
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With the establishment of an ad hoc parliamentary process beginning to take 
shape by early November 1945, the formation of political parties was not long to follow.  
Still, it would take several months before the various pre-independence groups could 
coalesce into recognizable parties.  During the first month of independence, Sukarno had 
unsuccessfully tried to turn the wartime Jawa Hokokai into a state party, renaming it the 
Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party  PNI), but this idea met 
strong resistance from groups that resented the Presidents blatant attempt to force a 
broad collection of ideological forces into a monolithic entity under his leadership.  The 
diversity of membership within the Jawa Hokokai made it impossible for its membership 
to agree on a single ideological agenda, and the younger Republican leaders that had 
actively opposed the Japanese chafed at such boldface attempts by the collaborationists to 
further perpetuate their political dominance (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 213).  Likewise, Muslim 
leaders in Masyumi continued to resent their marginalization by the secularists.   
During November 1945, the Republican government had given permission for the 
organization of political parties, and by early 1946, the main political parties had already 
begun to take shape.  The PKI had risen phoenix-like from the flames of the 1926-27 
uprising and the oblivion of wartime exile, to reconstitute itself in late 1945.  Tan 
Malaka, a prominent PKI leader from the 1920s thought to still be in exile, had revealed 
himself in August and quickly taken up the reins of leadership for the disparate Marxist 
factions.  In November 1945, Sjarifuddins youthful followers founded the Pemuda 
Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Youth  Pĕsindo), which for a time merged 
with Sjahrirs followers to found the Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party).  This union did 
not last long, and within a year they had split again, the moderate socialists remaining 
with Sjahrirs Sayap Kiri, and the more radical youths aligning with Sjarifuddin.   
Masyumi too announced its intent to participate as a political party, but by November 
1945, modernist Muslim leaders of the likes of Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (a former 
head of the Partai Sarekat Islam) and Natsir had displaced the Japanese-favored 
traditionalist leaders at the organizations helm (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 221).  Finally, the pre-
war Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia Nationalist Party  PNI) was reborn in 
January 1946, with Sukarno as its ideological leader, if not its official leader.    
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Although not a political party per se, it would be an oversight not to mention the 
transformation of the Republican army during this period because it would in time come 
to play a substantial political role.  The Japanese had been active in the mobilization and 
training of native, quasi-military forces during the period of their occupation, particularly 
in the months leading up to their eventual surrender to the Allies.  In early 1943, they had 
organized both a militarized youth corps (Seinendan) and a Vigilance Corps 
(Keibodan) for older males.  Later they formed an auxiliary military force (Heiho) 
under Japanese command, and by the end of the year, they had escalated mobilization 
with the establishment of the Pěmbela Tanah Air (Protectors of the Fatherland  
PETA), a volunteer army intended specifically to operate under indigenous leadership 
against the expected Allied invasion.  Ricklefs notes that PETA was highly disciplined in 
accordance with Japanese military standards, and that many of its members were 
indoctrinated with Indonesian nationalist ideas (1993, p. 206).  By late 1944, both 
Masyumi and the Jawa Hokokai had been given permission to organize their own 
militarized youth corps, the Barisan Hizbullah (Gods Forces) and the Barisan 
Pělopor (Vanguard Column), respectively.  By 1945, Japanese military policies had 
produced a highly-militarized and disciplined Indonesian population. 
As the most professional and highly-trained of the auxiliary forces created by the 
Japanese, PETA was therefore the most capable of successfully imposing some sense of 
order on the disparate collection of militarized youth groups.  The Japanese took steps to 
try to quickly disband these groups in the closing weeks of the occupation in order to 
affect a smooth transfer of authority to the Allies.  These actions, however, produced just 
the opposite effect than what was intended, for in the absence of strong central 
leadership, these local youth groups simply melted into the countryside where they 
continued to pursue their own agendas as badan pěrjuangan (armed struggle groups), 
which were often at odds with that of the Republican leadership in Yogyakarta (Ricklefs, 
1993, p. 214).  Some of these groups inevitably gravitated toward specific political 
ideologies, and they often became associated with political movements, such as the 
socialists Pĕsindo, Masyumis Barisan Hizbullah, or Tan Malakas Marxist Pěrsatuan 
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Pěrjuangan (Struggle Union).  Others fell under the sway of charismatic local leaders 
looking to make name for themselves at the expense of both the Dutch and the Republic 
of Indonesia.   
The leadership of those forces that formed the core of the Republican army was 
itself split into two antagonistic camps, one led by Japanese-trained soldiers with little to 
no pre-wartime military experience, and the other by soldiers who had served in the 
former Dutch colonial army (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 222).  The former tended to adopt a much 
more hardline position towards any negotiated settlements with the Dutch, and they 
tended to favor a sustained populist-guerilla war in the hopes of achieving an 
unconditional surrender.  Conversely, the latter group was far more amenable to a 
combination of military action and negotiation along the lines pursued by successive 
Republican governments.  General Sudirman emerged as the most prominent leader of 
the Japanese-trained faction, while Colonel A.H. Nasution would rise up through the 
ranks to become the leader of the Dutch-trained faction.  Until the struggle for the heart 
and soul of the army was finally resolved, the army itself would remain a source of 
tremendous political instability for the young state.   
Despite their relatively quick return to Jakarta, the Dutch were in a very weak 
position to extend their authority.  They had returned with the intention of rapidly 
subduing the rebellion with the aid of the British, Australian, and Americans, but their 
optimism was quickly dashed.  Britains transitional occupation force had suffered 
embarrassingly high losses, including the death of its own commander (General Mallaby) 
against a ragtag Republican army in the Battle of Surabaya, and they soon came to realize 
that this was a fight for which they had no stomach.  It became more and more clear to 
the Dutch that if they wanted to re-take their former colonies, they would have to do it on 
their own.  In truth, however, they simply did not yet have the available manpower or 
resources to undertake such a massive effort.  Consequently, they were forced to seek a 
negotiated settlement not only to assuage the impatient urgings of their allies, but also in 
recognition of their own relative military weakness on the ground.  To the Dutch, 
however, a prolonged strategy of negotiation was just another means to expand their 
toehold in the colonial territories until they were able to marshal enough strength to kill 
off the nascent Republic once and for all.       
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Initial Indo-Dutch negotiations brokered with the assistance of the British resulted 
in the Linggadjati Agreement of November 15, 1946.  This agreement provided for Dutch 
recognition of the Republic of Indonesias de facto authority over Java, Sumatra and 
Madura.  It also led to the formation of a federal United States of Indonesia to consist of 
the Republic of Indonesia, as well as both Kalimantan and the Nĕgara Indonesia Timur 
(Eastern Indonesian State).  This federal structure would in turn become part of a 
greater Netherlands-Indonesian Union that would ultimately remain under the Dutch 
crown.  The complexity of this agreement, particularly as it related to the structure of the 
federal government, debt transfer, and the preservation of Dutch ownership of investment 
capital, doomed this plan to failure (Gardner, 1997, p. 28).   
The amount of Indonesian concessions outlined in the draft agreement met with 
stiff resistance within the KNIP.  Although Prime Minister Sjahrirs negotiations with the 
Dutch had ultimately received Sukarnos blessings, many saw the agreement as a sell-out 
because it fell far short of the unconditional Dutch surrender and withdrawal sought by 
large segments of the Indonesian population, especially the populist factions of the army.  
Sjahrir himself had been briefly detained by outraged soldiers during the previous 
summer when an event subsequently known as the July 3rd Affair erupted because of 
the divisions within the military leadership over the direction of negotiations.  Populist 
forces under the leadership of General Sudirman had sought to limit the latitude of 
Sjahrirs negotiations, but Sukarno failed to cave to their demands and Sjahrir was 
ultimately released (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 223).    
Despite profound internal disagreements within the Republican government, the 
KNIP finally ratified the agreement four months later.  However, the political backlash 
resulted in the fall of Sjahrirs government, and his replacement as Prime Minister by his 
former political ally-cum-opponent, Amir Sjarifuddin.  The Linggadjati Agreement was 
finalized on May 25, 1947, but on July 21, 1947, the Dutch launched a military operation 
against Republican forces on Java and Sumatra.  This police action led to the 
emasculation of the Republican authority throughout much of Sumatra and in both West 
and East Java, and forced the remnants of leadership to flee to the Yogyakarta region of 
Central Java where they would remain until 1949.  
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Although Dutch military efforts had largely proven effective against the poorly 
organized and ill-equipped Republican resistance, the international reaction to their 
heavy-handedness was almost entirely negative.  Following protests by the governments 
of Australia, India and the USSR, and the United States, the United Nations successfully 
pressured the Netherlands into accepting a cease-fire and the assistance of a Good Offices 
Committee that would facilitate further negotiations.  This committee, comprised of 
representatives from the United States, Australia and Belgium, helped the Dutch and 
Republican forces craft the subsequent Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948.    
To Indonesians, the Renville Agreement was a disaster because it seemed to 
legitimize continued Dutch control of those areas seized during the 1947 police action.  
Although this was an almost unacceptable sacrifice to many Indonesian patriots, the 
willingness of Republican leaders to make such a painful concession for the sake of peace 
won them the high regard of U.S. officials (Ricklefs, 1993, p.  226).  Still, the agreement 
left some 25 million Indonesians well behind the line of Dutch military advances, the 
Van Mook Line.  Perhaps more importantly, it also stranded significant numbers of 
Indonesian military units in enemy territory (Gardner, 1997, p. 50).  The willingness of 
the Republican government under Sjarifuddin to acquiesce to the Renville Agreements 
decidedly one-sided stipulations infuriated the Republican army leadership and 
contributed to a feeling that the civilian leadership had sold out the revolution to save its 
own collective skin.   
As a consequence of the furor that the Renville Agreement created, Prime 
Minister Sjarifuddin was forced to resign, and Vice President Hatta was then tasked by 
Sukarno with assembling a business cabinet.  By February 1948, it seemed as if 
relations between the Dutch and Indonesians were on a more even keel, but the apparent 
weakening of the Republican government only served to embolden the ambitions of 
charismatic local leaders bent on seizing the initiative from the isolated bureaucrats in 
Yogyakarta. 
An Islamic leader named S.M. Kartosuwirjo, with the support of numerous local 
kyai, seized the opportunity of a leadership vacuum created by the retreat of Republican 
forces during the Dutch police action of 1947 to establish a breakaway regime in West 
Java in May 1948.  Called the Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State), it 
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became better known as the Darul Islam movement (from the Arabic, dar-al-Islam, 
House of Islam).  This was a political and military movement that was committed to 
the establishment of a Muslim theocratic state; however, despite sharing the goal of 
establishing an Islamic state, Kartosuwirjos movement failed to win the support of 
Masyumi because of the latters oft-affirmed commitment to work within the 
parliamentary process (Van Dijk, 1981, p. 85). Although the Darul Islams guerilla 
activities were initially directed against the re-imposition of Dutch rule in West Java, in 
time they also took on a strident anti-Republic character as well.  Until it was finally 
suppressed in 1962, Darul Islams guerrilla activity remained a considerable thorn in the 
side of the Republican government, and it kept Masyumi in an awkward position betwixt 
the two.     
A perhaps more daunting political challenge to the Republican leadership during 
the late 1940s was the revitalization of Marxist forces under the leadership of Musso and 
Tan Malaka.  Youth groups under these leaders chafed at what they saw as the Republic's 
unforgivable piecemeal abrogation of the fruits of hard-won national independence.  
Clashes between the PKI and Republican armed forces broke out in mid-September 1948 
around Surakarta in Central Java, and the conflict continued to escalate until the 
communists were forced to retreat to the East Java town of Madiun.  From here they 
announced the formation of National Front government, denounced Sukarno and Hatta, 
and called for the immediate overthrow of the Republican government.  The Republican 
government responded by sending the armys Siliwangi Division under General Nasution 
to crush the rebels, but as the PKI forces withdrew they undertook a slaughter of 
Masyumi officials and encouraged communal massacres along abangan-santri lines 
(Ricklefs, 1993, p. 229).   
The PKI revolt at Madiun was short-lived.  Musso was killed, and its other 
prominent leaders were forced to flee into exile again.  Amir Sjarifuddin, who had 
revealed his long-hidden PKI membership just a few weeks earlier, was captured and 
executed.  Although Tan Malaka had played no part in the revolt, his influence waned 
significantly  in  the  months  that  followed,  and  he  was  ultimately  killed  in an armed 
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conflict with Republican forces in February 1949.  Even though the PKI was decimated 
in the reprisals of the Madiun revolt, it would again manage to rebuild itself to become a 
potent political force in the 1950s. 
Although not particularly threatening from a military perspective, the Madiun 
Affair had some rather important long-term consequences for the Republic.  PKI 
violence directed against santri-Masyumi elements during the retreat from Madiun 
produced an intense hatred among many Muslims, and the PKI violence would come 
home to roost some sixteen years later when the tables would be turned on the 
communists.  Likewise, the timing of the communists revolt during the ongoing war 
against the Dutch was perceived as a stab-in-the-back by many elements in the 
Republican armed forces, even those who had been somewhat sympathetic to the PKIs 
ideology (Heffner, 2000, p. 50).  With the death of General Sudirman in early 1950, the 
leadership of the army would pass into the hands of Nasution, whose Siliwangi Division 
had been given the task of crushing the revolt.  As a result of this searing experience, he 
would always remain suspicious of communism and would nurture a life-long 
antagonism towards the PKI.   
Perhaps the most important effect of this event was the influence it had on the 
way U.S. policy makers viewed the Indonesian struggle for independence. The 
emergence of the Cold War in the wake of WWII had led to a redefining of relationships 
between the United States and other countries in the region.  There was no longer much 
patience for fence-sitting in a world increasingly divided into the polarized camps of 
Communism and Democracy.  U.S. post-WWII foreign policy was shaped 
overwhelmingly by the Truman administrations commitment to re-building Europe and 
simultaneously halting the advance of Communism in both Europe and Asia.  The Dutch 
were acutely sensitive to these U.S. concerns, and they were long able to use them in 
order to delay full U.S. support for Indonesian independence, however, the Republics 
demonstration of both its will and ability to crush communist insurgencies won it a great 
deal more standing in the eyes of the U.S. administration.  U.S. officials now began to 
discount Dutch claims of the Republics susceptibility to communist infiltration, and they 
began to pressure the Netherlands to more quickly accommodate Indonesian demands for 
full independence. 
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Despite increasingly loud calls from the international community for a negotiated 
solution, the Dutch attempted once again to seize upon the perceived vulnerability of the 
Republican government in the aftermath of the Madiun revolt by launching a second 
"police action".  With relative speed they were able to capture Yogyakarta in December 
1948 and imprison many Indonesian leaders.  Both President Sukarno and Vice President 
Hatta, who was at this time was also serving as Prime Minister, allowed themselves to be 
arrested and sent into exile in hopes of arousing the ire of world opinion.  An emergency 
Republican government was subsequently established in western Sumatra under the 
leadership of Sjarifuddin Prawiranegara, and Nasution declared a martial government on 
Java.  Although the army leadership resented the civilian leaderships timidity while 
soldiers were dying on the battlefield, the Republican strategy proved to be an effective 
one in the long run: International condemnation of the Dutch attack was both swift and 
decisive.  In January 1949, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding the 
release of Republican government officials, the establishment of an interim government, 
and the completion of the full transfer of sovereignty by July 1, 1950.  To buttress these 
demands, the Truman administration hinted that Marshall Plan reconstruction aid to the 
Netherlands might become jeopardized by further stalling on the issue of Indonesian 
independence.      
From August 23 to November 2, 1943, a conference was held in the Netherlands 
between Republican and Dutch representatives with the aim of determining the timeline 
for the transfer of sovereignty.  Also participating in this conference were representatives 
of the fifteen federal states established by the Dutch over the course of the previous four 
years.  The resultant Hague Agreement created a federal Indonesian state, called the 
Republik Indonesia Serikat (Republic of the United States of Indonesia - RUSI), which 
was comprised of the fifteen Dutch-created states and the original Republic of Indonesia.  
Despite vehement protestation by the Indonesian delegation, it was determined that the 
territory of West New Guinea would for the time being remain under Dutch control.  
Sukarno and Hatta would remain President and Vice President, respectively, and a 
bicameral legislature would be established, which would include all of the members from 
the Republics original KNIP, as well as those from the parliaments of the other federal 
states.  Most Indonesians expected that an election would be held as soon as practical in 
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order to select a Constituent Assembly, which would bear the responsibility for drafting a 
more permanent constitution.  After nearly three and a half centuries of Dutch colonial 
occupation and another four and a half years of armed struggle, full sovereignty was 
formally transferred from the Netherlands to the RUSI on December 27, 1949. 
 
K. CONCLUSION 
The peculiar contours of the Indonesian political landscape on the eve of the 
August 1945 declaration of independence developed as a result of the unique 
combination of domestic and international influences at work in the region over the 
course of several centuries.  The most important of these factors was the introduction of 
Islam in the first half of the second millennium A.D., and its subsequent evolution into 
the primary socio-political framework for the entire region.  This process, however, did 
not occur in a vacuum, nor was the archipelago a blank slate onto which the Islamic faith 
could be grafted.   
Long before Islams arrival, maritime Southeast Asia had already been home to 
numerous thriving, cosmopolitan and culturally-complex societies, not least of which 
were the legendary kingdoms of Srivijaya, Mahajaput, and Mataram.  Some five 
centuries earlier, Hindu and Buddhist culture had swept through the region on the winds 
of the trade routes to find a population receptive to the alien cosmology (Coedès, 1968, 
pp. 26-27).  Over time this new religion absorbed the indigenous animist beliefs to 
produce a uniquely archipelagic variant that might have seemed strangely familiar, yet 
wholly heterodox to the Brahmans of India.   
The Islamization of maritime Southeast Asia proceeded in a similar manner: 
Introduced through commercial interchange with the Muslim merchants of the Arabian 
Peninsula, Persia, India and China, Islam flowed like water across the entire archipelago, 
initially avoiding areas of resistance, but becoming readily absorbed where local 
conditions proved receptive.  In time, even those areas that had at first proved 
uninterested in Islams charms relented and professed the faith.  By the time the ships of 
the Netherlands returned to the East Indies in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, Islam was 
firmly entrenched throughout most of the region.   
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The process of Islamization did not, however, proceed in an entirely uniform 
manner.  A raft of political, economic, educational and societal differences led to the 
bifurcation of this process, and resulted in the development of two distinct political 
cultures, described by Feith as Javanese-aristocratic and the Islamic-entrepreneurial 
(1962, pp. 30-32).  These socio-political cultures were based on differing worldviews, 
which had their roots in the belief systems of the abangan, santri and priyayi aliran 
described by Geertz (1960, pp. 11-261).  Although differences between these variations 
have perhaps grown less stark than they were in the waning years of the colonial 
administration, they remained a significant impediment to political cooperation in post-
independence Indonesia.    
The arrival of the Dutch Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United East 
India Company - VOC) in 1602, and the subsequent Dutch NEI colonial regime that 
replaced it in 1816, further fragmented Indonesian society through the co-option of 
priyayi elites and the attempted marginalization of religious teachers and scholars 
through the repression of all aspects of Islam.  The Padri Movement (1803-1838) made 
manifest the deep tensions between the penghulu (priyayi) and santri elements of society, 
and seemed to give justification to Dutch attempts to minimize the further impact of 
Islam on Indonesian society.  The failure of the Dutch to appreciate the Islamic concept 
of tawhīd, the indivisibility of Gods dominion, made such a secularizing policy flawed 
from the beginning, and had it not been for the timely counsel of Dr. Snouck-Hurgronjie, 
the building tensions might have erupted in a far more violent manner than history has 
recorded. 
The Dutch colonial Islamic policies that were put into place in the closing years of 
the 19th century as a result of the general liberalizing of attitudes in the Netherlands 
towards its colonies produced an environment far more accommodating towards cultural 
Islam, while still expressly forbidding its political manifestations.  This period was 
marked by ever increasing numbers of Indonesian pilgrims conducting the Haj, many of 
whom remained in Mecca and Cairo to study Islamic jurisprudence and mystical 
teachings at the feet of renowned Indonesian scholars in residence.  Although much of 
the knowledge imparted by these scholars was quite orthodox, this was also a period of 
renewal, and the reformist exhortations of Muhammad Abduh (Egyptian reformist), 
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Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Iranian reformist), and others took root in the fertile minds of 
many an Indonesian student who would later return home to challenge the status quo of 
both the political and religious establishments.     
The 20th century witnessed a change in Dutch colonial policy that was to have a 
profound effect on the development of Indonesian political consciousness.  The 
introduction of the Dutch Ethical Policy towards the NEI in 1904 was based on a half-
hearted Dutch desire to move away from an exploitative relationship with the colonies, 
and towards one that reflected a civilizing mission more concerned with the welfare of its 
subjects than economics (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 151).  This policy quickened the pace of 
economic liberalization begun in the previous decades, opening up new entrepreneurial 
opportunities for abangan, as well as for santri.  It also permitted the establishment of 
organizations founded for the purpose of charitable, economic, or otherwise apolitical 
purposes.  Still, perhaps the most important policy shift concerned those colonial efforts 
that expanded the educational franchise to the native population. 
The expansion of Dutch native schools in the last years of the 19th century was 
intended in large part to hasten the assimilation of western values and attitudes into the 
Indonesian worldview (Van Niel, 1980, p. 114).  A more immediate goal was to produce 
sufficient numbers of educated natives to fill the expanding colonial bureaucracy.  In 
some measure this effort succeeded, but only to a limited extent.  Although short-term 
Dutch goals were achieved, the long-term effect was to awaken a hunger among educated 
Indonesians for the power, prestige and authority enjoyed by their Dutch masters.  From 
this relatively small kernel of educated Indonesian elites emerged the nationalist leaders 
of the 20th century.  Similarly, the latitude given to ostensibly Islamic economic or 
educational movements, such as the Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul 
Ulama, did much to foster a level of grassroots influence heretofore not enjoyed.    
The relative brevity of the Japanese military occupation of the NEI territories 
belies the profound long-term effects that their policies would have not only on the 
contours of Indonesian political landscape, but also on the development of the Islamic 
political parties.  Recognizing the latent power of religion to effect the efficient 
mobilization of the masses in support of their war effort, the Japanese took measures to 
recruit and indoctrinate Islamic leaders from all levels of society in the political arts of 
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mobilization, organization and propagandizing.  For the first time in the modern era, 
Muslim leaders could exercise authority beyond just the scope of religious concerns, and 
they took to their new role with enthusiasm and vigor, discovering along the way that 
they had much to contribute to the nationalist dialogue.  Unaccustomed as they were to 
such government-sanctioned authority, these leaders nonetheless rapidly embraced their 
new-found political legitimacy, establishing themselves not only as the most important 
political force in the NEI in terms of their grassroots support, but also as a potent military 
force with the establishment of the Barisan Hizbullah.  They had finally become 
politically articulate. 
Although the establishment of Masyumi theoretically united the disparate 
modernist and traditionalist santri factions under one organizational framework, efforts 
by the Japanese to favor the orthodox rural elements at the expense of urban modernist 
leaders, ultimately reinforced rather than healed the orthodox-modernist cleavages of the 
pre-war period.   Yet, the decision of Masyumis members in November 1945 to retain 
their organizational framework, and to transform themselves into a political party in the 
post-occupation era signaled the culmination of a long transition that had begun as 
merely a broad self-strengthening movement within the ummah, but which had ended in 
political consciousness.  Eventually, this spirit of unity would again be compromised by 
the reemergence of the old modernist/orthodox schism.    
Japans pragmatic shift away from Masyumi and towards the secular nationalist 
leaders as the war was coming to conclusion not only deprived the Islamic leaders of the 
prestige, authority and influence that they had come to enjoy and expect, but it also left 
them increasingly vulnerable to the machinations of secular-nationalist leaders to further 
marginalize any further political relevancy they might still retain.  The intended effect of 
these efforts became increasingly obvious with the selection of the first cabinet of the 
post-occupation Republic of Indonesia (Aug 19, 1945  November 14, 1945) in which 
Masyumi received only scant representation (Benda, 1955, p. 360).  In time, even the 
older secular-nationalist leaders of the first Republican cabinet would lose influence to 
the Angkatan Baru (New Generation), a group of younger and more radical 
ideologues educated in the closing years of the colonial era and indoctrinated and 
militarized in the crucible of the Japanese occupation (Van Niel, 1980, p. 164).   
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The other significant result of Japanese occupation policies was the formation, 
training, and indoctrination of auxiliary military forces and paramilitary forces associated 
with various interest groups.  Beginning with the creation of a military youth corps and 
auxiliary forces in early 1943, and gradually progressing to the formation of a volunteer 
Indonesian army, the Japanese forces increasingly mobilized and militarized Indonesias 
youth.  The establishment of Barisan Hizbullah under Masyumi in late 1944 further 
factionalized these military organizations.  The leaders of these armed groups, mostly 
young and of rural origins, would later emerge as a daunting counter-weight to the 
accomodationist negotiating strategies of the early Republican governments.  In the 
closing years of the revolutionary period and well into the era of constitutional 
democracy, these Japanese-trained soldiers would continue to contest with their Dutch-
trained counterparts for control of the future of the Indonesian army.  The inability of the 
army to emerge as a unified, independent political force in its own right until several 
years later can be traced back to this period and to the half-hearted efforts of the Japanese 
to build-up native Indonesian military capacities.    
The history of Islam in Indonesia has largely been one of periodic tajdid 
(renewal) and islah (reform).  The process has been occasionally dramatic and 
revolutionary, but more often it has been gradual and evolutionary, inching forward over 
the course of the centuries.  Dr. Snouck-Hurgronjie sagely cautioned his fellow scholars 
to be aware that fundamental changes in Indonesias Islamic character were often, 
hidden from those who do not make a careful study of the subject. (Geertz, 1963, p. 
16).  Geertz himself cautioned observers to not confuse the overwhelming Islamic 
character of Indonesian society for cultural or political homogeneity (1960, p. 7).  The 
divisive nature of the Islamic political discourse in modern Indonesia stems in great part 
from the social, economic and political pressures that the ummah was subjected to during 
the long process of Islamization, the Dutch colonial presence, and the brief but 
profoundly influential Japanese military occupation.   
As the Republic of Indonesia took the first tentative steps towards freedom in 
1945, they were to face significant internal and external challenges.  While struggling 
with returning Dutch forces for control of the former NEI territories, the Republican 
leaders would also be forced to contest with each other to determine the shape of the 
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government to come.  In this struggle, the Islamic parties under the unified banner of 
Masyumi had significant advantages in their favor, including organizational experience, 
grassroots support, discipline, and an ideological base for which an overwhelming 
majority of Indonesians felt a primordial sentiment (Geertz, 1963, pp. 105-157).  Yet, 
in spite of these advantages, the Islamic parties failed to transform their widespread 
grassroots support into effective political power, and by the late 1950s they had been 
reduced to disarray and politically irrelevancy.  The following chapter will explore the 
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III. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF MASYUMI DURING THE ERA 
OF THE PROVISIONAL PARLIAMENT (1950 – 1956) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the role played by Islamic political parties during 
Indonesias brief flirtation with parliamentary democracy during the 1950s.  It provides a 
description of the complex web of interactions between what was once Indonesias 
largest and most powerful political party, Masyumi, and other important actors on 
Indonesias political stage during that tumultuous period.  The results of a complete study 
of this period suggests that the decline and subsequent proscription of Masyumi in 1962 
was not a foregone conclusion, but was instead the avoidable consequence of a string of 
poor strategic and tactical political decisions made by its leadership over the span of the 
previous decade.  Although forty-five years have passed since the collapse of Indonesias 
first experiment with democracy, the contours of Indonesias post-Suharto political 
landscape continue to be largely shaped by the events and experiences of that era.  
Consequently, the lessons of Masyumis decline and fall remain relevant for those 
seeking to understand the modern relevance of political Islam in that archipelagic state.    
The escalation of religious tensions in Indonesia over the last two decades has 
increasingly attracted the concerned attention of the current U.S. administration, 
particularly since the events of September 11, 2001.  With the next Indonesian general 
elections scheduled to occur in less than two years, much has been made of the 
destabilizing potentiality that political Islam could have on the still fragile electoral 
process.  Although the specter of Islamic politics appears to loom large over the nascent 
democracy, conventional wisdom opines that the majority of Indonesians are religiously 
tolerant, secular-leaning, and traditionally averse to the admixing of religion and politics.  
One need only note the relatively weak showing of Islamic political parties in the 1999 
general elections to reinforce this point.  The incongruence of religion-based politics with 
the modern political sensitivities of the Indonesian public is frequently cited to dismiss 
the likelihood of any future success by religiously-based parties.   
Although often overlooked in modern times, conventional wisdom on the eve of 
the 1955 general elections noted a completely opposing tendency, one that suggested that 
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the voting habits of most Indonesians would indeed largely be influenced by their 
religious sympathies.  This perception in turn gave rise to the oft-repeated prediction that 
the three main Islamic political parties (Masyumi, Nahdatul Ulama, and the Partai 
Sarekat Islam Indonesia) would win a decisive majority in the parliamentary elections 
held in September 1955, as well as in the elections for members of the Constituent 
Assembly conducted three months later.  The possibility of a landslide win by these 
parties was used to strike fear into the heart of every devout secularist.  The fact that 
these Islamic parties ultimately received far less popular support than the pundits had 
predicted begs an explanation that can only come from a careful study of the actors and 
issues that dominated the political scene in the critical years leading up to these elections.  
Were the pundits wrong about the relationship between religion and politics, or did other 
factors serve to undermine voter support to these parties?   
An explanation for why the conventional wisdom of the 1950s proved so grossly 
mistaken has profound relevance for those who hope to divine the future course of 
Indonesian politics.  Many political observers continue to question the relative 
significance of political Islam in Indonesia because of tenacious perceptions that 
Indonesians prefer to compartmentalize their politics from their religion.  It is thus 
assumed that political Islam is somehow incompatible with their secular sympathies.  
This chapter will suggest, however, that the cause for political Islams previous failures is 
far more complex than that offered by the purveyors of conventional wisdom.  It will also 
lay the groundwork for the next chapters most pressing question How might 
observations of past political behavior in Indonesia help shed light on the future electoral 
possibilities for political Islam in that country? 
Although forty-five years have passed since the collapse of Indonesias first 
experiment with parliamentary democracy, the contours of Indonesias post-Suharto 
political landscape continue to be largely shaped by the events and experiences of that 
earlier era.  Likewise, many of the domestic and international factors that came to 
influence the political discourse in those years have again re-surfaced to plague modern 
Indonesia, and the apparent inability of the three secular post-Suharto governments to 
solve the nations complex web of fiscal, social, and security problems has at the very 
least opened the door for a serious consideration of the agenda put forth by the 
72 
proponents of political Islam.  The 2004 political contest in Indonesia will largely be 
decided over the course of the next two years as each of these players attempts to 
convince the Indonesian voters of the efficacy of their respective solutions to Indonesias 
growing list of problems, but these discussions always take place in the shadow of the 
1950s experience.  That experience ended in dictatorship.      
This chapter examines the successive governments of Prime Ministers Natsir, 
Sukiman, Wilopo, Sastroamidjojo, and Harahap with the intent of providing a more 
nuanced picture of the complex dynamics between the myriad of political parties serving 
in both the government and parliament during these critical years.  It also surveys a range 
of non-party players, specifically the President, the army, and the United States, all of 
which were capable of exerting significant influence upon government policy.  The result 
of this examination will obviate a number of causal factors that had little to do with those 
suggested in conventional wisdom, but which nonetheless greatly contributed to the 
diminishment of political Islams influence during this and later periods. 
 
B. BACKGROUND: A NEW STATE EMERGES 
With the transfer of sovereignty finally completed in late December 1949, it must 
have seemed a relief to most Indonesians that they were at last finally free to pursue their 
own political destiny, unmolested by the continued meddling of outside powers.  Yet, the 
lingering effects of years of Dutch and Japanese efforts to undermine the solidarity of the 
Indonesian nationalist movement by exploiting regional, ethnic and religious cleavages 
had in the end produced an inherently fragile political entity.   
The Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) created in the vacuum left 
by the withdrawal of the Dutch was comprised of sixteen relatively autonomous states 
marked by significant ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional differences.  
Consequently, the federal basis of the RUSI was to be a short-lived experiment: Almost 
as soon as the ink was dry on the Hague Agreement of December 1949, the various states 
that had been created by the Dutch in the wake of the Linggadjati Agreement began to 
voluntarily request to be absorbed into the Republic of Indonesia.  A few of the more 
stubborn holdouts, notably the states of West Kalimantan, East Sumatra, and Negara 
Indonesia Timur (East Indonesian State) finally succumbed to a combination of 
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internal political pressure and veiled threats of Republican military intervention, and 
eventually accepted the inevitable.  By mid-August 1950, all of the former states had 
merged themselves into an enlarged Republic of Indonesia, and although occasional 
scattered outbreaks of anti-Republican violence would occur from time to time, Indonesia 
had indisputably come into existence.   
The Republic of Indonesia established on August 17, 1950 was based upon a new 
provisional constitution drafted over the course of the previous months by an RUSI 
cabinet headed by Mohammed Hatta.  It provided for an executive cabinet assembled by 
a formateur appointed by the President, but the cabinet remained answerable to an elected 
unicameral legislature.  The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Peoples Representative 
Council -DPR), a body comprised of 236 members drawn from the former legislative 
organs of the RUSI, was appointed to act as a provisional parliament until elections could 
be conducted.  Although the provisional constitution specifically provided for the 
elections of both a Parliamentary Assembly and a Constituent Assembly, the latter of 
which would be given the responsibility for drafting a permanent constitution for the 
Republic, these elections would not be carried out until late 1955.   
Until its eventual replacement following the elections of 1955, the legitimacy of 
the DPR would be gradually eroded by attempts by the President, the army, successive 
governments, and the various party leaders to control the appointment of replacement 
members in order to increase their own influence over government policy.  A law enacted 
in December 1953 gave the President full latitude to appoint replacement members for 
those independent, non-party representatives whom had either died while serving in 
office, or whom had resigned.  Likewise, he was empowered to approve or reject 
candidates submitted by the various parties as replacements for their own members.   
Over time, the maintenance of a partys relative strength in parliament became 
increasingly more important, particularly as the economy stagnated and access to the 
sources of patronage became more scarce.  Ideology thus became less and less important 
to successive governments as they strove to hold onto the perks and privileges of office 
upon which the whole traditional system of patronage relied.  Consequently, the 
parliament became progressively more sensitive to any real or perceived attempts by 
successive governments to implement policies that could potentially upset the delicate 
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political balance of power achieved through an increasingly Byzantine web of strategic 
alliances and backroom agreements.  The DPR thus became the main battleground for 
political elites to contest for power, and the failure of all of the governments between 
1950 and 1956 to respect this balance ultimately led to their fall one by one. 
 
C. MASYUMI DURING THE CABINET OF MOHAMMAD NATSIR 
(SEPTEMBER 1950 – MARCH 1951) 
The responsibility of forming the first government of the post-independence 
Republic of Indonesia was assigned by President Sukarno to the Chairman of Masyumi, 
Mohammad Natsir.  With 49 parliamentary seats, Masyumi was both the largest party 
represented in the DPR and the obvious choice to be afforded the initial opportunity to 
assemble a cabinet.  Most observers assumed, however, that Masyumis lack of an 
overwhelming majority in parliament deprived them of a mandate to rule unilaterally, and 
thus they would be required as a matter of political pragmatism to seek to build a 
coalition government.  The second largest party in the parliament, the Partai Nasional 
Indonesia (PNI), seemed to be the obvious choice to act as a cabinet partner.      
As formateur, Natsir did initially try to cobble together a cabinet with the PNI, but 
a series of disagreements over the apportionment of key ministerial portfolios inevitably 
led each attempt to failure.  Natsir then altered his strategy, and boldly moved to 
assemble a cabinet with Masyumi at its core, but which was augmented with non-party 
representatives and members from many of the smaller parties in parliament.  
Consequently, he was able to form a cabinet in which Masyumi held the post of Prime 
Minister, as well as the key ministerial portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and 
Religious Affairs.  Five portfolios were given to individuals who were not affiliated with 
any specific party, and the remaining nine positions were allocated to several of the 
smaller parties, notably the Partai Sosialis Indonesia - PSI (16 seats), Partai Indonesia 
Raja - Parindra (9 seats), Parkindo (4 seats), Persatuan Indonesia Raja - PIR (18 seats), 
the Catholic Faction (8 seats), the Democratic Faction (14 seats), and the Partai Sarekat 
Islam Indonesia - PSII (5 seats).  The relatively modest apportionment of two ministerial 
portfolios to the PSI belies the fact that all five of the ministers without party affiliation 
were reputed to have shared its political agenda (Feith, 1962, p. 151).       
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Not surprisingly, the composition of the Natsir Cabinet met with immediate 
protestation from within the parliament, as well as from within Masyumi itself.  As the 
second largest party in the parliament, the leadership of the PNI vigorously objected to 
having been excluded from the cabinet.  Likewise, Masyumis senior leadership was itself 
split on the wisdom of excluding the PNI members in favor of a hodgepodge of many far 
less-influential parties.  In particular, Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojos wing of Masyumis 
modernist-faction cautioned Natsir against the polarization of Masyumi-PNI relations that 
would inevitably result from forcing the latter into a closer relationship with the various 
other opposition parties, particularly those that subscribed to Communist ideologies 
(Feith, 1962, p. 151).  Indeed, Sukiman and his political allies within Masyumi were 
among the most vociferous in their condemnation of Natsirs efforts to exclude the PNI 
from the cabinet.      
Despite attempts in October 1950 by political allies of the PNI to introduce a 
parliamentary motion that would have led to the appointment of a new slate of 
formateurs, the Natsir government was able to muster enough support to win a vote of 
confidence by a fairly comfortable margin (118 to 73) (Kahin, 1950, p. 211).  Still, the 
loss of support from the only other notable Islamic party, the PSII, precipitated the 
resignation of its sole representative on the cabinet, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, and thereby 
weakened the coalition appreciably.  The substantial acrimony that characterized these 
and other attempts to derail Natsirs government even before it could begin its work 
seemed to presage a progressive worsening of relations between the parliament and future 
cabinets (Feith, 1962, p. 153). 
 
1. Cabinet Character 
Natsirs cabinet derived its ideological impetus from the Prime Ministers own 
leanings toward religious socialism, a conservative blend of modernist Islam and 
Marxism that gave him a political outlook closely in accord with that of the PSIs Sutan 
Sjahrir.  Natsir had served as Minister of Information in two of the three pre-
independence Sjahrir cabinets, as well as in the pre-independence cabinet of Hatta.  
Although there were significant differences between them that would remain 
irreconcilable, particularly with regard to the appropriate role of Islam in the Indonesian 
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state, Natsirs political and economic ideas were in many ways compatible with those of 
the PSIs leadership, as well as with those of both Parkindo and the Catholic Faction.  
These parties shared an ideological and political commitment to the concepts of religious 
tolerance, fiscal austerity, and an independent and active foreign policy.  Above all, they 
shared an abiding distrust of communism, as well as a common fear that found its source 
in the lingering memories of the failed PKI uprising of 1926 and the ill-fated Madiun 
revolt of 1948.  Strange bedfellows as they may have seemed to outsiders, in Natsirs 
political calculus they offered the best possible combination to defeat the future re-
emergence of a politically-influential communist movement (Kahin, 1950, p. 211). 
 
2. Agenda 
For this cabinet the revolution was complete, and the time was finally at hand to 
take the necessary measures to stabilize the social order in order to begin the long-
delayed work of economic and infrastructure development.  Consequently, the Natsir 
governments program was comprised of eight core objectives that were intended to 
streamline and fine-tune the machinery of the government, the military and the economy.  
Among these goals were the consolidation, re-organization and rationalization of both the 
Republics civil service and its army in order to meet the evolving needs of the newly 
expanded state.  With regard to the states devastated economy, Natsirs cabinet was 
anxious to not only re-start the flow of foreign investment, but to rectify a drastic trade 
imbalance that saw most of the profits from indigenous industry flowing to Europe.     
In order to attract further foreign investment and safeguard investor confidence, 
the government further committed itself to ending the various anti-Republican uprisings 
that had continued to threaten internal security despite the armys attempts to quell them.  
Movements, such as the Darul Islam in West Java and the rebellion of former Dutch 
Indies Army (KNIL) personnel in South Sulawesi, were foremost on the list of issues to 
be resolved.  Likewise, Natsir was eager to continue discussions with the Dutch to 
resolve a litany of issues that had been agreed to during the negotiations leading up to the 
Hague Agreement of 1949, but which had grown increasingly intolerable to Indonesians 
of all political persuasions over the preceding nine months.  Foremost among these issues 
was the question of Indonesias continued participation in the Netherlands-Indonesian 
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Union, which had been established in the wake of the Hague Agreement.  This was an 
idea that most Indonesians abhorred, and which was made even more galling by the 
unwillingness of the Dutch to seriously discuss the transfer of sovereignty for West New 
Guinea (Irian Jaya), despite their enthusiasm for transferring the Dutch colonys pre-
independence debts onto the backs of the new Indonesian state.      
As pressing as the above problems were for the majority of the cabinet ministers, 
the most important issue on the Natsir governments agenda seems to have been the 
scheduling of elections for the Constituent Assembly.  Natsir had indicated his desire to 
hold elections no later than the end of 1951, at which time he planed to return the 
cabinets mandate to the President (Feith, 1962, p. 153).   Believing that it would achieve 
an even greater windfall in parliamentary seats than it already enjoyed, Masyumi was 
particularly eager to expedite the elections, and thus strengthen the balance of power in 
its favor.  Most of the smaller parties and the PNI for that matter, however, were 
decidedly less enthusiastic.  Most shared Masyumis view that Indonesias 85% Muslim 
majority would sweep the Islamic parties into office with a decisive majority, and their 
strategy thus became one designed to delay the inevitable for as long as possible, lest they 
forfeit the perks and prerogatives of the offices they owed to appointment rather than the 
popular vote.          
The general character of Natsirs agenda was one of developmental pragmatism.  
As Kahin notes, the governments program was one that was intended to transform the 
old colonial economy into a new national economy, which would not only facilitate 
the short-term expansion of an indigenous capitalistic economy, but which would also lay 
the ground for the long-term development of a mixed capitalistic-socialist economy 
(1950, p. 212).  To that end, this cabinet was built around a core of individuals who were 
what Feith has described as administrators, leaders who had the technical, legal 
administrative and foreign-language skills required to run a modern state (1962, p. 113).  
Yet, possessing those skills didnt necessarily guarantee political success in a post-
revolutionary political environment where the disruption of traditional social patterns 
often made appeals to the colorful symbolism and emotionalism of ethnic, religious, or 
regional identities more compelling than the relatively uninspiring blandness of Natsirs 
developmental pragmatism.  Consequently, the Natsir cabinets lofty goals were almost 
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immediately bogged down by the sniping of opposition factions in parliament, by 
internecine squabbles within the parties that constituted the government, and by various 
degrees of pressure applied by extra-parliamentary forces, such as the President and the 
army.  Finally, overlaid upon and thus inevitably complicating the domestic political 
environment there was the international dynamic beginning to take shape in the form of 
the Cold War. 
 
3. Political Dynamics 
a. Intra-Cabinet Dynamics 
 As noted above, Natsirs formulation of a coalition of Masyumi, PSI and 
several smaller parties was not one that was overwhelmingly supported by the entire 
Masyumi membership, much less its leadership.  During this period, Masyumi was rent by 
several internal cleavages that made it a far less monolithic or homogenous political 
threat than most of its political competitors feared it to be.  As Van Der Kroef explains, 
The left wing of the party is close to the position of the Socialists and embraces most of 
the tenets of Islamic modernism; the center and the right envisage a bourgeois civilization 
as the groundwork of an orthodox all-Moslem state.  Only on the formal, religious 
questions do the various wings of the Moslem movement see eye to eye. (1952, p. 18).  
In truth, these wings sometimes failed to agree even on important theological issues.   
 Political, ideological, and theological cleavages not surprisingly ran along 
the old modernist and traditionalist divide that had evolved from the bifurcated process of 
Islamization.  As noted in Chapter II, this process ultimately produced the traditionalist 
Nahdatul Ulama heartlands of West and Central Java, and the modernist strongholds of 
coastal Java and the outer Islands.  Although many of the Nahdatul Ulamas traditionalist 
leaders were ousted from key party positions in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender, 
they continued to play a substantial role in shaping the partys agenda and ensuring the 
partys political primacy.  As the village kyai and ulama, they were the link between the 
urban leaders and the partys grassroots support in the villages, and to neglect that 
important link was to put the party at peril.  Consequently, Natsir was careful to ensure 
that at least one of Nahdatul Ulamas leaders was included in the cabinet, and thus K.C. 
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Wahid Hasjim (the father of future Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid) was 
appointed as Minister of Religious Affairs.    
  Further complicating Masyumis internal political stability was the divide 
within its own modernist wing, especially in the mutual antagonism between the 
opposing factions led by Prime Minister Natsir and Dr. Sukiman.  Natsir and Sukiman 
differed substantially from each other on a wide array of domestic and international 
positions.  These two men, however, were not yet politically savvy enough to realize that 
by attacking each other, particularly in public forums, they only served to weaken 
Masyumis overall position and encourage the resolve of the opposition.  Eventually, 
Natsirs faction would come to dominate the Masyumi leadership, but during the first 
years of this period, internal Masyumi dynamics continued to be one of a struggle 
between these powerful factions and their leaders.   
 According to Feith, it was just the sort of hostility that existed between the 
Natsir and Sukiman factions, and between the modernist and traditionalist factions, that 
had encouraged a more hardline PNI negotiating position in the first weeks of Natsirs 
work as formateur (1962, p. 149).  Whenever possible, Masyumis anti-Natsir leaders, 
particularly Dr. Sukiman and Jusuf Wibisono, sought to erode support within their own 
party for the government.  They achieved this by repeatedly attacking both Natsir and his 
government not just on the issue of the cabinets composition, but also on a wide variety 
of other policy issues with which they disagreed.  This divide became so pronounced that 
when a vote of confidence for the Natsir government was put before the parliament on 
October 25, 1950, senior Masyumi members Wibisono and Burhanuddin Harahap 
absented themselves from the vote in protest rather than lend their support to the 
beleaguered Prime Minister (Feith, 1962, p. 152).   
 Similarly, when the resignation of Dr. Halim as the Minister of Defense in 
December 1950 and the withdrawal of the PSII Minister Harsono Tjokroaminoto set the 
conditions for the possible re-organization of the cabinet, the factions again clashed over 
the appropriate course of action.  Natsir opted for a minor shuffling of posts without a 
substantial change of the governments policies, while the Sukiman faction again pressed 
for a completely new cabinet.  Wibisono even went so far as to publicly encourage the 
Prime Minister to resign.   
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 The Natsir governments relationship with the representatives from the 
other government parties in parliament would prove to be no more harmonious than 
Masyumis own internal party dynamics.  The coalition arrangement between Masyumi 
and its parties introduced an unexpected slate of problems that would over time erode the 
governments internal cohesion, and lead one by one to the defection of its supporters.  
The one important theme to run through these various problems concerned the 
maintenance of the political status quo with regard to the apportionment of the sources of 
patronage, and there were essentially two factions represented within the cabinet, each of 
which approached this problem differently.   
 On one hand, the combination of Masyumi, the PSI, Parkindo and the 
Catholic Faction represented socially progressive political parties that each had relatively 
stable bases of support.  Masyumi had its strength in Indonesias Muslim majority; The 
PSI was the party of western-educated urban intellectuals; and the latter parties were 
strong in the predominately Christian areas of Eastern Indonesia.  These parties had little 
to lose in the event of upcoming elections, and most expected to make even further gains 
in parliament.  This inevitability was fully anticipated by the governments opponents, 
and as Paulker notes, Much of the political history of independent Indonesia could be 
written in terms of the efforts of other political groups to weaken Masyumi and to 
postpone elections until its chances to consolidate itself as the countrys leading party had 
been reduced. (1958, p. 134).  
 Conversely, many of the smaller parties in the coalition, such as Parindra, 
the PIR, and the Democratic Faction, knew very well that elections would likely reduce 
their influence in the parliament, if not put an end to their respective parties entirely.  As 
Tinker and Walker remind us, the Indonesian parliament of this period consisted of a 
hodge-podge of members really representative of no one, and primarily interested in 
maintaining their own position. (1956, p. 104).  Consequently, these parties had much to 
gain from delaying tactics that would stall the conduct of elections for as long as possible, 
while affording them more time to entrench themselves in the growing bureaucracy.  The 
different ways in which these factions viewed the issue of elections tended to produce 
tensions not only among the various cabinet ministers, but also between the parties in the 
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parliament.  Ultimately, it was a disagreement over a policy decision directly related to 
the issue of elections that would bring down Natsirs government.    
 The second major area of tension within the cabinet had to do with 
economic development and fiscal austerity, both of which were central to Natsirs 
agenda.  Again, Masyumi, the PSI and the smaller Christian parties were in agreement on 
the need to take measures that would encourage the growth of the domestic economy; 
however, the smaller parties frequently accused their ministers of excessive parsimony 
when it came to providing access to the sources of patronage which many expected to 
flow from participation in the cabinet.  As export revenues began to grow as a result of 
the increased demand for Indonesias products during the Korean War, many expected 
that those close to the government would also benefit economically, but the governments 
Minister of Finance, Masyumis Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, proved to be particularly 
fiscally disciplined.  Over time, the leadership of these smaller parties became 
increasingly disillusioned by Natsir and Prawiranegaras unwillingness to more 
generously share the spoils of power with the cabinets junior partners (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 
242).  As a direct result of disagreements such as those outlined above, cracks soon began 
to appear in the relatively tenuous bonds of cooperation among the various parties 
making up the Natsir government.  
 
b. Parliamentary Dynamics 
The relationship between the Natsir government and the opposition was 
never very cordial.  Excluded from the cabinet after the failure of prolonged negotiations 
with Masyumi, the PNI at first resolved to conduct a constructive opposition, 
supporting what it found good in the governments program and opposing what it found 
bad. (Kahin, 1950, p. 210).  However, the PNIs strategy rapidly devolved into one of 
obstructionism, and as Dr. Sukiman had warned, the PNI leadership began to work much 
more closely with the communist-oriented parties in parliament.  This latter development 
gave the communist parties a sense of legitimacy they had not enjoyed since the ill-fated 
Madiun Affair of 1948.  Realizing that they would likely be given the next opportunity as 
formateur, much of the PNIs strategy seems to have been aimed at causing the collapse 
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of the Natsir cabinet, and it would be a PNI-sponsored motion in parliament that would 
eventually bring down the government.  
 
c. Presidential Dynamics 
Relations between the Natsir government and the President, as well as 
between the government and the army are also important components that helped shape 
the political dynamics of this period.  President Sukarnos relationship with Natsir began 
to deteriorate not long after the formation of the cabinet, a development that Feith has 
attributed to Natsirs repeated attempts to curtail the Presidents direct involvement in the 
affairs of the government (1962, p. 171).  Sukarno also became increasingly unhappy 
with the direction of the Natsirs policies, many of which were closely aligned with those 
of former Prime Minister Sjahrir, someone for whom Sukarno had nothing but contempt 
(Sukarno, 1965, pp. 210-211).   As a consequence of his growing unhappiness with 
Natsirs policies towards negotiations with the Dutch over West New Guinea (Irian Jaya), 
as well as over Natsirs intentions to rationalize the army and civil service, the President 
progressively withdrew his support for the government.  Although he would not overtly 
intervene to undermine the Natsir government, neither would he lend it his political 
support when it most needed it.  
 
d. The Role of the Army 
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The relationship between the government and the army during this period 
was a fairly positive one, with both groups benefiting from the convergence of their 
respective goals.  Natsir could count on the support of the senior military leadership, 
particularly the Acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Colonel T.B. Simatupang, and 
the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel A.H. Nasution, both of whom represented the 
professional administrator group of officers that had held dominance within the 
military since 1948 (Feith, 1962, p. 171).  The ability of the army to influence the 
government was amply demonstrated by its successful veto of Masyumis Abdul Hakim 
as Minister of Defense during the tense early-days of negotiations between Masyumi and 
the PNI regarding cabinet composition.  The fact that Natsir proved to be far more 
sensitive to the concerns of the army leadership in this matter than he had been of those 
of the PNI testifies to how important he considered the armys support to be.  Over time, 
the tension and mutual disdain that had characterized relations between the army 
leadership and Sukarno seems to have spilled over to create further tension between 
Natsir and the President, effectively forcing the government into an even closer 
dependence on the army.  
 
e. International Influences 
 Finally, the effect of the international environment also must be taken into 
consideration when analyzing the complex range of forces that influenced the Natsir 
government.  The loss of mainland China to the communists in 1948, followed by the 
outbreak of the Korean War n 1950, dramatically altered the perspective of most U.S. 
policy makers.  At the very least, it caused them to take stock of their strategic position in 
the region, and to look with a somewhat jaundiced eye at the independence movements in 
Southeast Asia.  As far as the Truman administration was concerned, the virus of 
communism was spreading rapidly and was poised to consume the Asian landscape.  
Indonesia was increasingly beginning to be perceived as a critical link in the defensive 
chain that ran from Japan, through Taiwan, the Philippines, and onward into British 
Malaya.    
 Its anti-communist sentiments notwithstanding, the Natsir governments 
relations with the United States were shaped by a commitment to politik bebas 
(independent politics), a non-aligned foreign policy that Natsir hoped would allow 
Indonesia to navigate a safe course between the two emerging Cold War power blocs 
(Anak Agung, 1973, p. 179).  Despite a shared disdain for communism, Natsir was 
convinced that the best foreign policy was one that would prevent Indonesia from 
becoming entangled in commitments to either the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or 
the United States (Kahin, 1950, p. 213).  Natsirs government was thus willing to accept 
technical and economic aid from the United States, but typically rebuffed any military aid 
that might incur any security commitments.  This neutral stance did not always sit well 
with U.S. policy makers, but as long as the communists were in a substantially weaker 
position than the other political parties, as they were during this period, little overt 
pressure was exerted on the Indonesian government by the United States.  As the 
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communists became stronger, however, U.S. officials would become increasingly 
uncomfortable with policies of non-alignment, and they would begin to exert both overt 
and covert means to try to influence successive Indonesian governments to choose sides 
in the emerging Cold War.  
 
4. The Fall of Mohammad Natsir’s Cabinet 
From the moment of its inception, the Natsir governments ambitious economic 
and social agenda was stalled because of the cabinets need to concentrate on the fight for 
its own political survival (Feith, 1962, p. 165).  Dr. Sukimans prediction that the 
exclusion of the PNI from the cabinet would have a polarizing effect in parliament 
proved accurate.  The resultant backlash produced greater cooperation between the PNI 
and the various communist parties.  Almost every domestic and foreign policy decision 
that the government tried to implement met with staunch resistance and second-guessing 
within the parliament, and more ominously, smaller and smaller margins of victory on 
successive confidence measures served to obviate a progressive erosion of support for the 
government.  As those smaller parties in the government grew disenchanted with Natsirs 
agenda, they more frequently abstained from crucial votes, or in many cases even joined 
with the opposition.  The resignation of the PSII party from the government in December 
1950 further weakened the cabinet, while commensurately strengthening the opposition.             
The Natsir cabinet was ultimately brought down over an issue that was not one of 
its own making.  In August 1950, the government of the RUSI-era Republic of Indonesia 
implemented a regulation that authorized the creation of interim legislative councils at the 
provincial, regency, and municipal levels of government.  Government Regulation No. 39 
of 1950 provided procedures by which regency councils were to be elected by 
representatives from established political, religious, social, educational and cultural 
organizations within each district and sub-district.  In turn, the regency and municipal 
councils would elect members to the provincial councils on a proportional representation 
basis.  These councils would then serve as the provisional government until elections 
could be held at some future date, although an exact time frame for those elections had 
still not yet been determined. 
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Although the previous government had believed that the regulation would 
produce councils that were fairly representative of their respective constituencies, the 
regulations most apparent effect was to strengthen Masyumis position throughout much 
of Java and Sumatra.  Compared to the other parties, Masyumi had a tremendous 
organizational advantage by virtue of its grassroots support among the village kyai and 
ulama.  Its constituent organizations, particularly Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, 
were also far more prolific than the secular parties when it came to the establishment of 
social, religious, educational and cultural sub-organizations.  By the end of November, 
Masyumi was well on its way towards achieving a position of almost complete control of 
most of the regional legislatures (Feith, 1962, p. 166).  Consequently, the PNI submitted 
a motion to both suspend further implementation of Regulation 39 and to dismiss the 
councils already established.  Masyumis erstwhile political ally, the PSII, countersigned 
the motion and instructed their member to resign from the cabinet.   
The intense debate that raged over the submission of the PNI motion quickly 
began to reflect the political polarization that was emerging both within the cabinet and 
within parliament.  Masyumi supported the regulation, but offered what appeared to be a 
reasonable compromise.  It recommended allowing the existing councils to stand, while 
expediting elections for the regional assemblies.  Clearly, this was a win-win situation for 
Masyumi, for they certainly also expected to reap a windfall in direct elections; however, 
the government had not anticipated that three of its constituent parties (PIR, Parindra, and 
Parkindo) would cross the aisles to vote with the opposition.  As a result, the government 
was defeated on the motion by a vote of 70 to 48.  The margin of defeat was made even 
more striking by the decision of the PSI members in parliament to abstain from the vote 
en bloc, thus depriving the cabinet of some of its core support.      
In January 1951, Prime Minister Natsir informed parliament that he would not 
yield on the issue of Regulation 39, and he challenged parliament to vote on a motion of 
no confidence in the government.  On the day scheduled for further discussions of the 
matter, several key parties boycotted the session, and the PIR subsequently informed 
Natsir that it was also withdrawing its two ministers from the cabinet.  Continued sniping 
by Dr. Sukiman and Wibisono, as well as from others within his own party, only served 
to make Natsirs political situation more untenable.  As support for his government 
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crumbled all around him, the Prime Minister saw that the cabinet could no longer govern 
effectively, and on March 21, 1951 he returned his mandate to the President. 
 
D. MASYUMI DURING THE CABINET OF DR. SUKIMAN 
WIRJOSANDJOJO (APRIL 1951 – FEBRUARY 1952) 
Following the resignation of Prime Minister Natsir in March 1951, President 
Sukarno appointed Mr. Sartono of the PNI as formateur of a new government; however, 
after almost a month of negotiations with Masyumi in hopes of establishing a coalition 
cabinet, he was forced to admit failure.  The widening ideological gulf that had come to 
separate these two parties seemed to militate against the hope of any future cooperation 
between them (Feith, 1962, p. 177).  The most significant obstacle to a possible PNI-
Masyumi coalition, however, seems to have arisen over the disagreement about who 
would be given the coveted post of Prime Minister.  Masyumi lobbied for the 
reappointment of Natsir, while the PNI favored a candidate of its own.  Although Sartono 
briefly considered a coalition between the PNI and the Badan Permusyawaratan Partai-
Partai (Consultative Body of Parties  BPP), a loose confederation of the PKI and ten 
smaller parties, including both the PSII and Parindra, he seems to never have seriously 
entertained the option (Feith, 1962, p. 178).  In the end, he was unable to bridge the 
divide between Masyumi and his own party, and in mid-April he returned his mandate to 
the President.  
Following Sartonos failure, Sukarno appointed two new formateurs, the PNIs 
Sidik Djojosukarto and Masyumis Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo.  After several days of 
contentious negotiations, both men finally agreed to a cabinet formula that would give 
both the PNI and Masyumi an equal number of seats in the government.  A final 
agreement to this effect seemed to hinge on which party would be given the coveted post 
of Prime Minister.  The claims of both parties seemed non-negotiable, but the PNI 
ultimately wavered, offering to let Masyumi fill the post, as long as Natsir was not re-
appointed as Prime Minister.  It was exactly the opportunity that the Sukiman wing of 
Masyumi had hoped for, yet it would not be an easily won victory. 
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When Dr. Sukiman announced the final cabinet agreement with the PNI, 
including his own appointment as Prime Minister, he was met with significant resistance 
from within his own party.  The Natsir-led group, which from the very beginning had 
expressed misgivings about Dr. Sukimans involvement as co-formateur, pushed a 
resolution through Masyumis Executive Council that declared Dr. Sukimans actions as 
formateur were invalid and were not representative of Masyumis political will (Feith, 
1962, p. 180).  Eventually Natsir would back down, but no members of his faction would 
receive portfolios in the new cabinet.    
The Sukiman cabinet was composed of a core of Masyumi and PNI ministers, but 
it was also augmented by a handful of members from the smaller parties.  It also included 
two members without party affiliation.  Masyumi controlled the Ministries of Finance, 
Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, and Religious Affairs, while the PNI held the post of 
Deputy Prime Minister, as well as those of the Ministries of Interior, Information, Trade 
and Affairs, and Public Works.  The smaller parties in the government included the PIR, 
Parindra, Parkindo, the Catholic Faction, and the Democratic Fraction, all of which had 
also served in the Natsir government.  The PSI was excluded, as were the PSII and the 
myriad of communist parties.  When the parliament finally voted to approve the cabinet 
in June 1951, Sukimans formula won approval with a vote of 119 to 30. 
 
1. Cabinet Character 
The character of the Sukiman cabinet would prove to be quite different from that 
of its predecessor, despite the fact that both Prime Ministers had been senior members of 
Masyumi.  Many of this governments ministers had been prominent men in the pre-war 
years, but had found themselves sidelined by a younger generation of leaders from 1945 
on.  With few exceptions, most had been excluded from participation in the Sjahrir, 
Sjarifuddin and Hatta governments of the revolutionary period.  They tended to be more 
conservative than their predecessors, and they were generally more wary of radical 
changes to the social status quo.  These were not the administrators and technocrats 
that had dominated the previous cabinet.  Although many were very well educated and 
had served in previous governments, they tended to be less concerned with the goals of 
consolidation, rationalization and reorganization that had underpinned much of the 
previous governments agenda.  Unfortunately, they also tended to have very little in 
common with each other in terms of their own policy objectives.  The PNI and Masyumi 
ministers that made up Sukimans cabinet differed from each other on just about every 
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conceivable issue, from the economy to foreign policy.  Most importantly, they were not 
in agreement over the future of elections.  The addition of nine ministers from the smaller 
parties, or with ambiguous party allegiance, further complicated the cabinets cohesion.   
Feith attributes the poor cohesion of the Sukiman government both to the haste 
with which the cabinet had been assembled, and to the lack of detailed coordination and 
policy negotiation that had taken place before the cabinets composition was finalized 
(1962, p. 183).  Despite having had a fairly solid majority in the parliament behind it, the 
Sukiman cabinets diverse composition would in the end subject it to much greater 
internal stresses than even Natsir had been forced to face. 
 
2. Agenda 
The actual agenda of the Sukiman government was not radically different from 
that of its predecessors, except perhaps in a matter of emphasis.  Sukiman tended towards 
conservative domestic and international policies not unlike those of Natsir, and in fact 
many of his policies were simply extensions of those of the previous administration.  The 
priority of those policies, however, did differ from those of the previous cabinet.  With 
the increasing threat posed by both the Darul Islam separatist movement in West Java, 
and aggressive PKI labor agitation both on Java and Sumatra, the restoration and 
maintenance of internal security became the governments highest policy priority.  
Consequently, the issue of elections was dropped to third place, no doubt to the extreme 
satisfaction of the leadership of both the PNI and the smaller parties.  With regard to 
economic development issues, negotiations with the Dutch over the future of Irian Jaya, 
and the conduct of future elections, Sukimans course would not deviate appreciably 
from that laid down by the previous government.    
In the area of fiscal austerity, Sukiman and his Minister of Finance, Jusuf 
Wibisono, proved to be less disciplined than Natsir had been.  Their policy of awarding 
bonuses to civil service employees in honor of the Muslim feast of Idul Fitri, and the 
subsequent implementation of free monthly rice allocations to government employees 
earned them a great deal of political support, but it also stirred up resentment among 
those who were outside of the circle of patronage (Feith, 1962, pp. 186-187).  This was 
particularly galling to some at a time when many Indonesians had been involuntarily 
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moved off the rolls of government service as a result of efforts to shrink the size of the 
bureaucracy.  Still, the Sukiman cabinet viewed it as but one more way to win political 
loyalty for a highly-divided government.  The re-ordering of the governments policy 
priorities under Sukimans watch indicates the amount of concessions that Masyumi were 
willing to make in order to win the support of their PNI and its other partners.  Even so, 
Sukimans efforts to implement a coherent and consistent domestic and foreign policy 
agenda would repeatedly be threatened by the contrary agendas pursued by the other 
parties represented in the cabinet. 
 
3. Political Dynamics  
a. Intra-Cabinet Dynamics 
 As noted above, the single biggest obstacle the Sukiman government faced 
was a lack of internal cohesion within the cabinet itself.  Masyumi and PNI ministers 
differed on a wide variety of policies that each hoped to use to further expand their 
control over the levers of government.  Specifically, the issues of regional elections and 
appointments to the government bureaucracy would cause much division within the 
cabinet.     
 The debate over Regulation 39, which had contributed to the fall of the 
Natsir government in March 1951, was left unresolved well into Sukimans tenure.  A 
compromise was finally reached between Masyumi and the PNI that recognized the 
legitimacy of those provincial and regency councils that had already been created, but 
which also forbade the further creation of additional councils until a new process could 
be agreed upon.  As a result of subsequent negotiations, it was agreed that the new 
regulation would recognize only the participation of political parties in the selection 
process, and it would exclude those other cultural, religious, and social organizations that 
had previously given Masyumi such a decisive edge.  In principle, this agreement pointed 
to a compromise that both sides could live with, however, no new regulation was ever 
promulgated during Sukimans tenure.  Both sides simply continued to proclaim the need 
for elections as a national panacea, while scheming to adjust the regional political 
conditions in order to give them the advantage should elections ever occur.     
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 A related Masyumi-PNI dispute arose after attempts by the PNI Minister 
of the Interior, Iskaq Tjokroadsijuro, to appoint PNI members to the governorships of 
West Java and Sulawesi.  While such appointments were theoretically well within the 
purview of the Interior Ministry, previous Ministers had been obliged to appoint 
governors from lists of candidates submitted by the appropriate regional assemblies.  In 
these disputed cases, however, Minister Iskaq simply ignored the lists of candidates 
submitted by the West Java and Sulawesi assemblies, and appointed men of his own 
choosing.  This effort was viewed by many observers as an undisguised PNI attempt to 
undercut the prerogatives of the Masyumi-dominated provincial assemblies to control 
their own gubernatorial and bupati appointments.  Masyumi also saw it as indisputable 
evidence of the PNIs ongoing strategy to further expand its own influence within the 
higher posts of the Indonesian civil service at the expense of Masyumi (Feith, 1962, p. 
184).  Following these appointments, only three of the ten governorships (North Sumatra, 
Central Sumatra, and Jakarta) were left in the hands of Masyumi men, and all parties well 
knew the pivotal role that the governors would play in the conduct of future elections.  
 A motion of censure against Minister Iskaq was submitted to parliament in 
early September, but a threat by the PNI to withdraw from the cabinet made its passage 
tactically unattractive to Masyumi.  If the PNI withdrew, the cabinet would collapse, and 
it was very likely that Sukarno would name another PNI member as the sole formateur of 
the nest government.  Consequently, on the day that the motion was put to a vote, 
Masyumi and PSI members absented themselves from the chamber, thus ensuring that a 
quorum could not be achieved.   
 The two examples described above were indicative of the near-constant 
struggle that went on during this period between Masyumi and the PNI cabinet members, 
with each side striving to gain a political advantage over the other.  Attempts by each 
party to gain the upper hand produced tension within the cabinet, and caused policies to 
be watered down in order to accommodate the least common denominator that would be 
acceptable to both.  Rather than moving the country forward, policies were diluted to 
ensure that neither Masyumi, nor the PNI gained at the expense of the other.  
Consequently, most of the cabinets energies had to be directed towards maintaining 
internal cohesion rather than outward towards solving Indonesias growing economic and 
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social problems.  Political inaction had become the operative basis of the governments 
strategy for survival (Feith, 1962, p. 205).  
 
b. Parliamentary Dynamics 
 Unlike that of Natsir, the Sukiman government enjoyed fairly strong and 
consistent support in parliament.  Although it was hardly given a free hand, the fact 
that the cabinet was comprised of parties that held more than 60% of the seats in 
parliament ensured that the government had more flexibility in policy formulation than its 
predecessor.  Despite having a majority in parliament, the cabinet was not without 
potentially powerful opposition: Both the PSI and the PKI were excluded from the 
cabinet, and both had much to gain from Sukimans failure.  The PKIs strategy during 
the Natsir government had been to seek common cause with the PNI, but now that they 
were in the opposition alone, they were forced to seek out wedge issues that they could 
use to splinter Sukimans fragile Masyumi-PNI coalition.  In addition, there were factions 
in parliament from within both Masyumi and the PNI that were at odds with their party 
colleagues now serving in the government.  Masyumis Natsir-led group was especially 
active in opposing this cabinet, and the PSI proved to be particularly cooperative in 
working with them in order to de-stabilize the government.  
 The divisions within each of these parties inevitably expressed themselves 
in backroom negotiations conducted in conjunction with parliamentary debates.  A 
notable example of this trend concerned the Indonesian parliaments consideration of 
support for the U.S. sponsored Japanese Peace Treaty of September 1951.  Many 
Indonesian leaders feared that by becoming a signatory to the treaty, Indonesia would 
find itself drawn deeper and deeper into a military relationship with the United States, 
however many also believed that a closer relationship with the West was both inevitable 
and desirable.  According to Feith, both Masyumi and the PNI were split on the issue of 
this treaty, and while the members of those parties serving on the cabinet were in general 
agreement on the matter, the intra-party factions in parliament were at odds with each 
other and with the cabinet (1962, pp. 193-194).  In early September, the Sukiman and 
Natsir factions within Masyumi debated the treaty, and though Sukiman ultimately won 
the partys approval, he did so only by a razor-thin margin.  Conversely, the internal PNI 
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party debate resulted in a decision to oppose the treaty.  Thus, when it came time for the 
cabinet to vote on what further instructions to provide its representative at the San 
Francisco Treaty Conference, it found itself divided.  The actual cabinet vote of 10 to 6 
found Masyumi, the PIR, the Catholic Faction and the Democratic Fraction supporting 
the treaty, with the PNI and Labor Party opposing it.   
 The impact of this split was never fully realized because the treaty was 
never sent to the parliament for a vote after it became clear that neither the PNI, nor 
Masyumis Natsir faction would support ratification.  An embarrassment to the 
government of that magnitude would certainly have caused it to fall, and as a result, 
ratification of this treaty became just one more in a long list of issues that the cabinet 
scrupulously avoided in order to prevent a political showdown. 
 
c. Presidential Dynamics 
 The quality and nature of the Sukiman governments relations with both 
the army and the President were also very different than that of its predecessors.  
Although the source of these differences can be traced back to the roles that many of the 
cabinet members had played during the Japanese occupation and the revolutionary 
period, much of the animosity can also be attributed to the cabinets actions while in 
office.  President Sukarno had grown increasingly disillusioned with the Natsir 
government despite his initial optimism, but with the Sukiman cabinet he was able to 
maintain better relations.  It seemed that the worse the governments relations with the 
army became, the more amicably the President responded.  Unlike the relatively young 
members of Natsirs cabinet, many of whom had risen to political prominence late in the 
revolutionary period, most of the members of Sukimans cabinet had known and worked 
with each other during the colonial period and throughout the years of Japanese 
occupation.   
 Sukimans personal relationship with Sukarno began in the 1920s, and the 
lasting bond of amity between them had been cemented by the support that Sukiman, as 
head of the pre-war Partai Sarekat Islam, had given Sukarno in his attempt to create a 
pan-Indonesian nationalist movement.  The PSIs participation in the Permufakatan 
Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (Agreement of Indonesian 
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Peoples Political Associations  PPPKI) was to be short lived (1927-1929), however, 
Sukimans personal relations with Sukarno continued to be cordial in the years after.   
 Conversely, Natsir had been associated with the extremist Persatuan Islam 
(United Islam) movement in the pre-war years, and had become one of the modernist 
movements most vocal critics of the PPPKI, arguing that any alliance between secular 
and religious movements would only serve to weaken the latter.  His virulent polemics 
against Sukarnos nationalist formula would ultimately cause many in the secular camp to 
view Islam as a divisive and dangerous political force (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 190).  As a 
consequence of those pre-war experiences, it is not surprising that Sukarno felt far more 
comfortable working with Sukiman than with Natsir. 
 The political relationship between Sukarno and Sukiman developed into 
one based on mutual support and defense.  This formula became increasingly important 
as relations between the army and the government further deteriorated.  As a result, the 
President was able to exert significantly more influence over the cabinets policies than 
he was ever able to during any previous administration.  On more than one occasion, his 
personal intervention ensured that the fragile cabinet did not fall apart.  This relationship, 
however, also worked the other way.  When parliament began to criticize the President 
for his frequent meddling in issues that were ostensibly the purview of the parliament, 
Prime Minister Sukiman vigorously defended Sukarnos continued role in such 
deliberations.  His response to the Presidents critics helped crystallize a role for the Head 
of State that went significantly further than the drafters of the Constitution of 1950 had 
ever intended, and as a result the Presidents powers were greatly expanded during Prime 
Minister Sukimans tenure (Feith, 1962, p. 217).  
 
d. The Role of the Army 
 The cabinets relationship with the army was strained from the very 
beginning.  The political affiliations of the cabinet ministers were such that they had very 
little in common with the professional military officers that had come to dominate the 
high command billets.  Two of the governments ministers, Muhammad Yamin (Justice) 
and Achmad Subardjo (Foreign Affairs) had even been directly involved in the Tan 
Malaka coup attempt of July 3rd 1946.  Senior army leaders were also gravely 
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disappointed with Sukimans selection of the PIRs Sewaka as Minister of Defense, not 
because his views were necessarily opposed to those of the army, but rather because he 
lacked the political experience and gravitas to be a forceful and effective proponent on 
behalf of their institutional interests  The army-cabinet relationship further deteriorated 
when the cabinet repeatedly undertook actions that the military though it have been 
should be consulted on, but wasnt, including the June 1951 release of nearly a thousand 
political prisoners by Minister of Justice Yamin.  The army quickly moved to re-arrest 
most of these prisoners, and Minister Yamin subsequently resigned from the cabinet, but 
the pattern of stilted cooperation between the government and the army only got 
progressively worse.      
 The governments August 1951 arrest of some 15,000 radicals, mostly 
communist activists or sympathizers, further angered the army leadership.  Although 
Colonels Nasution and Simatupang had little sympathy for the communists, particularly 
with the memory of the Madiun Affair of 1948 still fresh in their minds, they did resent 
the governments unilateral undertaking of such a drastic action without first consulting 
them.  As a result of their indignation over this matter, army leaders refused to assist the 
Prime Minister in his post facto attempt to use existing martial law regulations to legally 
justify the cabinets rather draconian course of action (Feith, 1962, p. 207).  Following 
this episode, the Sukiman government failed to take appropriate measures to smooth 
relations with the army, and their relations continued to deteriorate to the point where 
both the government and the army seemed to be implementing their own agendas 
irrespective of the others interests.   
 Another issue that particularly irked the army leadership was the timidity 
with which both Natsir and Sukiman approached the settlement of the Darul Islam 
rebellion in West Java.  Not unexpectedly, Masyumis leaders, regardless of their 
factional loyalties, generally felt some sympathy for the movements objectives, even if 
they disavowed their means.  They were also well aware that a significant portion of their 
grassroots support in the villages of Java and Sumatra could not distinguish between 
Masyumi and Darul Islam, an assertion that simply fueled the armys suspicion that in 
many cases they were in fact one and the same (Vandenbosch, 1952, p. 183; Federspiel, 
1973, p. 409).  Although Sukiman did take a much harder line against the Darul Islam 
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than Natsir, he continued to press for an approach that combined military action with 
diplomacy, with an emphasis on the latter.  This approach, however, was one that was 
deeply resented by the army leadership because it was seen as the needless meddling of 
politicians in what in their view was a strictly military affair.   
 Again and again, the Sukiman government acted in ways that contributed 
to their further estrangement from the army leadership.  Likewise, the armys inability to 
more fully assert itself on the political stage during this period owed itself to a state of 
ideological disunity among its officers corps that prevented its leadership from injecting 
itself more forcefully onto the political stage (Crouch, 1988, pp. 28-29).  
 
e. International Influences 
 By the time the Sukiman cabinet had begun to find its sea legs, the 
international environment had become strewn with a great many more obstacles than 
even Natsir had been forced to contend with.  The increasing rigidity of U.S. diplomacy 
during the Cold War era had significant repercussions for regime stability throughout 
Asia.  The cornerstone of Natsirs foreign policy had been to maintain an independent, 
but active foreign policy that would allow Indonesia to steer a safe course between the 
emerging superpowers.  His approach to dealing with overtures from the United States 
for more extensive military commitments had been to gently, but firmly repulse them.  
While Sukiman would also adhere claim to adhere to a policy of politik bebas/aktif, in 
truth his foreign policy brought Indonesia much closer into the U.S. sphere of influence.   
 The Sukiman governments tilt towards the United States was accelerated 
by the perception among many in Masyumi that the political power of the PKI was 
growing again, and that it was being supported by foreign regimes, most notably the 
Peoples Republic of China (PRC).  In response, Sukiman took measures to combat what 
he viewed as a rising communist tide.  In May 1951, the government reversed course on 
an earlier decision not to support a United Nations General Assembly embargo on the 
shipment of war materials to the PRC, even though the decision to abide by export 
controls on rubber, oil, and tin had the potential to stall the recovery of the Indonesian 
economy.  In July, the government also refused entry to twenty-two Chinese diplomats 
assigned to the PRC embassy and consulates in Indonesia out of fear that they had been 
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sent to lend support to the PKIs cadre-building efforts.  Finally, in August 1951, 
Sukiman authorized the arrest of thousands of PKI supporters, despite little evidence that 
they were planning another coup attempt.    
 It has already been shown how the governments position regarding the 
1951 Japanese Peace Treaty defied the wishes of much of parliament.  Similarly, the 
Sukiman governments secret negotiations with the United States for increased military 
aid blatantly contradicted the wishes of most of Indonesias senior political leadership.  
The United States, however, was beginning by the summer of 1951 to push Indonesia for 
greater assurances that they were on the side of the free world, and the U.S. Truman 
Administration was becoming increasingly less tolerant of Indonesias neutralist stance.  
The U.S. Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1951 signaled a shift in emphasis from the 
economic recovery of the post WWII era, to the strategic realities of the emerging Cold 
War.  A provision of this law required that all countries desiring U.S. military aid must 
express a commitment to certain fundamental principles, including the contribution of its 
own resources to the defensive strength of the free world.  To many Indonesians, this 
simply meant U.S. interests, and thus was unacceptable (Feith, 1962, p. 199).   
 To most Indonesians, the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951 implied a quid 
pro quo security arrangement with the United States that they were simply unable and 
unwilling to commit to.  Because U.S. officials were caught up in their own stark black-
and-white Cold War reality, most were unable to recognize how narrow the range of 
policy options was within Indonesias domestic political environment.  Indonesian 
politicians were by and large committed to an independent, non-aligned foreign policy, 
and no government could survive long if it tried to stray from that ideal.  Gardner has 
suggested that the intransigence of U.S. officials over negotiating the binding stipulations 
of the U.S. Mutual Security Act was specifically intended to weaken Indonesias own 
commitment to this policy.  Consequently, attempts were frequently made to compel the 
Indonesian government to accept aid based on the provisions of the U.S. Mutual Security 
Act, when other less-binding means were available (1997, pp. 106-107).  Repeated 
attempts  by  U.S.  diplomats  to  extract further security commitments from the Sukiman 
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government only seemed to contribute to the further polarization of the pro-western and 
neutralist factions within the Indonesian government, within the individual parties, and 
within the parliament as a whole.  
 
4. The Fall of Dr. Sukiman’s Cabinet 
In January 1952, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Achmad Subardjo, 
unwisely committed Indonesia to receiving a relatively modest amount of U.S. aid in 
accordance with the provisions of the U.S. Mutual Security Act.  Almost immediately, 
Prime Minister Sukiman recognized that the political implications of the agreement 
would be problematic with the cabinets detractors in parliament.  To head off a possible 
showdown, he sought the U.S. Ambassadors assistance in modifying the text of the 
agreement in hopes of making it more palatable to the parliamentary opposition (Gardner, 
1997, p. 106).  He was, however, rebuffed by U.S. Ambassador Cochran, who perhaps 
failed to appreciate the gravity of the political threat to the cabinet.   
The sense of dread that Sukiman must have been feeling finally came to fruition 
on February 4, 1952 when the exact details of the agreement became public knowledge.  
The government was almost immediately assailed by criticism from all quarters.  Both 
the Minister of Defense and the senior army leadership were resentful that they hadnt 
been consulted regarding the details of the aid agreement.  Masyumis Natsir-led 
Executive Council passed a motion expressing opposition to the agreement, and the PNI 
followed suit a few days later, adding the demand that the Prime Minister return the 
cabinets mandate to the President.  The smaller government parties wanted the cabinet to 
vote on whether or not to support the agreement, but both the Masyumi and PNI ministers 
stalled, fearing that a split vote would only further destabilize the government (Feith, 
1962, p. 204).  On February 21, the parliament passed a motion of censure against 
Foreign Minister Subardjo, precipitating the submission of his resignation, but even after 
his departure the cabinets political situation failed to improve appreciably.  Two days 





E. MASYUMI DURING THE CABINET OF MR. WILOPO (APRIL 1952 – 
JUNE 1953) 
Following the collapse of the Sukiman cabinet, President Sukarno appointed two 
new formateurs for the specific purpose of assembling another coalition government 
between the parliaments two most powerful parties.  The PNIs Sidik Djojosukarto and 
Masyumis Prawoto Mangkusasmito labored for nineteen days without success because in 
the end neither could win sufficient support among their own parties for the various 
cabinet arrangements they had formulated.  The meddling of factions within both 
Masyumi and the PNI greatly frustrated these negotiations.  Prawoto was a member of the 
Natsir-led Masyumi faction, and Sidik was a member of the radical nationalist wing of 
the PNI that opposed Natsirs religious socialist agenda (Feith, 1962, p. 227).  
Consequently, there was little ground for sincere cooperation even between the two 
formateurs, much less among the parties to which they belonged.   
Eventually, Prawoto and Sidik were able to reach a compromise concerning the 
composition of most of the cabinet, but they remained deadlocked on the issue of the 
Ministry of Interior.  Both parties had come to accept that national elections would have 
to be held in the next few years, but they had also come to recognize that the Ministry of 
the Interior would have a great deal of influence in their planning and conduct.  
Consequently, both parties attempted to gain that coveted post for itself in hopes of 
fortifying its own chances, but as negotiations stalled over this issue, Sidik and Prawoto 
also then began to criticize each others nominations for other posts in the cabinet.  By 
mid-March, it was clear that these men couldnt agree on much, and so they were forced 
to return their mandate to the President. 
On March 19, 1952 the PNIs Wilopo was appointed by President Sukarno to be 
the next formateur.  As a candidate that both the PNI and Masyumi had previously 
considered for the post of Prime Minister, he proved to be acceptable to both parties.  
Further, his views on most of the other important issues facing the government were 
ideologically compatible with those of both Prawoto and Natsir.  In many respects, he 
seemed to be the ideal compromise formateur, and with that outlook, he set about 
building  a  cabinet  that  was  more  concerned  with  ideological  cohesion  than  with 
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achieving the support of any specific party or parliamentary faction (Feith, 1962, p. 228).  
By March 30th, he had completed his proposed roster of ministerial candidates for 
submission to the President.   
Wilopos cabinet was truly a coalition cabinet.  Not only did it have ministers 
from both Masyumi and the PNI, but it also included members from the PSI and the PSII, 
both which had been excluded from the previous cabinet.  Additionally, the standard 
assortment of smaller parties, including the Catholic Faction, Parkindo, Parindra, and the 
Labor Front, was given token representation within the cabinet.  The PIR and the 
Democratic Fraction, both of which had served in the previous two cabinets, were 
excluded this time around. 
The Presidents hesitation to immediately approve Wilopos selections was an 
indication of his disappointment with a cabinet primarily composed of men with socialist 
leanings (Feith, 1962, p. 229).  Likewise, the PNI expressed displeasure at Wilopos 
selections, and the Nahdatul Ulama leaders within Masyumi chafed at the exclusion of 
their own men from the cabinet.  For the first time since 1949, Nahdlatul Ulamas 
perennial Minister of Religion, K.H. Wahid Hasjim, was replaced by a member of 
Muhammadiyah, K.H. Fakih Usman.  Finally, the opportunity for yet another partnership 
between Masyumi and the PNI was sufficient reason for the PKI to be wary of this 
cabinet, though the fresh memory of Sukimans persecution left them hesitant to be too 
vocal in their opposition (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 244).  Wilopos selection of Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono IX as Defense Minister at least enabled him to win the cautious 
support of the senior army leadership. 
 
1. Cabinet Character 
Despite Wilopos credentials as a member of the PNI, his cabinet had far more in 
common with that of Natsir than it did with Sukimans Masyumi-PNI coalition.  None of 
the five Masyumi men who had served under Sukiman had been selected for this cabinet, 
and only two of Sukimans five PNI ministers were invited back into this administration.  
Not surprisingly, this cabinets positions on many the issues that had long divided PNI 
and Masyumi came down squarely on the side of the latter.  This trend did not bode well 
for relations between Wilopo and the rest of his party in parliament. 
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In general, this cabinet was far different from its predecessor on many different 
fronts.  Most of its members were significantly younger than those whom had served in 
the Sukiman government, and most were sympathetic to the progressive socialist 
ideology that had characterized the governments of Sjahrir and Hatta, and to some extent 
Natsir, as well.  These were administrators and technocrats that agreed on a course for 
Indonesia despite their individual party memberships, and as a result they had far more 
internal cohesion than Sukimans cabinet had enjoyed.  Although this cabinet did not 
enjoy the personal support of President Sukarno as Dr. Sukimans had, the return of the 
highly respected and influential Sultan of Yogyakarta to the role of Defense Minister 
made it far more acceptable to the armys senior leadership.  Thus, the political 
counterbalance shifted in favor of the army and away from the President when the 
Wilopo cabinet ascended to power.  
The cohesion of Wilopos cabinet came from his insistence that its members be 
ideologically compatible and that they share certain fundamental goals.  Further, he was 
willing to compromise in order to reach mutually acceptable agreements on policies that 
had deeply divided their predecessors.  On a number of issues that had particularly 
strained the Masyumi-PNI working relationship, he was able to carve out middle ground 
that both parties could accept for the time being.  Consequently, this cabinet would be 
able to withstand internal tensions better than his predecessors, yet it still had many 
enemies within parliament, within the army, and within the Presidential palace. 
 
2. Agenda 
Like his predecessors, Prime Minister Wilopo promulgated a multi-point agenda 
that outlined his governments priorities.  He re-elevated the contentious issue of national 
elections back to the first priority, although he was perhaps more motivated to placate 
Masyumi than he was sincerely interested in accelerating elections (Feith, 1962, p. 230).  
On the related issue of regional councils, he apparently also capitulated to Masyumis 
position and made allowances for those councils selected pursuant to Regulation 39 to 
continue to function.  Foreign Affairs was dropped to the last of the six top priorities, 
and Wilopo made it clear that the government was returning to a truly independent and 
active foreign policy.  To that end, he declared that Indonesia would in the future only 
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accept economic and technical aid from the United States, and that it would neither 
solicit, nor accept military aid.  In an attempt to evade policy disagreements that could 
exacerbate already existing PNI-Masyumi rifts, he scrupulously avoided making policy 
decisions on a number of contentious issues, such as the opening of an embassy in 
Moscow.   
On the issue of internal security, Wilopo suggested that the time had come to 
complete the process of transferring responsibility for provincial and district governance 
from soldiers to civilians.  To hasten this goal, he immediately ordered the lifting of those 
martial law restrictions that had been imposed in accordance with the 1939 State of War 
and Siege Act, and which incidentally had been the same regulations that Sukiman had 
used to legitimize his August 1951 mass arrest of PKI activists.  Feith has suggested that 
Wilopos decision on this matter was far more than just an attempt to assert civilian 
supremacy over the army, and that it represented a combined effort by both the cabinet 
and the senior army leadership to deprive the nearly autonomous territorial commanders 
of a significant portion of their power base (1962, pp. 231-232).  Territorial and regional 
commanders were frequently supporters of the President, and their loyalty to the armys 
senior leadership was often unreliable.  The Wilopo governments attempts to transition 
leadership responsibilities from soldiers to civilians, though rational on its face, was 
perceived as just one more shot fired in the ongoing struggle between the various 
leadership factions contesting for supremacy within the military.  It was a step that would 
ultimately have dire consequences for the government. 
 
3. Political Dynamics 
a. Intra-Cabinet Dynamics 
 Prime Minister Wilopos emphasis on ensuring the ideological 
compatibility of his ministers went along way towards maintaining stability within the 
cabinet.  His PNI and Masyumi ministers were in agreement on several key issues, 
including the holding of regional elections, the acceptance of foreign aid, the 
maintenance of internal security, and the language of ongoing negotiations with the 
Dutch.  For those issues upon which agreement proved more elusive, Wilopo engaged a 
strategy of inaction, eschewing to make commitments that might prove divisive to the 
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cabinet.  Initially, the conduct of national elections fell under this heading, but as pressure 
mounted on the government, Wilopo was forced by the tide of events to stake out a 
committed position.  Fortunately, by then all of the other parties had also come to the 
realization that stalling was no longer a prudent action in light of escalating agitation by 
the military and the general public.    
 The first major blow to the Wilopo government came in late April 1952 
when the Nahdlatul Ulama congress voted overwhelmingly to disaffiliate itself with 
Masyumi and to establish an independent political party.  Relations had long been 
strained between Masyumis traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama members and their modernist 
brethren.  These relations had grown progressively brittle ever since the modernists had 
taken control of the organizations senior leadership posts following the surrender of the 
Japanese in 1945.  Although Dr. Sukiman had been able to work effectively with the 
Nahdlatul Ulama leaders in his capacity as both Prime Minister and Chairman of 
Masyumis Legislative Council, Natsirs approach seemed designed to antagonize them, 
while marginalizing their role in the party.   
 The list of potential cabinet candidates that Masyumi had submitted to 
formateur Wilopo had been drafted under Natsirs influence, and for the first time since 
1949, the name of the Nahdlatul Ulamas K.H. Wahid Hasjim had not been listed for the 
post of Minister of Religious Affairs.  This slight was seen by the Nahdlatul Ulama 
leadership as an insult to their most senior and respected kyai, and was taken as further 
evidence that its contribution to Masyumi was under-appreciated (Feith, 1962, pp. 235-
236; Barton & Fealy, 1996, pp. 20-21).  Masyumis Natsir faction surely must have 
known that to slight Nahdlatul Ulama in such a way would be to invite a likely fracture 
of the party, and yet they did so anyway.       
 The immediate affect of the Nahdlatul Ulamas abandonment of Masyumi 
was to strengthen Natsirs overall influence in the latter.  It would leave Masyumi with 
seven fewer seats in parliament and have catastrophic long-term consequences for the 
party by almost entirely erasing its grassroots support in the heavily populated Javanese 
heartland.  Further, Nahdlatul Ulamas efforts to form a federative coalition with the 
other smaller Islamic parties in parliament, especially the PSII and Sumatras Pergerakan 
Tarbijah Islamiyah (Islamic Educational Movement  PERTI), gave Muslims a 
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political alternative to Masyumi.  The Nahdlatul Ulamas K.H. Wahid Hasjim was 
elected as the first chairman of the new Liga Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim 
League  LIGA).     
 Although the worsening of Nahdlatul Ulama-Masyumi relations would 
eventually prove to become the Achilles heal for the electoral unity of Indonesias 
Muslim polity, the internal ideological divisions within the PNI would prove to be far 
more vexing issue for the cabinet in the near-term.  As noted above, Wilopos political 
outlook was far more consistent with that of Natsir, Hatta and Sjahrir than it was with 
most of the senior leadership of his own party.  The PNI had long opposed many of the 
policy initiatives that Wilopo sought to implement because many of them had the 
potential to erode the PNIs influence in both the army and the civil service.  
Additionally, Wilopos apparent commitment to the conduct of national elections was not 
consistent with the PNIs attempts to delay for as long as possible.  
 By 1952, the PNI was also becoming rent by increasing divisions between 
a radical nationalist wing headed by Sidik Djojosukarto, and groups headed by Sartono, 
Suwirjo and Wilopo, which were in varying degrees far more inclined toward national 
consolidation and socialism.  The policies of the Wilopo cabinet were particularly 
distasteful to the PNIs Sidik faction, and building frustration over the willingness of 
Prime Minister Wilopo to implement a significant portion of the Masyumi agenda only 
seemed to increase his resolve to derail any future cooperation with the Masyumi 
leadership (Feith, 1962, p. 242).  By late 1952, the Sidik group had formed a tactical 
alliance with the PNIs Sartono-Suwirjo group, which further isolated Prime Minister 
Wilopo within his own party.  The PNIs leadership then quietly moved to develop closer 
ties not only with the PKI, but also with the new Islamic alternative to Masyumi, the 
Nahdlatul Ulama (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 245).  In time, the PNI would then turn on Wilopo 
himself.  
 
b. Parliamentary Dynamics 
 The ministers of the Wilopo government were able to achieve a great deal 
of political consensus despite frequent opposition from their respective party 
representatives in parliament.  Still, the cabinet could not operate independently from the 
104 
will of parliament for very long.  The previous two cabinets had in the final analysis been 
brought down by parliamentary opposition to particular government policies, and the 
Wilopo government was as susceptible, if not more so, to becoming submerged in the 
shifting sands of political allegiances in parliament.  As noted previously, the 
disaffiliation of the Nahdlatul Ulama from Masyumi and its subsequent establishment as 
a political party in its own right further eroded Masyumis influence in parliament.  More 
importantly, it handed the PNI a potential Islamic political ally to oppose the Masyumi 
agenda.   
 The PKI, which had formed an alliance of convenience with the PNI in 
1950 in order to oppose Natsirs government, had been relegated during Sukimans 
tenure to political impotency.  Worse, Sukimans 1951 anti-PKI roundup had reminded 
them of their status as the pariah of Indonesian politics.  Their situation during Wilopos 
tenure was little better, but increasing disillusion within the PNI over Wilopos agenda 
offered an opportunity for the PKI leadership to redeem itself, and to perhaps expand its 
influence once again.   
 The PKIs new strategy began with a public relations offensive.  Starting 
with the inception of the Wilopo government, the PKI leadership had resolved to be less 
antagonistic towards the parties in the cabinet, and to support those government 
initiatives that it found well-framed and sound.  The PKI also announced its conditional 
willingness to work with any other political party that shared its newfound commitment 
to nationalism (Feith, 1954, p. 244).  Likewise, it also began to woo other parties that 
might be interested in developing political alliances by which to further the political 
mobilization of workers, peasants, women, and other underrepresented constituencies.  It 
was very obvious to most observers at the time that their interest was primarily to forge 
links with the anti-Wilopo and anti-Masyumi PNI elements in parliament (Feith, 1962, 
pp. 238-239).  The PKIs shift in attitude also extended to their public pronouncements 
concerning President Sukarno, which had previously been very antagonistic, but which 
had subsequently taken on a more positive and conciliatory tone.   
 The PKIs strategy was two-fold.  Following the rehabilitation of its 
image, it would then move to exploit every potential wedge issue that could possibly 
induce tension between the fragile PNI and Masyumi coalition, and has already been 
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noted, there was no shortage of potentially divisive issues.  By the end of Wilopos 
tenure, the PKI had re-emerged with significant political influence in parliament.  Its 
overtures to the PNI leadership in parliament had proven fruitful; however, when 
combined with the willingness of the Nahdlatul Ulama to throw its political support 
behind PNI, it inevitably led to the emergence of a formidable new power bloc in 
parliament that significantly threatened Masyumis slim numerical dominance (Bone, 
1954, p. 18).  By late 1951, parliament had become split down the middle, with Masyumi, 
the PSI, and the small Christian parties on one side, and the PNI, PKI and Nahdatul 
Ulama on the other.  Both sides continued to be assisted from time to time by the shifting 
support of the smaller parties, but this support was almost always self-serving and by no 
means consistent.  
 
c. Presidential Dynamics 
 The polarization of parliament into two power blocs centered on the PNI 
and Masyumi did not manifest in a political vacuum.  President Sukarno was by no means 
a champion of the Wilopo government as he had been of that of Dr. Sukiman.  Much of 
his indifference towards this cabinet was directly related to Wilopos political agenda, 
which he correctly saw as an extension of Natsirs agendas and by extension that of the 
pre-independence Hatta and Sjahrir administrations, as well.  It was an agenda 
characterized by an emphasis on consolidation, rationalization, reorganization, neutrality 
in foreign relations, fiscal austerity, and managed economic growth.  For the Wilopo 
government, the revolution was over, and the time had come for Indonesia to take its 
rightful place among the international community, to work to better its own domestic 
conditions, and to contribute to the peace and stability of the world.  It had no interest in 
aligning with one international power bloc or another, or in continuing to fight a 
revolution at home now that independence had at last been achieved.   
 This perspective was not, however, one that was shared by President 
Sukarno, or for that matter, by much of the leadership of either the PNI or the PKI.  They 
believed that the inevitable unfolding of the revolution had been stalled by the political 
agendas of Natsir and Wilopo, both of whom Sukarno believed had only served to 
impede the natural course of Indonesias progress by kowtowing to Dutch and U.S. 
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interests.  Although a shared view of a betrayed revolution was sufficient raison dêtre 
for an increased level of cooperation between these groups, Sukarno also had personal 
reasons for disliking Wilopo.  The Wilopo cabinet contained many men with whom 
Sukarno had clashed in the struggle to delimit the scope of his Presidential prerogatives 
(Feith, 1962, pp. 244-245).  Wilopos ministers, like those of Natsir, but unlike those of 
Sukiman, had repeatedly tried to contain the expansion of Sukarnos political influence 
by reducing the size of his office budget and severely curtailing his opportunities for 
making political campaign speeches.  More than anything else, efforts such as these only 
seemed to steel Sukarnos desire to work through all other available channels in order to 
maintain his prestige and influence.   
 The tentative rapprochement between the PNI and PKI seemed to provide 
Sukarno with an opportunity to align with a political bloc to oppose the government 
agenda, but the army continued to provide an effective counterweight to his influence.  
The armys ideological loyalty, or at least that of its most senior leadership, was aligned 
with the Wilopo government, particularly its Minister of Defense, Sultan Hamengku 
Buwono IX.  In mid-1952, a relatively delicate balance of power existed between these 
two contesting power blocs, but the leadership struggle within the army was now rapidly 
nearing critical mass.  Within months, the balance of power would shift decisively. 
 
d. The Role of the Army 
 Indonesias post-revolutionary army had never been a politically unified 
force.  Its hasty founding in 1945 had resulted in a composite force of Dutchtrained 
professional soldiers that had been merged with guerilla units established and trained by 
the Japanese army.  These two wings of the army had very different ideas regarding how 
the revolution should be fought, as well as about who should lead the army and the 
government.  On occasion, these differences erupted into violence between the contesting 
groups, or as attempts to alter the political system through unconstitutional means: The 
July 3rd Affair of 1946 had been the most notable attempt by radical nationalist forces 
within the army to assert their control over the Indonesian government.  Similarly, in the 
aftermath of the Madiun Revolt of 1948, the professional component of the army moved 
decisively to excise many of the radical elements within their ranks.  From 1949 to 1952, 
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the various factions within the army leadership had settled into a grudging acceptance of 
each other because neither was strong enough to overcome the either, but this struggle 
continued to simmer in the background.   
 Under Prime Ministers Hatta and Natsir, the Indonesian government had 
occasionally attempted to implement plans for the reduction and re-organization of the 
army.  These plans were intended to reduce the size of the force by hundreds of 
thousands of soldiers, many of whom were really no more than bandits or local warlords 
who had been given army commissions during the struggle with the Dutch.  These 
elements most often aligned themselves with those political parties that were in 
opposition to Sjahrir, Hatta, and then Natsir.  Consequently, the governments efforts to 
rationalize and re-organize the army were seen as no less than a direct attack on a crucial 
component of the oppositions political base, and these efforts were vigorously resisted. 
 The army had maintained a relatively apolitical posture during the brief 
tenure of the Sukiman government mainly because its own internal leadership divisions 
had precluded it from speaking consistently with one voice, but also because the 
appointment of a relatively unimportant politician to the post of Defense Minister had 
deprived the senior leadership of its main avenue of political influence.  The return of 
Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX to the post of Defense Minister once again provided an 
opportunity for the armys senior leadership to forge close links of cooperation with the 
government, and to again begin their efforts to re-shape the army into the western-model 
of a smaller, but more professional force.  This renewed sense of cooperation between the 
senior army leadership and the cabinet did not, however, sit well with the parliamentary 
opposition, who quickly seized upon disaffection within the army to launch an oblique 
attack against the government (Crouch, 1988, p. 29).  
 Wilopos plans to reduce the size of both the civil service and the army 
following a post-Korean War slump in government revenues precipitated a crisis between 
the cabinet and parliament that would upset the armys apolitical orientation.  Regional 
commanders, many of whom were loyal to the PNI and Sukarno, were vehemently 
opposed to the senior leaderships plans for reducing the armys end-strength by upwards 
of fifty percent.  Disregarding protocol, they appealed directly to both parliament and to 
President Sukarno for intervention, accusing the armys senior leadership of becoming 
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political foils for the PSI and Masyumi (Feith, 1962, p. 252).  The PNI leadership in 
parliament responded by ordering a series of reviews of Wilopos defense policies, which 
culminated in late September in the tabling of a motion of no confidence in the policies of 
the Minister of Defense.  This motion also called for a reorganization of the armed forces 
pursuant to the findings of a parliamentary commission that would be subsequently be 
established to investigate allegations of fraud within the Ministry of Defense.     
 Observing the emerging showdown in parliament, numerous army leaders 
loyal to both the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the Wilopo government began to agitate 
against the unwarranted interference of both the parliament and the President.  
Particularly galling to them was the fact that parliament was not an elected body, but 
rather an appointed one that had little legitimacy in their eyes.  This was made more 
upsetting by the repeated failure of successive governments to make headway in planning 
for the conduct of national elections, which would ultimately lead to the replacement of 
the appointed provisional parliament with one that was legitimately elected by the people 
(Feith, 1962, p. 256).  A second PNI-sponsored motion submitted in early October 
recommended the establishment of a joint government-parliamentary commission, 
heavily biased towards the latter, which would have the authority to investigate questions 
pertaining to the reorganization of the army.  It would also be empowered to investigate 
questions of corruption in the Ministry of Defense.  Not surprisingly, these steps were 
viewed as an immediate threat by the armys top leadership, and within days, seven of the 
territorial commanders had gathered in Jakarta to see how the situation would unfold.   
 When the parliament met on October 15, 1952 to discuss the various 
motions before it, Prime Minister Wilopo felt assured that backroom negotiations with 
the PNI leadership had won him enough support in the coming vote to preserve his 
cabinet.  He had not, however, anticipated the personal interference by the President, who 
managed to rally support for the PNI-motion and ensure its passage by a vote of 91 to 54 
(Feith, 1962, p. 256).  The parliamentary vote had placed Wilopos policies in question, 
and the Minister of Defense had threatened to resign if any of the motions criticizing his 
leadership were passed.  Neither side knew what the others response would be, so both 
simply waited for the other to make the next move.  It was the army, however, that would 
attempt to seize the initiative in order to reaffirm the balance of power. 
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 On October 17, 1952 some 30,000 officers, soldiers and civilians staged a 
protest outside the Presidential palace while Sukarno was meeting inside with several of 
the armys top-ranking officers.  The senior officers, including many of the territorial 
commanders, had come to complain about the illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of 
parliament, and to demand its dissolution.  The President appeared to sympathize with 
their concerns and told them that he would look into the matter further, but little progress 
was made towards cooling tempers.  Over the next few days, parliament was put on 
recess, and the army placed several politicians under arrest.  They also ordered the 
closure of several opposition newspapers that had been particularly critical of the 
government.  By the end of a week, however, the situation had returned to some 
semblance of normalcy, and the government had re-opened for business as usual. 
 In the aftermath of this event, subsequently referred to as the October 17th 
Affair, there were a series of bloodless coups at the regional level where those officers 
that had sympathized with the dissolving of parliament were methodically replaced by 
officers sympathetic to both the PNI and Sukarno.  By mid-November, the pro-
government territorial commanders in East Java, East Indonesia, and South Sumatra had 
been relieved of their commands, and the central army leadership had come to stand 
alone in its support for the government (Feith, 1962, p. 269).  The political center of 
gravity within the army now shifted from behind the Wilopo cabinet, to behind the 
President and the PNI.   
 In early December, the cabinet was forced by the swell of public opinion 
to take measures to try to calm the situation.  It announced the dismissal of Colonel 
Nasution and his allies from their senior posts in the army leadership, and appointed a 
prominent anti-October 17th leader to take over as acting Army Chief of Staff.  A 
subsequent row between the new army chief and the Minister of Defense regarding other 
related personal reassignments resulted in the Sultans resignation from the cabinet in 
January 1953.  The threatened resignation of the cabinets two PSI ministers was only 
barely prevented, but the widely held view that the PSI had somehow had a hand in 
encouraging the October 17th Affair had placed a debilitating strain on relations between 
them and their traditional Masyumi allies (Feith, 1962, pp. 271-271).       
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 The shift in the armys political loyalties following the October 17th Affair 
had completely upset the delicate balance of power that had been maintained since 1948.  
The emergence of a pro-PNI leadership within the armys senior ranks threw the 
advantage to those factions within parliament that had long opposed the government.  By 
December, Wilopo had been almost completely abandoned by his own party, and 
Masyumi and the PSI now stood against a political power bloc composed of the PNI, 
PKI, and the Nahdatul Ulama.  Making matters worse, the opposition now could count 
on the support of both the President and the army.  
 
e. International Influences 
The Wilopo administrations approach to foreign relations was not one to 
produce significant opposition within the parliament.  Realizing the fundamental 
differences that existed between the Masyumi and PNI approaches to international 
relations, Wilopo opted to follow a middle course designed to avoid controversy.  There 
were of course issues that were unavoidable, such as the reoccurring debate over the 
Japanese Peace Treaty, ongoing negotiations with the Dutch, and the status of various 
diplomatic missions to the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union, but Wilopo 
was able for the most part to steer clear of the foreign policy pitfalls that the Sukiman 
government had suffered so disastrously from.  Rather than pressure from the outside, it 
would be internal pressures that would contribute to the fall of the Wilopo government.  
 
4. The Fall of Mr. Wilopo’s Cabinet 
The government of Wilopo would fall not with a bang, but with a whimper.  After 
the events of the October 17th Affair, the cabinet enjoyed even less political latitude than 
before.  Parliamentary support was at an all time low, and it seemed as if all the parties, 
including those participating in the government, were simply waiting for the next 
controversy to demonstrate the cabinets weakness, and thus to precipitate its implosion.  
The governments attempts to resolve a series of disputes over land distribution and the 
relocation of squatters from western-owned agricultural estates presented just such an 
issue to their growing opposition. 
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The seed of this issue had been planted several decades earlier with the 
establishment of large Dutch plantations along the eastern coast of Sumatra.  The 
granting of 75-year concessions by the Netherlands government was intended to 
guarantee a consistent source of revenues for the colonial regime, but the arrival of the 
Japanese in 1942 led to the abandonment of these properties (Vandenbosch, 1953, p. 
146).  As a condition of independence, Indonesia had agreed to recognize the validity of 
the pre-war Dutch concessions, including those estates that the Europeans had been 
forced to abandon as a consequence of the Japanese invasion.  Prior to the return of 
western-owned businesses, however, thousands of Indonesias poor and unemployed 
peasants began to move onto these vacant lands in order to establish their own farms.  
When the time came for them to vacate in order to facilitate the return of European-
owned companies, they naturally resisted.   
The cornerstone of both the Natsir and Sukiman economic programs had been the 
facilitation of western investment, including the honoring of those agreements made with 
the Dutch during negotiations leading to the Hague Agreement of 1949.  In order to 
stimulate economic growth, European and American investors would have to be wooed 
back to Indonesia, and most Indonesian leaders knew that foreign investors would only 
return if they had confidence that the Indonesian state was committed to both the rule of 
law and the principle of private property.  Under these circumstances, the growing 
presence of large numbers of squatters would prove to be an explosive political situation 
for the government.  The government found itself in the difficult position of having to 
remove Indonesian citizens from property that was to be returned for the use of the same 
Europeans who had exploited Indonesians for three centuries.  It was a no-win situation 
for Prime Minister Wilopo.     
The Sukiman government had first attempted to address this issue in the Summer 
of 1951 by proposing a compromise formula that would reduce the size of most of these 
land concessions in order to set-aside land for the use of Indonesian farmers.  It seemed 
like a plan that all parties could agree to, but that was not to be the case.  By the time the 
Wilopo government finally got around to implementing the plan during the following 
March, they ran headlong into the determined resistance of the peasants, as well as the 
political opposition.  On March 16, 1953, the police attempted to re-locate several 
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squatters from farms in the vicinity of Tandjong Morawa, but the squatters refused to 
cooperate.  In the melee, several of the peasants tried to seize weapons from the police, 
and as shots rang out, five of the farmers fell dead.  The uproar that followed would 
eventually lead to the fall of Wilopos cabinet. 
Although couched in the terms of squatters rights and European investment, the 
heated debate that followed the Tandjong Morawa incident was indeed far more complex 
(Feith, 1962, p. 295).  At its very heart was a struggle for political power in one of the 
few areas of Indonesia where the dominance of a particular political party had not yet 
become fully established.  Much of Sumatra, particularly in the north, was politically 
aligned with Masyumi, but large swaths of territory along the eastern and southern coasts, 
which had long been under the control of Dutch plantations during the colonial era, were 
left unclaimed.  In these areas, which were largely populated largely by Javanese and 
Chinese migrants, political Islam held little sway among the common farmer.  Still, the 
legislative councils established pursuant to Regulation 39 had allowed Masyumi to gain 
predominance in the district, regency and provincial governments without much 
competition.   
The PNI and the PKI had not, however, given up the struggle for these villages.  
These parties well knew that political gains at the grassroots level in these areas would 
allow them in turn to eventually seize control over successively higher levels of 
government until they fully-controlled the regional bureaucracies.  Consequently, the PNI 
and PKI members in parliament saw this incident as an opportunity to win support from 
tens of thousands of potential voters, and to undercut Masyumis already tenuous political 
support in large areas of Sumatra.  It also presented an opportunity to strike at the heart of 
the Wilopo government, which was already teetering from the reverberations of the 
October 17th Affair. 
In the middle of May 1953, a motion was put forth in parliament by a PKI-
sympathizer from the Sarekat Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants Association  
SAKTI).  The SAKTI motion demanded a vote of no confidence in Wilopos Minister of 
the Interior, Masyumis Mohammed Roem.  Despite the motion having been 
subsequently modified by the PNI in order to soften its language, Roem remained 
adamant in his vow to resign if the motion was passed.  Both sides understood that 
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Roems withdrawal from the cabinet would have dire consequences for the government; 
because it would also likely precipitate the withdrawal from the cabinet of Masyumis 
other three ministers (Feith, 1962, p. 296).   
Initially, fear of the governments collapse caused some restraint by both sides, 
but internal debate within the PNI fortified the resolve of the parliamentary opposition.  
Confident of their position in any subsequent cabinet, the PNI leadership offered to table 
the motion if Roem would offer his resignation, but Masyumi steadfastly refused these 
terms.  The PNI then offered to allow Roem to remain in the cabinet if Masyumi would 
approve the appointment of a PNI member to the vacant post of Minister of Information.  
Masyumi members were well aware of the central role that this ministry would play in the 
planning and conduct of upcoming national elections, and thus they once again declined 
the terms of the compromise.  Seeing that an impasse had been reached, and that neither 
the PNI, nor Masyumi were in the mood for compromise, Prime Minister Wilopo faced 
the inevitable and returned his mandate to the President. 
 
F. MASYUMI DURING THE CABINET OF ALI SASTROADMIDJOJO 
(JULY 1953 – JULY 1955) 
The collapse of the Wilopo government in June 1953 led to a prolonged period of 
negotiations between Masyumi and the PNI over the formation of a new cabinet.  Despite 
efforts to find an acceptable solution, five successive attempts to form a coalition would 
each fail, and fifty-eight days would pass before a government would again be formed.  
Efforts by the Masyumis Mohammad Roem and the PNIs Sarmidi Mangungsarkaro to 
form a cabinet built around a Masyumi-PNI core repeatedly fell short as a consequence of 
the insurmountable antagonism between the two main parties in parliament.  Likewise, 
efforts by the PNIs Mukarto Notowidigdo and Masyumis Burhanuddin Harahap to form 
cabinets centered on their own parties also met with failure.  By mid-1953, it seemed as if 
it would be impossible for Indonesias two largest political parties to ever cooperate 
again.  As if recognizing the impasse, President Sukarno named the chairman of the much 
smaller and less influential PIR party, Mr. Wongsonegoro, as the next formateur, and it 
seemed as if the deadlock might finally be broken.    
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Wongsonegoros initial cabinet recommendation was relatively generous to the 
Masyumi.  He offered it the portfolio of First Deputy Prime Minister, as well as the 
portfolios of Interior, Social Affairs, and Economic Affairs, but Masyumi stalled, hoping 
to either win greater concessions, or to force the return of Wongsonegoros mandate in 
the hope of receiving the formateurship for itself in the next round (Feith, 1962, pp. 337-
338).  Believing that they could count on assurances by the Nahdlatul Ulama not to 
participate in any government that excluded Masyumi, Natsir and the other party leaders 
waited for a better offer, but it never came.  Instead, Wongsonegoro turned away from 
Masyumi, and instead offered a greater share of ministerial assignments to the two other 
influential Islamic political parties within parliament, the Nahdlatul Ulama and the PSII.  
Confident that both parties would reject this offer in favor of preserving Muslim unity in 
the face of aggressive PNI and PKI expansion, Masyumis leaders learned that they had 
gambled badly, for both the Nahdlatul Ulama and PSII eventually accepted this offer.  
Consequently, Wongsonegoro was able to form a cabinet with significant Islamic 
political representation, but with no Masyumi influence.      
The cabinet roster submitted to President Sukarno by Wongsonegoro on July 31st 
listed the PNIs Ali Sastroamidjojo as Prime Minister, and included a motley collection 
of ministers from not only the PNI, but also from the PIR, Nahdlatul Ulama, PSII and 
five of the other smaller parties.  Between them, Nahdlatul Ulama and the PSII garnered 
five ministerial posts, but the PNI still dominated the cabinet with the three other major 
portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Economic Affairs.  Excluded from the cabinet 
were Masyumi, the PSI, Parkindo, the Catholic Faction, and the Democratic Fraction  all 
the parties that had been instrumental in forming the Natsir government.  Although both 
the PKI and the Partai Murba were excluded, two of the smallest parties given seats in 
the cabinet were generally believed to have close associations with the communists 
(Feith, 1962, p. 339).  Taken together, the parties participating on the cabinet held only a 
narrow majority in the parliament (114 to 107).  Yet, with assurances that the additional 
weight of the PKIs thirteen seats would be behind them, the government was able to 
achieve a comfortable buffer against Masyumis opposition. 
 
1. Cabinet Character 
Feith has opined that the Sastroamidjojo cabinet was the inevitable culmination of 
a string of events that had brought down the previous government, and which ultimately 
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led to the further polarization of parliament (1962, p. 339).  The PNIs alliance with the 
PKI, as well as its greatly improved cooperation with both the Nahdlatul Ulama and the 
PSII, had provided an effective means to blunt the powerful Masyumi-PSI alliance.  The 
extra weight of both the armys and the President Sukarnos support only made the 
coalitions grip on power that much more secure, or so the cabinet believed.   
The first Sastroamidjojo cabinet was a different animal than any of its 
predecessors.  Most of its members had cut their political teeth as radical nationalists in 
the revolutionary period, but only four of its twenty ministers had participated in any of 
the post-RUSI cabinets (Feith, 1962, p. 341).  A handful had served in the first Sukarno-
led cabinet of the post-WWII Republic, and three had been involved in the July 3rd Affair 
of 1946 that had sought to overthrow the government of the Republic of Indonesia under 
Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir.  In essence, this was a group of men that had enjoyed 
personal and professional relations with President Sukarno over the course of several 
decades, and which had long been opposed to the economic, military and social policies 
of Hatta, Sjahrir, and Natsir.  It was as far removed from the cabinets of Natsir, Sukiman 
and Wilopo as possible in the current political climate of the parliament, and it was 
particularly sobering spectacle to the Masyumi leaders who had turned their back on 
good-faith negotiations with the PNI. 
 
2. Agenda 
Despite this cabinet having radically different political underpinnings than any of 
its predecessors, Sastroamidjojos agenda differed little from that of Wilopo or Sukiman, 
or even Natsir for that matter, except perhaps in terms of its emphasis on certain matters 
of the economy and foreign relations.  Reflecting the secure mandate that he believed he 
enjoyed, Sastroamidjojo moved confidently on a number of significant issues about 
which others had often spoken, but had rarely acted on.  In outlining his intended agenda 
to parliament, Sastroamidjojo announced his intention to send an ambassador to Moscow, 
to negotiate a bi-lateral treaty with Japan against the wishes of the United States, to 
establish a trade agreement with communist China, to settle the Irian Jaya question, and 
to terminate once and for all the Indonesian-Netherlands Union established pursuant to 
the Hague Agreement of 1949.   
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Perhaps the most significant of Sastroamidjojos foreign policy goals concerned 
the expansion of Indonesias cooperation with the Asian-Arab bloc in the United Nations, 
an effort that would culminate with Indonesias hosting of the Asian-African Conference 
of 1955 at Bandung.  This conference was to mark Indonesias emergence as a leader 
among the third world nations, but it also served to make U.S. officials increasingly 
anxious about the ideological direction that Indonesia was heading.  U.S. fears seemed to 
be confirmed when in May 1954, the Indonesian government under Sastroamidjojo 
proposed a non-aggression pact with communist China.   
Sastroamidjojo proved to be equally aggressive when it came to his domestic 
agenda, which included efforts to indigenize the economy by both accelerating the 
nationalization of foreign-owned businesses and by granting tax credits to native 
Indonesians in order to facilitate the growth of entrepreneurship.  The rapid expansion in 
the number of new Indonesian-owned firms created by these programs did little to 
contribute the countrys overall economic growth, but Natsirs reforms did tend to retard 
foreign investment by eroding investor confidence in the Indonesian market.  Feith notes 
that these programs were also tremendous drains to the Indonesian treasury at a time 
when the government could least afford it, particularly in light of increased expenditures 
to fight a new separatist movement in Aceh, as well as the long-standing Darul Islam 
movement (1962, p. 377).  Sastroamidjojos efforts to expand the civil service, which 
served as a means to both extend the PNIs influence and as an important source of 
patronage for the smaller political parties supporting the government, also proved to be 
an excessive drain on the governments shrinking fiscal resources. 
Although marked by impressive accomplishments on the international stage, 
Sastroamidjojos tenure was far less impressive on the domestic front.  The widely-held 
perception that many of his policies were intended more to consolidate his partys 
influence than to benefit the nation as a whole created a great deal of resentment among 
the opposition and within the army, as well.  The commencement of preparations for the 
upcoming national elections had begun the scramble for votes, as well as for control over 




3. Political Dynamics 
a. Intra-Cabinet Dynamics 
 The heterogeneous composition of the Sastroamidjojo cabinet almost 
guaranteed that it would suffer from internal conflict.  By late 1953, the PNI party had 
become fairly unified with the eclipse of the Wilopo faction, but although many within 
the party had questioned the wisdom of excluding Masyumi from the cabinet, it was not 
from within this quarter that the governments troubles would emerge.   
 The first hint of discord appeared in September 1953 with an internal PSII 
struggle that led to the resignation from the cabinet of its Ministers for Communications 
and State Welfare.  Likewise, the Nahdlatul Ulama was rent with internal discord, with 
many of its members coming to resent the wholesale abrogation of much of the partys 
agenda and its betrayal of Masyumi for the sake of an opportunity to join the government.  
The apparent willingness of many of the partys senior leadership to enter into a coalition 
underpinned by the support of the anti-religion communists of the PKI and its affiliates 
was a persistent source of great concern that would hamper the Nahdlatul Ulamas ability 
to commit fully to Sastroamidjojos agenda.   
 By mid-1954, Nahdlatul Ulama dissatisfaction with the governments 
economic policy, as well as with the rampant corruption that it had engendered, had 
reached a point where the partys leadership felt compelled to voice a protest to the 
government.  In a sternly worded communiqué submitted to the cabinet in July the 
Nahdlatul Ulamas leadership demanded the resignation of the PIRs Ministers of 
Economic Affairs, Finance and Interior, as well as the reassignment of responsibility for 
internal security matters to the Nahdlatul Ulamas second Deputy Prime Minister, Zainul 
Arifin (Feith, 1962, p. 380).  In October, the PSII joined in support the Nahdlatul 
Ulamas demands.   
 Another of the cabinets supporters, the PIR, also underwent an internal 
power struggle during this period that culminated in a decision by the partys leadership 
council to demand the resignation of the entire cabinet under the threat of withdrawing its 
three members.  The refusal of the three PIR ministers to comply with the demands of 
their own party leadership resulted in a party split and led to the subsequent formation of 
a two competing factions.  The anti-government group within the PIR gained the 
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predominance of support from the partys members in parliament, and as a result, the 
government lost nineteen of the PIR votes in parliament on which it had depended to 
maintain its rather slim margin of control.  Notwithstanding their defiance against the 
demands of both the Nahdlatul Ulama and the PSII, as well as from within their own 
party leadership, the PIR Ministers ultimately resigned their posts at the end of October 
1954. 
 The government withstood a series of no-confidence motions over the 
course of the next several months, but the growing momentum of each of these 
demonstrated the increasing weakness of the cabinet against both internal and external 
challenges.  Ultimately, the wide variances in ideological outlook among the junior 
parties in the government coalition would pull the cabinet apart.  In July 1955, Parindra 
voted to withdraw its Minister from the cabinet, and one day later, the PSII began to urge 
the whole cabinet to resign.  By the end of the month, the Nahdlatul Ulama, PRN and 
Labor Party had all decided to join with the PSII in calling for the return of the 
governments mandate.  Although the subsequent fall of the Sastroamidjojo cabinet cant 
be entirely attributed to the actions of the governments smaller parties, there is little 
doubt that the lack of a shared vision among them created an almost insurmountable 
obstacle to overcome once additional pressure began to be applied from outside sources.  
 
b. Parliamentary Dynamics 
 The governments relationship with parliament was not always as smooth 
as might be inferred from the healthy surplus of votes that it enjoyed by virtue of the 
PKIs tacit support.  The cooperation of the smaller parties constituting the government 
was not always reliable and it was often vulnerable to the manipulation of those parties 
that remained in the opposition.  Conversely, the decline in the political relevance of both 
Masyumi and the PSI was not unexpected in light of the continuing erosion of their 
influence in both the bureaucracy and in the army.  By the end of Sastroamidjojos 
tenure, the number of Indonesias governorships under Masyumi and PSI control was 
only a quarter of what it had been two years earlier.  Sastroamidjojos efforts to replace 
Masyumi and PSI members at all levels of government service further cut into the ability 
of the major opposition parties to shape policy.  More importantly, it also deprived them 
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of a significant source of patronage and party revenue in the months leading up to 
national elections (Feith, 1962, pp. 367-369).       
 Masyumi was increasingly compelled to fight a two front war during this 
period.  On one hand, they had to face a powerful government coalition buttressed with a 
sizable contingent of Nahdlatul Ulama and PSII notables that had the potential for 
siphoning off support from Masyumis voter base.  Secondly, the progressive weakening 
of the PSI, made all the more dramatic by the decline of its influence in the army after the 
October 17th Affair, exacerbated Masyumis sense of political isolation and made them all 
the more vulnerable to counter-attack.  Neither of these developments, however, seemed 
to dissuade Masyumi from taking an aggressive stance against much of the governments 
agenda.  
 From the very beginning, Masyumi parliamentarians made no effort to 
conceal their desire to bring the cabinet down.  When Sastroamidjojos cabinet was first 
presented to the parliament in July 1953 for a vote of support, Masyumi and the Catholic 
Faction were the only two parties to vote against the proposed government (Feith, 1962, 
p. 344).  Masyumi was also the first party to sponsor a parliamentary motion questioning 
the governments economic policies and the rampant corruption that had been spawned 
by the PNIs use of government tax credits as a mechanism to reward its supporters 
(Feith, 1962, p. 379).  The governments failure to satisfactorily respond to Masyumis 
original inquiries merely encouraged the latter to expand the scope of the motion into a 
vote of no-confidence against the PNIs Minister of Economic Affairs, Iskaq 
Tjokroadisjuro.  This motion was defeated by a margin of 101 to 60 votes, but the 
governments apparent difficulty in cobbling together enough votes to defeat the 
Masyumi motion pointed to potential rifts within the coalition.  Masyumis concerns 
regarding the governments economic policies would rapidly also become political fodder 
for the Nahdlatul Ulama and the PSII, both of which also stood to lose as a result of the 
PNIs bureaucratic expansion.  This was also one of the central causes for the split within 
the PIR party discussed above.  
 Complaints over the corrupt and self-serving nature of the PNIs economic 
policies ultimately led to the resignation of the cabinets PIR ministers, which in turn 
encouraged the PNI to finally drop Iskaq Tjokroadisjuro from the cabinet.  The loss of 
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much of the PIRs parliamentary support could have been far more catastrophic for the 
government, however, a law approved by parliament during the tenure of the Wilopo 
government authorized the cabinet to appoint new members to replace non-party 
members who had either died or resigned in office.  The government parties 
overwhelmingly benefited from this law because all but seven of parliaments twenty-
three new members would prove to be supporters of Sastroamidjojos cabinet (Feith, 
1962, pp. 381-382).  Subsequent attempts by Masyumi to bring down the cabinet would 
fail, and in the end it would take an extra-parliamentary force to finally destabilize the 
government coalition sufficiently to collapse it.  Still, while Masyumi was focused on 
opposing Sastroamidjojo, it was itself being subjected to an intense attack on its flanks by 
the PKI.    
 The mass arrests that had occurred during Sukimans August 1951 anti-
communist offensive precipitated a significant change in the PKIs political strategy.  
After 1951, the party leadership discarded its previous policy of opposing all non-
communist parties, and it began to seek out political allies from among the secular 
nationalist parties, especially the PNI.  This change was an effort to not only remake the 
PKIs image as a viable political party willing to work within the constitutional 
parliamentary system, but by forging bonds of cooperation with other powerful parties, 
its leaders sought to provide the party with a measure of political cover so that it could 
begin to re-build itself from within (Thomas, 1981, pp. 370-371).   
 By adding its support to that of the governments coalition, the PKI 
ensured that the Sastroamidjojo cabinet would be able to maintain a sufficient majority 
within parliament to withstand attacks by Masyumi and the PSI.  In practice, however, 
this strategy was more far more complex than it might appear, because it ultimately 
depended on the tacit cooperation of those members of historically anti-communist 
parties also serving in the cabinet and in parliament (Feith, 1962, p. 343).  The most 
curious partnership to arise from this strategy was that which developed between the PKI 
and the Nahdlatul Ulama, whose members had viciously clashed with the communists in 
the aftermath of the Madiun Revolt of 1948.  It was an inherently unstable relationship 
because the communists were competing for the same votes as Nahdlatul Ulama in 
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Central and East Java.  Consequently, it was an accommodation that was entertained into 
only grudgingly by the latter (Barton & Fealy, 1996, pp. 29-33). 
  While the additional support of the PKI voting bloc ensured that the PNI 
would have sufficient parliamentary support to ward off repeated Masyumi challenges, it 
was actually the PKI that derived the greatest benefit from the relationship.  The PKI took 
full advantage of the protection that its role as a political collaborator afforded it, and 
within a year it had doubled its membership roles (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 248).  Most of its 
new members came from the villages of Central and East Java, as well as from the estate 
areas of East and North Sumatra, but its success in attracting new members during this 
period was in great part the result of a watering-down of its ideology and its willingness 
to accept anyone, regardless of social status, into its ranks (McVey, 1996, p. 102).  This 
was the most effective period of mass mobilization for the PKI, and much of its success 
can be attributed to the latitude that it enjoyed as a result of its relationship with the PNI.    
 In addition to providing a voting bloc in parliament in support of the 
governments policies, the PKIs other important task was to weaken Masyumi by 
repeatedly attacking it as an intolerant and extremist party beholden to western 
imperialists (Feith, 1962, pp. 357-359).  The most effective PKI attacks involved attempts 
to equate Masyumi with both the outlaw Darul Islam movement and the separatist 
movement in Aceh, which had erupted within weeks of the beginning of Sastroamidjojos 
tenure.  This was not, however, a particularly difficult line of attack to pursue in light of 
Masyumis historic timidity about implementing aggressive military solutions against the 
problem of Muslim rebels and terrorists.  Masyumis attempts to counter the PKI attacks 
by depicting the latter as radical, anti-religious zealots bent on establishing a godless 
communist state rang rather hollow when PKI leaders drew attention to their close 
working relationship with a government that now included two prominent Islamic 
political parties (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 249).   
 Masyumis need to fight on two fronts, and the increasing inability of the 
PSI to contribute much to the contest, left the modernist Muslim leaders of Masyumi 
increasingly politically isolated.  Their political struggle became little more than a 
desperate rear-guard action for survival, while the other parties took advantage of the 
spoils of government to expand their membership roles and to fill their campaign coffers.  
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Until the political dynamics shifted once again in their favor, Masyumi would be forced 
to fight to simply maintain its own political survival.  
 
c. Presidential Dynamics 
 As indicated above, this cabinets relationship with President Sukarno was 
perhaps the best that any Indonesian cabinet had ever enjoyed.  Much of this goodwill 
was simply an expression of a common political outlook, if not the logical by-product of 
several decades of shared revolutionary experiences against the same slate of foreign and 
domestic enemies.  The Presidents personal enmity toward many of Masyumis senior 
leaders, and his long-held belief that they were working to undermine Pancasila as the 
basis for the state, only served to bolster his support for any government that would 
exclude them from positions of power or prestige.   
 For its part, the government gladly loosed the political fetters on Sukarno.  
It encouraged him to take to the campaign trail where his speeches inevitably favored the 
secular-nationalist PNI, while criticizing Masyumi.  Although the President had in the 
past involved himself in politics, it had usually been in an oblique manner.  Now the 
Presidents more active efforts to support the PNI, and to denounce Masyumi, seemed to 
initiate a new era of Presidential politics in which Sukarno would become much more 
overtly involved (Gardner, 1997, p. 115).  The Presidents more active political role 
during this period was perhaps all the more apparent because the army no longer served 
as an effective counter-balance to his machinations (Feith, 1962, p. 341).  Sukarnos 
free-hand would not, however, last forever, for the distant rumblings of dissatisfaction 
were beginning to be heard again in the army, and the balance of power was about to shift 
once again.  
 
d. The Role of the Army 
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 Cumulative changes within the army during Sastroamidjojos tenure 
represent one of three most significant political developments to occur in Indonesia in its 
first two decades of independence.  Along with the rise of the PKI, and the concurrent 
eclipse of Masyumi, the army began to mature as a distinct and wholly independent 
political force in the crucible of the two years leading up to the 1955 elections.   
  The October 17th Affair of 1952 had demonstrated the existence of deep 
political divisions within the army, and in the aftermath, the armys leadership had been 
effectively purged of a large number of PSI and Masyumi loyalists.  Afterwards, the army 
settled once again into a relatively apolitical role, but the increasing factionalism and 
corruption of politics during the Wilopo and Sastroamidjojo administrations had a 
profound effect on the armys leadership.  It contributed to a collective loss of confidence 
in the legitimacy of both the cabinet and the parliament, as well as in the notion of 
civilian control of the military.  It produced the effect of causing the leaders to circle the 
wagons in order to safeguard the interests of the army.   
 The policies of the Minister of Defense, Iwa Kusumasumantri, proved to 
be very unpopular within the army.  Iwas party, the Progressive Faction, was known to 
have ties to the PKI, and his habit of appointing junior officers over the heads of those 
who were far more senior and capable smacked of political opportunism intended to 
fortify communist influence in the top ranks of the army leadership (Gardner, 1997, p. 
121).  A series of other cabinet decisions concerning personnel re-assignments, combined 
with suggestions by the Defense Minister to equip a fifth-force for the purpose of 
fighting Darul Islam, only further served to alienate army leaders who were beginning to 
resent the cabinets incessant meddling in internal army affairs (Feith, 1962, pp. 404-
405).  Actions by the cabinet to limit the participation of army personnel in the upcoming 
elections also contributed to a sense that they were being taken for granted by the 
government.  This resentment tended to transcend political ideologies and party loyalties 
because officers saw the Ministers actions as an affront to the armys status as an 
independent and equal arm of the Indonesian state.  The armys self-perceived role as the 
savior and guardian of the state was under assault, and this was a situation that all 
soldiers, regardless of their own individual political leaning, would vigorously resist. 
 In February 1955, a meeting of 270 army officers was held in Yogyakarta 
to discuss intra-army reconciliation.  Following a week of discussions, the gathering 
agreed to promulgate a resolution proclaiming a new spirit of cooperation among the 
officers and soldiers.  Although intra-leadership disputes would still be a frequent 
occurrence in the coming years, the united front that emerged produced a much more 
cohesive army (Feith, 1962, p. 398).  This new self-awareness was put to its first test in 
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June 1955 when the cabinet attempted to appoint a PNI-loyalist, Colonel Bambang Utojo, 
to the post of Chief of Staff of the Army (Crouch, 1988, p. 31).     
 The army leadership was uniformly displeased at the overtly politicized 
nature of the cabinets selection of an officer that was far too junior for the post.  
Consequently, they joined together in refusing to recognize his authority.  Over the 
course of the next several weeks, several prominent officers, including the leader of the 
anti-October 17th faction, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, stepped forward to denounce the past 
efforts of politicians to split the army in order to further their own political ambitions.  
These officers went even further by demanding that both the cabinet and the parliament 
formally pledge to no longer use the October 17th Affair as a political wedge issue, or to 
use any other criteria than seniority and competence to determine suitability for 
promotion (Feith, 1962, p. 398).  These officers also asked the government to explicitly 
define the limits of acceptable political interference in the internal affairs of the army.  
Efforts by both President Sukarno and the cabinet to woo the anti-October 17th faction 
back into their camp failed in the face of the army leaderships new sense of self-
awareness and resolve.  The army now seemed to speak with one voice, and what it said 
collectively indicated that it would no longer be politically beholden to any political 
faction.  
 The emergence of a much more politically conscious army in the wake of 
the February 1955 conference did not bode well for either the cabinet or for Sukarno.  
The army had made a stand, and it would no longer be used as the political instrument of 
corrupt and illegitimate politicians.  No longer would any of the various parties or the 
President be able to remain complacent about the armys political support, or even of its 
neutrality in any future political struggles.  The support of the army would be up for 
grabs in future, and its price would be determined not by others, but by the army itself.  
 
e. International Influences 
 When the Sastroamidjojo government came to power in July 1953 it faced 
a rising tide of frustration among its U.S. government counterparts.  The stalemate in 
Korea, ongoing communist machinations in Indochina, and a sobering realization that the 
Peoples Republic of China was not going to be a passing phenomenon, all contributed to 
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a growing sense that the Cold War would be a very long struggle indeed.  When General 
Dwight Eisenhower assumed the U.S. Presidency in January 1954, standing policy 
towards Asia changed only in terms of emphasis (Gardner, 1997, p. 112).  Under the 
leadership of John Dulles, the U.S. State Department undertook efforts to tighten the web 
of security commitments throughout Asia.  Following the course set by the Japanese 
Peace Treaty of 1951 and the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) mutual defense pact 
of 1951, the United States negotiated the Manila Pact in September 1954, which led to 
the creation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).  SEATO was 
specifically intended to help counter communist ambitions in the region, but absent 
among its signatories were the regions most fervent non-aligned nations, notably India, 
Burma and Indonesia.   
 While Indonesia had previously, albeit reluctantly, acceded to the 
Japanese Peace Treaty, Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo was well aware that it had 
contributed to the fall of the Sukiman cabinet.  The presence of multiple former colonial 
powers among the SEATO signatories, allied for the undisguised purpose of preventing 
another communist victory like that which led to the collapse of the French colonial 
presence in Vietnam, was not lost on the Indonesians.  No cabinet that supported a treaty 
with such blatant neo-colonial underpinnings would have survived for very long, and 
although the Sastroamidjojo cabinet viewed SEATO from a very pragmatic perspective, 
the Eisenhower administration proved to be far less accommodating.  The U.S. 
administration seemed haunted by a November 1953 National Security Council (NSC) 
policy memorandum that had advised that the loss of Indonesia to communism would 
have serious security implications for the United States and the rest of the free world. 
(Gardner, 1997, p. 115).   
 During 1953, Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo took advantage of 
Indonesias rising international profile to agitate for the resolution of the West New 
Guinea issue.  On balance, this issue was far more important to domestic stability than 
perhaps even the strict adherence to an independent and active foreign policy.  
Indonesias leaders recognized that the United States was obliquely supporting Dutch 
claims by supporting maintenance of the territorial status quo, and the unwillingness of 
the United States to support Indonesian attempts to raise the West New Guinea issue in 
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the United Nations in August 1954 didnt go unnoticed.  If anything, American 
intransigence in this matter hardened the Indonesian leaderships resolve to force the 
issue unilaterally, and it did serve to edge them further out of the U.S. sphere of influence 
and deeper into the camp of other third world nations (Gardner, 1997, p. 118).   
 The theme of the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in April 
1955 surely must have antagonized U.S. officials, as this meeting of developing nations 
received most of its momentum from the Cold War tensions.  The Bandung conferences 
stated goal of establishing a new power bloc of emerging Asian and African nations had a 
powerful effect of fanning nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiment among the 
Indonesian populace in the months leading up to the 1955 Indonesian general elections.  
Similarly, the increasing U.S. pressure, which was intended to drive the Indonesian 
government into the camp of the free world, only seemed to strengthen the Indonesian 
governments resolve to re-double their efforts to resist such overtures.  
 
4. The Fall of Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Cabinet 
The fall of the Sastroamidjojo cabinet was a direct result of the armys refusal to 
submit to the appointment of Colonel Bambang Utojo as Army Chief of Staff.  By the 
end of June 1955, the leader of parliaments Defense Section, Zainul Baharuddin, 
submitted a motion of no-confidence against the Minister of Defense, Iwa 
Kusumasumantri, and it was immediately seconded by a member of one of the 
governments own parties, the Parindras Hadjarati.  The government tried to avoid a 
parliamentary showdown, hoping that the armys new-found unity would begin to 
crumble if the cabinet stood firm, but the armys resolve only seemed to stiffen in the 
weeks that followed (Feith, 1962, p. 401).  By mid-July, the Parindras R.P. Suroso had 
been instructed by his partys leadership to resign from the cabinet, and the PSII had 
begun to advise the government to return its mandate, yet Sastroamidjojo continued to 
stall.   
 On July 13, Defense Minister Iwa resigned, and the cabinet made one last attempt 
to placate the army leadership by offering to retire Colonel Bambang Utojo, and to 
replace him as Army Chief of Staff with Colonel Lubis.  Lubis had been a pivotal leader 
of the Anti-October 17th faction and was a close relative of Zainul Baharuddin, the leader 
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of the Parliaments Defense Section.  According to the compromise plan, the army 
leaders would simply have to make a formal acknowledgement of Colonel Utojos 
authority prior to his retirement and Lubis appointment, but even this they refused to do 
as a matter of principle (Feith, 1962, p. 401).  The cabinets prestige had evaporated, and 
by the end of the month, the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Labor Party and the PRN had all 
withdrawn their support for the government.  On July 24, Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo 
was compelled by the collapse of his coalition to return the governments mandate to 
Vice President Hatta.  President Sukarnos departure from Indonesia several days earlier 
in conjunction with a Haj pilgrimage to Mecca signaled as clear an indication as any that 
he had himself lost confidence in the ability of the Sastroamidjojo government to recover 
from the mortal blow that the army had dealt it (Feith, 1962, p. 402). 
 
G. MASYUMI DURING THE CABINET OF BURHANUDDIN HARAHAP 
(AUGUST 1955 – MARCH 1956) 
The rise of the army and the subsequent fall of Sastroamidjojos government 
seemed to signal an opportunity for the re-emergence of Masyumi and the PSI on the 
political stage.  The question on everyones mind in the Summer of 1955 was whether the 
army would return to its pre-October 17th 1952 role as a passive supporter of the these 
parties, or whether it would try to increase its own share of power.  Shortly after the 
return of Prime Minister Sastroamidjojos mandate, Vice President Hatta arranged to 
meet with the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis.  To many 
observers the haste with which this meeting was convened seemed to imply that the 
military would have a much more active role in determining the composition of the next 
cabinet.  An army statement released shortly thereafter denied such inferences and 
suggested only that the cabinet selection process should be grounded in the needs of the 
country as a whole, rather than in the needs of any particular political party or faction 
(Feith, 1962, p. 415).  The army leadership cautioned the parties against a return to the 
rampant corruption of the kind that had characterized the previous cabinet.  With the 
benefit of hindsight, their warnings now seem to have been a clear omen of things yet to 
come.    
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Although nearly all parties agreed that the appointment of a new cabinet needed 
to be completed with a sense of urgency, neither of the two main parliamentary factions 
could agree on the appropriate course to take.  The Masyumi-PSI faction recommended 
the appointment of a business cabinet led by Vice President Hatta, while the PNI and 
the PKI, campaigned for a coalition cabinet like those of the past.  On July 29, Vice 
President Hatta, acting on behalf of President Sukarno, named three co-formateurs to 
assemble a new cabinet.  Masyumis Dr. Sukiman, the PNIs Wilopo, and a non-affiliated 
member of parliament, Mr. Assat, were tasked with negotiating a cabinet that above all 
else would be capable of both restoring a sense of moral authority to the government, 
while bringing to conclusion the planning and conduct of national elections.    
The three co-formateurs successfully cooperated in the selection of nominees for 
the various ministerial portfolios, but progress stalled when it came to naming a candidate 
for the post of Prime Minister.  Masyumi wanted to offer this post to Vice President 
Hatta, but because the 1950 provisional constitution did not authorize the Vice President 
to serve concurrently in the cabinet, special permission had to be authorized by 
parliament via special resolution.  The resolution ultimately forwarded by Masyumi 
authorized the granting of a leave of absence for Hatta so that he could serve as Prime 
Minister, but it also permitted him to return to the post of Vice President at the expiration 
of the cabinets term.  The PNI, however, refused to accept the latter stipulation, and 
unable to overcome this deadlock, the formateurs returned their mandate to the Vice 
President less than a week after receiving it.  Hatta then turned to Masyumi, naming 
Burhanuddin Harahap as the next formateur.   
Burhanuddin sought at first to forge a Masyumi-PNI coalition as the basis for the 
next cabinet, but the unwillingness of both of the main parties to accede to eithers 
choices for key assignments led each effort to failure.  The PNI was particularly opposed 
to the idea of a Masyumi member in the politically sensitive post of Minister of Defense, 
and Masyumi consistently balked at the PNIs candidates for Foreign Affairs and Public 
Works (Feith, 1962, p. 418).  It seemed as if the bitter relations that had festered between 
the two parties over the last several cabinets had made any future cooperation increasing 
unlikely.  In the end, Masyumi turned away from the PNI, and instead engaged in talks 
with the two other prominent Islamic parties (PSII and Nahdatul Ulama).  Both of these 
parties now controlled a sizable voting bloc in parliament, but the Nahdatul Ulamas 
leadership seemed to be less than enthusiastic about entering into a coalition with 
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Masyumi.  Their reticence concerning this matter was grounded in the elementary 
political calculation that the party had made better political gains while serving in the 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet than it had ever made as a constituent member of Masyumi.  
Ultimately, however, they and the PSII chose to join Burhanuddins government, along 
with the two Christian parties, the PSI, and several of the smaller parties that had always 
seemed to find a niche in previous cabinets. 
 
1. Cabinet Character 
The twenty-three ministerial posts of the Burhanuddin cabinet afforded it the 
distinction of having been the largest of the post-independence cabinets to date.  This 
statistic points to an ever-growing reliance on the participation in the government of the 
smaller parties (Feith, 1962, p. 419).  This support did not, however, come without a 
price because the participation of the smaller parties magnified the tendency towards 
corruption.  Realizing that the upcoming elections would in all likelihood erase not only 
their presence in parliament, but also their continued access to the spoils of government, 
the smaller parties aggressively bargained to extract as many concessions as possible 
from their Masyumi patrons.  Consequently, despite high hopes that this cabinets Islamic 
moorings would allow it to serve as a beacon of moral authority; it nonetheless rapidly 
began to demonstrate the same degree of rampant corruption that had plagued the 
previous cabinet. 
As the smaller parties continued to graze from the public trough, Masyumi and the 
PSI re-focused their collective energies on systematically undoing PNI and PKI gains 
made in the civil service and military over the previous two years.  It was not an agenda 
likely to win great public acclaim, but the nearness of the impending elections and the 
concomitant need for both Masyumi and the PSI to quickly re-establish its influence at 
the various levels of the government bureaucracy, imbued a sense of desperation in the 
governments actions.  Consequently, it left little room for the pursuit of more high-
minded aims.   
Not all of the constituent parties within the cabinet shared the same perspective 
when it came to the governments agenda.  The spectrum ranged from Masyumi/PSIs 
relatively straightforward policy of bureaucratic and economic rectification, to the more 
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haphazard struggle of the minor parties to win as much patronage as possible before the 
death knell of elections sounded out their doom.  The Nahdatul Ulama and PSII agendas 
were as motivated by practical concerns as those of any other party in the cabinet, except 
that they were perhaps more acutely sensitive to concerns about the implementation of 
government policies intended principally to antagonize the PNI.  Nahdatul Ulama, and to 
a lesser extent PSII, would in all likelihood find a home in any future cabinet, and they 
were understandably loathe to poison their own relationships with the opposition parties 
for the sake of politically expedient policies which almost entirely benefited Masyumi 
and PSI membership.  As a result, they proved to be stubborn in resisting much of the 
Prime Ministers agenda. 
 
2. Agenda 
The agenda of the Burhanuddin cabinet was essentially two-fold.  Its long-term 
goals included a slowing-down or halting of the policies of the previous administration, 
especially those that had been aimed at nationalizing large parts of the economy and 
opening it up to indigenous Indonesian businesses at the expense of foreign investment.  
The cabinet felt that the previous governments economic policies had been too radical in 
light of the fragility of the economy, and that such policies had only served to scare off 
foreign investors and fritter away dwindling revenues.  Consequently, the Burhanuddin 
cabinet was far more interested in wooing back foreign investment through confidence 
building measures, while taking the appropriate measures to expand production capacities 
irrespective of the nationality of the ownership of the means of production (Feith, 1962, 
p. 421).  
As with economics, the Burhanuddin cabinet took a different tack with respect to 
foreign policy, opting instead to pursue more cordial relations with the West.  The 
policies of Sastroamidjojo had been stridently neutral, but that neutrality had often been 
misconstrued by the United States.  Indonesias willingness to trade with and to seek aid 
from both the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China was frequently perceived 
through  the  distorted lens of  the  Cold  War  as  something  more than what it was.  The 
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PKIs tacit support for the Sastroamidjojo government only seemed to lend more 
credence to U.S. concerns that Indonesia was beginning to drift dangerously close to the 
communist orbit.   
The Burhanuddin cabinet fully appreciated the negative effect that such 
appearances could have on trade relationships with the West, but it also recognized the 
consequences that U.S. apprehensions had in fueling the impasse over the West New 
Guinea issue.  If the Untied States believed that Indonesia was falling into the communist 
sphere, it would never agree to pressure the Netherlands to relinquish its claims of 
sovereignty.  Consequently, the governments foreign policy became one of allaying the 
Wests concerns in order to win the support of the United States for resolving Indonesias 
territorial claims in West New Guinea, the importance of which cannot be understated in 
terms of how it influenced domestic morale and the political discourse.       
In the near-term, the governments agenda was based on what Feith has described 
as a platform of hostility towards the policies of its predecessor (1962, p. 420).  Thus, 
the cabinet set out to unravel the gains that the PNI and PKI had made in the army, in the 
civil service, and in the indigenous economy.  Every policy decision was scrutinized to 
determine its potential political impact on the government parties, rather than in 
consideration of the economic or security consequences for the state.  Policies were 
implemented with either an eye towards whatever advantage might be gained in the 
upcoming elections, or with the intent of depriving the opposition of some measure of 
patrimonial influence.  Despite promises of a return to moral authority, politics 
remained as corrupt and patronage-driven as ever, if not more so.    
The fundamental problem with Burhanuddins agenda was that the short-term 
benefits it produced would eventually be subsumed by the lack of confidence it would 
inevitably engender among Masyumis own supporters in the long-term.  The PNI and 
PKI naturally opposed the governments self-serving policies, however, what Masyumi 
and the PSI failed to fully appreciate was the degree of disillusionment its policies would 
cause not only among the general public, but in the army as well.   
The generally tepid support that the senior army leaders had given to the 
Burhanuddin cabinet when it was first announced was no doubt due in large part to the 
armys suspicions that this cabinet would be in no way fundamentally different than its 
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predecessors.  As much as army leaders might disagree over the status and end goal of 
the revolution, almost all were in basic agreement that the political parties as a whole had 
so far acquitted themselves disgracefully and in contravention to the spirit that had 
motivated the struggle for independence.  Their constant bickering and patrimonial one-
upmanship had repeatedly stalled the political process and kept the young nation mired in 
a state of developmental immaturity.     
The lack of a shared political vision among this governments constituent 
elements tended to impart a lack of consistency in its overall agenda, and made even its 
legitimate goals unachievable.  Its ad hoc approach to undoing the accomplishments of 
the previous cabinet was perhaps its most successful endeavor, but such efforts were 
hardly met with unqualified approval by those who might agree in principal that the 
policies of Sastroamidjojo had been heavy-handed and necessitated some remedy.  Many 
who had reviled the previous government for its self-serving and corrupt nature quickly 
began to have similar misgivings about this cabinet, and specifically its inadequacy for 
carrying out the tasks of governance.  Thus, the Burhanuddin cabinets agenda, or rather 
its lack of one, served only to reinforce the perception of many that parliament, the 
parties, and the whole western-style democratic experiment had somehow failed 
Indonesia.  The army leadership was among the first to come to this conclusion, and it 
was the armys support that Masyumi could stand least to loose. 
 
3. Political Dynamics 
a. Intra-Cabinet Dynamics 
 Like many of its predecessors, the Burhanuddin government was 
inherently unstable.  The exclusion of the PNI from the cabinet necessitated Masyumis 
reliance on a motley collection of smaller parties, many of which were rather ambivalent 
towards the Masyumi-PSI agenda.  The immanence of general elections, which were 
scheduled to be held within months of the cabinets installation, precipitated a greater 
sense of urgency for all of the parties within the Burhanuddins government with regard 
to molding the political landscape to their own advantage.  However, as noted repeatedly, 
their respective agendas were shaped by widely divergent goals.  While both Masyumi 
and the PSI were more interested in remedying the personnel and economic policies of 
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the Sastroamidjojo government lest they create political liabilities for the senior 
government parties, the outlook of the smaller parties was far more practical.  The 
inevitability of elections that had long been feared by the smaller parties had finally 
arrived.  Knowing full well that the national elections would likely erase their influence, 
if not their entire presence in parliament, the smaller parties scrambled to take full 
advantage of their last opportunity to wring as many concessions as possible from the 
government.  Regardless of the potential for impeding the governments agenda, or the 
negative impact that their efforts would have on the cabinets relations with the 
opposition parties, the President, and the army, the smaller parties pushed their own 
interests with relentless zeal.   
 The most important of the inter-cabinet dynamics, however, was that 
which guided political relations between Masyumi and the smaller Islamic parties 
participating in the government.  Since the fracturing of Masyumi in 1952, both Nahdatul 
Ulama and the PSII had gone on to blaze their own trails, and they had discovered that 
their political support could be a valuable commodity in an almost evenly split 
parliament.  In many ways, their ideological roots were closer to those of the PNI than 
they had ever been to those of Masyumis modernist Muslim majority.  As the voice of a 
constituency that was mainly concentrated in the outer islands and in the Sundanese 
heartland of West Java, Masyumis complaints about the inequity of Javanese domination 
of the political process consistently failed to resonate with the Javanese-dominated 
Nahdatul Ulama.  Masyumis economic and political concerns were simply not those of 
Nahdatul Ulama, or vice versa.  Nahdatul Ulamas leaders were more apt to find that 
they had much more in common, at least culturally and politically, with the priyayi who 
formed the core of the PNI leadership.  Although Masyumi was eager to alter the status 
quo of Javanese political domination, both Nahdatul Ulama and the PNI remained 
favorably inclined to maintain the political hegemony of the ethnic group which 
constituted nearly all of their support.       
 Nahdatul Ulama was fully aware that neither of the two main 
parliamentary factions could achieve sufficient parliamentary support to establish a 
cabinet without the leverage provided by the Nahdatul Ulama -PSII coalition, particularly 
when overt PKI involvement in the government remained taboo.  This realization 
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naturally made the Nahdatul Ulama and PSII leaders more reticent than their Masyumi 
colleagues regarding wholesale changes in the structure of the bureaucracy or in the 
economy, especially if such changes could tend to embarrass or antagonize the opposition 
parties.  Masyumi leaders were apt to view the political skittishness of Nahdatul Ulama 
and PSII as betrayal, but Nahdatul Ulamas leadership remained unperturbed:  Having 
also been welcome in the first Sastroamidjojo cabinet, Nahdatul Ulama and PSII leaders 
were quite willing to make every effort to maintain the political and bureaucratic status 
quo in order to safeguard their own future political fortunes.   Regardless of which parties 
gained ascendancy in the upcoming elections, both Nahdatul Ulama and PSII would 
likely find a role in the next government, and they were not about to jeopardize that 
opportunity in order to achieve political ends that held no intrinsic benefit for them.   
 The Nahdatul Ulamas unwillingness to wholeheartedly support Masyumi 
and PSI attempts to redress perceived grievances against the previous administration was 
most acutely demonstrated during Burhanuddins attempts to pursue corruption 
prosecutions against former ministers and other government employees.  Although 
initially lauded as a long-belated crackdown on corrupt politicians, it soon became 
obvious to most observers that the bulk of the investigations were, if not entirely 
politically motivated, at least weighted to have the most severe effect against PNI 
members.  Nahdatul Ulama and PSII strenuously objected to the tenor and scope of these 
investigations, fearing that they would only further worsen strained relations between the 
two largest parties and put them uncomfortably betwixt the two giants.  Nahdatul 
Ulamas position ultimately prevailed, and the cabinets efforts to pursue anti-corruption 
legislation in parliament withered on the vine.    
 Following the return of the general election results, the negotiating 
position of both Nahdatul Ulama and PSII did improve significantly.  Nahdatul Ulamas 
parliamentary delegation increased by nearly six hundred percent (from 8 to 45), making 
it the third largest party in parliament, whereas PSIIs grew by two hundred percent (from 
4 to 8).  Masyumis disappointing showing in the elections, and the PSIs loss of over 
sixty percent of its seats, would further constrain Masyumis ability to act in 
contravention to the will of its junior partners.  
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b. Parliamentary Dynamics 
 The initial opinion of the opposition parties regarding the Burhanuddin 
cabinet was cautiously reserved, but as government efforts to pursue corruption charges 
against former government employees (especially those with PNI affiliation) began to 
heat up, so did the rhetoric.  Within weeks of the cabinets installation, the oppositions 
simmering resentment began to bubble to the surface, but in the absence of attempts by 
the Burhanuddin government to achieve anything of substance in the months leading up 
to September general elections the opposition was left with little ammunition with which 
to attack the cabinet.  Consequently, much of the vitriol that would normally be expressed 
in parliamentary debates was instead relegated to the press and the campaign trail.    
 The most vehement opposition to Burhanuddins anti-corruption drive 
emerged within the cabinet itself, and the initial urgency of the effort eventually waned 
under the pressure of both Nahdatul Ulama and the PSII.  Even the President weighed in 
to oppose the cabinets efforts.  In the end, despite strenuous objections by Nahdatul 
Ulama leaders, the cabinet attempted to force the issue by the issuance of an emergency 
law that allowed the government to convene special corruption tribunals.  President 
Sukarnos veto complicated the implementation of this decree, and compelled the cabinet 
to weight the risks of either bringing the issue to a floor vote in parliament or else letting 
it die a natural death in committee.  Burhanuddin wisely chose the latter course for fear of 
further straining relations within his own cabinet, while incurring the wrath of the both 
the parliamentary opposition and the President.  
  The issue that suffered the most from rising tensions between the cabinet 
and the opposition parties concerned the perennial negotiations with the Dutch over both 
the status of the West New Guinea territories and the continuation of the Netherlands-
Indies Union.  The Burhanuddin cabinet, like its predecessors, attempted to renegotiate a 
diplomatic settlement to the more onerous stipulations of the 1949 Hague Agreement, but 
from the start it was hamstrung by the machinations of the parliamentary opposition.  
How much of this opposition was genuine is unclear, but the pattern of politics in this era 
was such that the opposition always seemed to oppose such efforts regardless of which 
parties were serving in government, even though every government since 1950 had 
pursued nearly identical policies towards the Netherlands.   
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 The biggest difference between the efforts of Burhanuddin and those of 
his predecessor was the degree of antagonism between Indonesia and the West that each 
of these governments was willing to tolerate in their attempts to force the hand of the 
Netherlands to settle outstanding economic and territorial claims.  In general, most PNI 
and PKI leaders were far more willing to take steps that were antagonistic to both the 
United States and Europe if it meant achieving their political and economic goals.  The 
much ballyhooed Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations of April 1955 was 
an event meant to telegraph to the world the emerging importance (and relevance) of non-
aligned third-world countries.  It was also meant to remind the West that newly post-
colonial, independent nations, such as Indonesia and India, no longer needed the West as 
much as the West needed them, and as a result, negotiations would be on their own terms, 
not on those of the imperialists that had for so long subjugated and exploited them.  
 Masyumi/PSI led governments, such as those of Natsir, Sukiman and 
Burhanuddin, were far more risk adverse than their PNI colleagues when it came to 
negotiations with the West.  Although the economic policies of Sastroamidjojo and 
President Sukarno were orientated towards the indigenization of native industries and the 
nationalization of foreign-owned capital, Masyumi and PSI leaders were generally far 
more accommodating towards western-owned business interests, if for no other reason 
than that they believed that sustained foreign investment was critical to the economic 
development of Indonesia.  Consequently, Masyumi/PNI-led cabinets tended to be much 
more hospitable and tentative in their negotiations with the Dutch for fear that short-term, 
symbolic gains won through unilateral action or rhetorical blustering would endanger the 
attainment of long-term economic gains.   
 In late 1955, the Burhanuddin government began to negotiate in earnest 
with the Dutch in hopes of resolving some of the loose-ends of the 1949 Hague 
Agreement that had remained unresolved throughout the previous fifteen years.  The 
Prime Minister had high hopes that a resolution of the minor issues on the table might 
encourage the Dutch to become more amenable to discussions regarding the ultimate 
status of West New Guinea, but this conciliatory approach proved to be increasingly 
intolerable to the opposition parties.  PNI leaders were still riding high following 
Sastroamidjojos successful hosting of the Bandung Conference, and they were 
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exceptionally sensitive to any appearance of weakness in negotiations with a former 
colonial power (Feith, 1962, p. 451).    
 Shortly before the Indonesian Foreign Minister (Mr. Ide Anak Agung Gde 
Agung) departed for Geneva to begin negotiations, the opposition sniping reached its 
crescendo.  The President also went on record in opposition to the negotiations less than a 
week after they had begun, and both the Nahdatul Ulama and PSII announced their 
refusal to participate in the governments delegation.  Within weeks, both of these parties 
went even further by demanding the dissolution of the entire diplomatic mission, and 
when Burhanuddin hesitated, they withdrew their members from the cabinet altogether.  
As might be expected, the increasing softness of domestic support at the beginning of 
negotiations only served to undermine Anak Agungs bargaining position, while 
conversely strengthening that of the Dutch.   
 In light of such soft domestic support towards the continuation of good-
faith negotiations, the cabinet was forced to lower expectations, while the constant 
hectoring from the opposition forced them to assume a less supple bargaining position.  
Initial agreements of substance between Indonesian and Dutch negotiators disintegrated 
under the pressures building back home, and the smell of weakening Indonesian resolve 
emboldened the Dutch to backtrack on previous agreements.  By February of 1956, it had 
become obvious that little of substance would be gained by continued negotiations, and 
the Indonesian delegation withdrew from further discussions. Two days later, the 
Burhanuddin cabinet unilaterally abrogated the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.  Although 
this was an action that many previous cabinets had considered, none had had the nerve to 
act so boldly.     
 The move by Burhanuddin to end the union was a surprise to many both 
inside and outside of the cabinet, though few could explain exactly what the action would 
mean for the Indonesian people.  Although the abrogation would prove to have little 
practical meaning in the short-term, its symbolic value was immeasurable for those 
government parties that had long been portrayed as accomodationist and pro-West by the 
more strident nationalists in the opposition.  It would be a hollow success, however, for 
although the cabinets motion passed unanimously in parliament, it did so only after the 
entire opposition membership left the floor in protest (Feith, 1962, p. 458).  In a narrow 
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political sense, the entire episode served to buoy the political credibility of the cabinet 
parties, but it also set a precedent for future unilateral usurpations of international 
agreements that would lead Indonesia down a slippery slope ending in the nationalization 
of Dutch-owned properties in 1957.  
 
c. Elections of 1955 
 The watershed event of the constitutional period was by all measures the 
general elections of 1955.  The importance of these events was derived not from the 
intrinsic influence they had in determining the participants of the political process, but 
rather because they redefined how those participants were perceived by both their allies 
and their enemies.  Prior to these elections, most political observers were unanimous in 
their overestimation of the strength of the two main Islamic political parties (Masyumi 
and Nahdatul Ulama).  Even after the split of Nahdatul Ulama from Masyumi in 1952, 
pundits continued to underemphasize the growing chasm between the opposing wings of 
the Muslim constituency, and their growing weakness in the face of the emerging 
strength of the communist parties, the President, and the army.  When the results of the 
elections had been tallied, many of those same pundits were astonished to discover that 
Masyumis support was far softer than any had anticipated.  Worse, the numbers pointed 
to the re-emergence of the PKI from under the shadows of Madiun as a potent political 
counterweight to the Islamic parties.  When the ground-truth of Masyumis political 
strength had finally been revealed, those opposition groups that had previously hesitated 
to take on the Islamic juggernaut were emboldened to try to seize a bigger share of the 
power.     
 Since 1950, the idea of elections had been an oft re-occurring theme in the 
political discourse, but it had taken half a decade to bring the idea to fruition because of a 
pervasive fear among the secular parties that elections would only serve to legitimize 
Masyumis political advantage, if not magnify it (Lubis, 1952, p. 158).  In the appointed 
parliament of 1950-1955, Masyumi held forty-four seats even after the separation with 
Nahdatul Ulama, while the next largest party, the PNI, controlled only forty-two.  Most 
observers of Indonesian politics during this era believed that Masyumi would inevitably 
gain a significant number of seats if and when elections were ever held (Feith, 1954, p. 
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246; Bone, 1955, p. 1084).  The opposition parties understandably believed that it was in 
their best interest to endeavor to delay the conduct of these elections for as long as 
possible.  Conversely, Masyumi was committed to forcing the issue to culmination.   
 The October 17th Affair of 1952 spurred the political parties to undertake 
preparations for elections with a greater sense of enthusiasm and vigor (Bone, 1955, p. 
1071).  A growing sense within the army that the un-elected parliament and its parties 
had become mired in political stalemate and corruption had contributed to the pro-
October 17th forces call for the wholesale disbanding of the parliament.  Although those 
forces had not prevailed in that showdown, their warning was received loud and clear 
even among those who had most vigorously resisted elections (Feith, 1957, pp. 2-3).  The 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet made great strides in scheduling the elections and completing 
much of the administrative preparations, but it would be left to the Burhanuddin cabinet 
to actually conduct the long-awaited event.       
 The election law promulgated in April 1953 provided for two separate 
national elections.  The first would be for the 257 seats of the national parliament, while 
the second would be for the Constituent Assembly, which would have the responsibility 
of drafting and approving a permanent constitution that would replace the 1950 
provisional constitution.   The latter body would be exactly twice the size of the former 
and its membership would be mutually exclusive from that of the new parliament.  From 
September 29 to November 29, more than 39 million Indonesian voters went to the polls 
to select those parties, organizations and individuals that would represent them in the 
national parliament.  In December, elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, but 
because of the complexity of the counting procedures outlined in the Election Law of 
1953, official results for these elections were not ready for release until the following 
March (Tinker & Walker, 1956, p. 107).  The official results proved surprising to many. 
 Although many pundits had correctly predicted the disappearance of a 
majority of the smaller parties in the wake of the elections, they had overestimated their 
predictions regarding the inevitability of a landslide victory for the Islamic parties, 
especially Masyumi.  To some extent these predictions were right: In the end, nearly 38 
million votes were cast, with 85% going for the four largest parties (Masyumi, PNI, PKI 
and Nahdatul Ulama).  The disparity between these top four and the remaining parties 
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was enormous.  Even the smallest of the four parties, the PKI, received more than five 
times as many votes as the next largest party (Feith, 1957, p. 57).   
 On the surface, the consolidation of a large majority of the electorate 
under the four main parties, and the concomitant extinction of so many of the smaller 
parties, would seem to have been a positive development.  It was after all the vacillation 
of the smaller parties that typically created the instability of past cabinets, but in this case 
the voting patterns simply reinforced ethnic and social divisions within Indonesian 
society (Tinker & Walker, 1956, p. 107).  These ethnic and social divisions would prove 
to be far more dangerous to the future of democracy in Indonesia than the small parties 
had ever been.    
 The nationalist, secular and left-wing parties received the majority of their 
support from Central and East Java, while the religiously-based parties polled strongest in 
the outer islands and West Java.  The sole exception, Nahdatul Ulama, received most of 
its support from East and Central Java, as well as from Sulawesi and Kalimantan 
(Gosnell, 1958, pp. 181-186).  Most observers were surprised by the strength of both the 
PNI and the PKI, but their successes were geographically isolated in Java and in some of 
the plantation areas of East Sumatra.  The PNI received nearly 66% of its vote in Central 
and East Java alone, while the PKI received almost 75% in those provinces (Feith, 1957, 
p. 62).  The sheer population density of Java guaranteed at least some success to these 
parties in relation to those parties that were largely supported in the less-densely 
populated seberang communities, but no one could have predicted the extent of the gains 
they made.  The party of urban intellectuals, the PSI, was decimated in these elections:  It 
lost nine of the fourteen seats it had held in the provisional parliament.     
 Similarly few predicted the dramatic rise of Nahdatul Ulama as a political 
force.  As a splinter party it had held a mere eight seats in the provisional parliament.  As 
a consequence of the parliamentary elections, Nahdatul Ulamas presence grew well over 
fivefold.  Gosnell suggests that Nahdatul Ulama undoubtedly benefited by the relentless 
attacks on Masyumi by the PNI, the PKI and Sukarno (1958, p. 187).  In East and Central 
Java, Nahdatul Ulama prevailed with ease against their Masyumi opponents because of 
the pesantren networks and the influence of their Kyai in shaping the voting behavior of 
villagers.   
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 The results of the parliamentary election further widened the chasm 
between Nahdatul Ulama and Masyumi, as well as between the constituencies of the 
outer island and those on Java. For Masyumi, the elections also served to obviate their 
political weakness in the Javanese heartland, the home of some 66% of Indonesian 
voters.  Although Masyumi received slightly more than 51% of its vote from Javanese 
voters (mostly in West Java), it emerged as the strongest party by far among that one-
third of the Indonesian population that lived outside of Java (Feith, 1962, p. 437).  
Unfortunately for Masyumi, this constituency was not in control of the key economic or 
political levers of power, and that fact would ultimately exacerbate existing tensions 
between the central government and the outer islanders.  In time, those tensions would 
erupt into full-scale conflict, and Masyumi would be forced to choose sides.  For its 
leaders, political and religious principles would impel them to support their outer island 
constituencies in their conflicts with the Indonesian government, and those conflicts 
would in turn further weaken Masyumi.  In the wave of dramatic political changes to 
come, Masyumi would find itself increasingly isolated.  
 
d. Presidential Dynamics 
 Following the collapse of the October 17th Affair, President Sukarnos 
political influence once again began to grow.  The lack of stability within the army had 
removed an effective political counterweight, and Sukarno took full advantage of the 
vacuum while he could, but the resolution of internal army divisions had inevitably 
helped bring down the Sastroamidjojo cabinet and thrown the Presidents continued 
influence in jeopardy.  Sukarno had himself had nothing to do with the formation of the 
Burhanuddin government as he had been out of the country upon the fall of the 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet.  Thus the appointment of the government formateurs and the 
subsequent approval of the ministerial candidates had fallen upon Hatta in his capacity as 
Acting President.       
 It was clear from the beginning that the President was not sympathetic to 
the Burhanuddin cabinet.  With a veto of the governments anti-corruption decree, 
Sukarno had taken the wind of the sails of the cabinets first efforts to assert its agenda.  
Similarly, the Presidents interference in Burhanuddins efforts to appoint a government 
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loyalist to the position of Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff further weakened the 
governments authority.  Because this appointment had been made against the wishes of 
the Acting Chief of Staff, it was met with obstructionism that would have been farcical 
had it not been so deadly serious.   
 The Presidents refusal to accept the Air Force Chief of Staffs protest 
resignation stiffened the spine of anti-cabinet forces in the Air Force and precipitated a 
clash of wills like that which had culminated in the armys October 17th Affair.  On the 
day of the swearing-in for the incoming Deputy Chief of Staff, the ceremony was 
violently interrupted by a number of enlisted men likely acting on the behalf of their 
leadership.  The Prime Minister suspected the complicity of the Air Force Chief of Staff 
(General Suryadarma), and so ordered his immediate arrest, however the President 
intervened to prevent the order from being carried out.  In the end, the President and 
General Suryadarma would stave off Burhanuddins attempts to expand Masyumi/PSI 
influence in the Air Force, and the governments candidate for Deputy Chief of Staff 
would never be sworn in.  It was another significant blow to the political credibility of a 
beleaguered administration.  More importantly, it was perceived by the army leadership 
as just another attempt by the parties to use the armed forces as pawns. 
 Relations between President Sukarno and the cabinet deteriorated further 
in the weeks preceding the second round of national elections conducted in December 
1955.  The losses dealt to Masyumi and PSI by the election results of September had 
greatly weakened their position in both the cabinet and parliament.  The election 
aftermath had also seemed to embolden the President to try to inflict an even more 
decisive blow to the fortunes of the government parties in the elections for the 
Constituent Assembly, the body that would bear responsibility for drafting the future 
constitution and determining the relative role of Pancasila vis-à-vis Islam as the 
ideological foundation of the state.  The President traveled across large portions of 
Indonesia to inveigh against what he perceived as Masyumi attempts to subvert 
Pancasila, and though the government attempted to restrict the Presidents partisan 
campaigning,  its  efforts  were  uniformly  met  by  defiance.   Ultimately, it seemed as if 
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Burhanuddin could do little to staunch attempts by the opposition to portray Masyumi as 
a party of religious extremists out of touch with the diverse needs of the entire Indonesian 
population.  
 
e. The Role of the Army 
 The armys pivotal role in the fall of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet might 
have given the appearance that its senior officers were more warmly predisposed towards 
the Masyumi and PSI leadership than to that of the PNI.  To some degree, that 
observation would have been correct.  Ever since the Yogyakarta conference of February 
1955, the army leadership had made significant progress in healing the internal breach 
that had been precipitated by the October 17th Affair of 1952.  Despite the continued 
presence of ideological schisms within the senior leadership, over time there emerged a 
more coherent and studied recognition that unity of leadership would need to be restored 
if the army was not to be subjected to further political interference by the parties (Penders 
& Sundhaussen, 1985, p. 94).  The army was increasingly unwilling to accede to its own 
political irrelevance, even as it sought to avoid becoming the political tool of others.  
What its leadership really desired was a recognition that it would no longer be simply a 
pawn of the parties, but instead a political force in its own right, deserving of a seat at the 
national leadership table.    
 The army leadership had expressed high expectations for the re-
establishment of unimpeachable moral authority as a consequence of the return of both 
Masyumi and PSI to the political fore (Feith, 1962, p. 420).  Yet, Burhanuddins cabinet 
selections were roundly criticized within the officer corps as a betrayal of the armys 
expectations.  Even those marginal efforts by the cabinet to investigate and prosecute 
corruption cases were abandoned in the face of political opposition.  Consequently, much 
of Masyumis political capital vis-à-vis its relationship with the army was squandered 
very early on.  Still, the senior army leadership, notably Colonels Zulkifli Lubis, Gatot 
Subrato, and Simbolon, really had nowhere else to turn.  Their enmity towards President 
Sukarno and the communists made their continued political alignment with Masyumi and 
the PSI the lesser of possible evils.     
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 Perhaps the most important and dramatic change in the political landscape 
during this period was the shift in relations between the leading government parties and 
the army leadership following the reappointment of A.H. Nasution to the position of 
Army Chief of Staff.  The search for a permanent Chief of Staff to replace Colonel Lubis, 
whom had served as acting head of the army for the previous two years, was begun 
shortly after Burhanuddins assumption as Prime Minister.  The return of Colonel 
Nasution to active duty and to the post of Army Chief of Staff was an unexpected turn of 
events for many, not least for Colonel Nasution, himself.   
 Nasutions retirement since his suspension in the wake of the October 17th 
Affair had been spent pursuing a variety of academic and political interests.  He had 
wisely kept himself in a state of self-imposed political exile outside of the political arena 
and untainted by the increasingly acrimonious rhetoric among the political parties.  
During this period, he took the opportunity to conduct his own exhaustive, critical study 
of both the political conditions leading up to the October 17th Affair and his own actions 
before, during and after those tumultuous events.  As a result, Nasution had come to 
realize that he had made mistakes during his previous tenure as Chief of Staff, not only in 
his efforts to move too quickly to reform the army, but also in underestimating the 
implications of upsetting the delicate balance of power between the army, the parties and 
the President (Feith, 1962, p. 443).  With a new chance now at hand, Nasution resolved 
not to make the same mistakes again, but his efforts to pursue a rapprochement with 
President Sukarno would not bode well for the continuation Masyumis tenuous hold on 
power.  The closing of the gap between Nasution and Sukarnos view of the army would 
ultimately compromise Masyumis continued political relevancy.  
 The new spirit of cooperation between Nasution and the President 
undercut the traditional balance of power between Masyumi, PSI and the smaller 
religious parties on one side, and the PNI, the President and the communist parties on the 
other.  Nasution was hardly a convert to the Sukarnos political views, but he had come to 
believe that the heath and security of the nation was increasingly imperiled by the 
political frailty of the parliamentary system and the brinkmanship of the parties.  His 
initial instinct was to work within the existing political system by founding a political 
party comprised of retired officers (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia  League 
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of Upholders of Indonesian Independence), but this in time also gave way to further 
disillusionment in the western-style liberal democracy that had characterized Indonesian 
politics since 1950.  In time, Nasution became convinced that only a return to the 
Constitution of 1945, with its strong presidential system, could prevent Indonesia from 
coming apart (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, p. 98).     
 Perhaps there was no way for the Masyumi leadership to foresee the 
merging of Nasutions and Sukarnos interests, but within months of Nasutions 
reappointment as Army Chief of Staff, Masyumi and their PSI allies found themselves 
increasing politically isolated.  Masyumis unwillingness to take aggressive action against 
both the Darul Islam movement and the budding autonomy movements in South 
Sulawesi and throughout Sumatra only served to further confirm Nasutions view that the 
interests of the individual parties were not necessarily concomitant with the nations 
interests.  Despite his sympathy for the complaints of the outer island constituencies 
against the Jakarta-based government, Nasution had come to the conclusion that the 
current system was incapable of solving the fundamental economic and political 
problems that were at the root of these disputes. 
 Many observers had expected the 1955 general elections to both clarify 
and stabilize the political situation by reducing the number of smaller parties, while 
concurrently strengthening Masyumis position in parliament (Compton, 1954, p. 76).  
The gaining of additional seats by Masyumi would have the effect of reducing its reliance 
on smaller parties so that it could be more aggressive in pursuing its anti-communist 
polices and western-friendly economic agenda, both of which were acceptable to 
Nasution.  Additionally, the secular PNI would be forced to become more cooperative 
with the Masyumi, thus forcing it to abandon its policy of surreptitiously cooperating with 
the PKI.  The PKI would be left alone and defenseless, and with any luck it would die on 
the vine.   
 When the results of the election began to become clear in late 1955, 
Nasution was faced with the realization that the political situation was unlikely to change 
significantly.  Although many of the smaller parties had indeed evaporated, Masyumi had 
received much softer support than anyone had anticipated.  Instead of gaining seats, it had 
lost ground in the face of gains by PNI, PKI and Nahdatul Ulama, all of which had 
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received greater than expected support.  Masyumis old political ally, the PSI had its 
presence in parliament reduced from 14 seats to 5.  Consequently, although the top four 
parties controlled over 77% of the parliamentary votes, the PNI-PKI axis controlled 
nearly 37%.  The tendency of the Nahdatul Ulama to cast its lot with the PNI, rather than 
with Masyumi, meant that a potential PNI-PKI-Nahdatul Ulama axis now had the 
potential to control nearly 55% of parliament.  Masyumi now found itself the odd man out 
without sufficient votes to effectively challenge the opposition.  It could from now on 
serve only as a spoiler, the lone voice of an emasculated opposition.  Nasution also 
began to realize that unless its fundamental approach towards cooperating with the 
secular, Java-centric parties was radically altered, Masyumis continued role in politics 
would only serve as a hindrance to effective governance (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, 
pp. 128-129).   
 Nasutions conclusion proved to be prescient in light of the deadlock that 
emerged within the Constituent Assembly when it began its deliberations in December 
1956.   Because voting results for this body were relatively consistent with the 
parliamentary elections, the Constituent Assembly was consistently unable to produce the 
necessary three-quarter majority needed to approve a new constitution for the Indonesian 
government.  Masyumi simply would not acquiesce to making permanent any secular 
constitution that did not include the provisions outlined in the 1945 Jakarta Charter, and 
the secular parties, especially the PKI, were unwilling to make that concession.  
Similarly, when the President attempted to resubmit the 1945 Constitution for 
consideration, Masyumi balked because the older constitution would place too much 
authority into the Presidents hands.  Ultimately, this elected body would be dissolved in 
1959 because of its failure to make any progress towards drafting a new constitution.       
 Masyumis failure to strenuously repudiate the outer island autonomy 
movements and its unwillingness to support Nasutions and Sukarnos calls to re-craft the 
machinery of the Indonesian government in order to make it less reflective of western 
liberal institutions, hardened Nasutions opinion toward his former allies and patrons.  
Masyumis perceived unwillingness to compromise in the Constituent Assemblys 
deliberations was the final straw for Nasution.  He had come to realize that Masyumis 
resistance to compromise had doomed the governments chance to reform itself through 
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democratic means, and that realization had opened the door for more radical action.  In 
July 1959 the Constitution of 1945 was re-adopted by Presidential Decree with the full 
support of Nasution and over the objections of Masyumi.  Shortly over a year later, 
Sukarno would move to ban those parties whose ideologies he deemed were a threat to 
the Pancasila framework outlined in the 1945 Constitution, or that resisted the transition 
to his concept of  Guided Democracy.   First among the many casualties were 
Sukarnos political nemeses, both Masyumi and the PSI.  By this time, Nasution was fully 
committed to the governments new direction, and he turned to a blind eye to the 
extinction of his former political allies.  
 
f. International Influences 
 The U.S. government responded optimistically to the installation of the 
Burhanuddin cabinet, particularly after having endured two years of the stridently 
nationalist Sastroamidjojo government.  Yet, as Gardner notes, U.S. enthusiasm was 
tempered by the realization that this particular cabinet would necessarily be short-lived 
because of the impending elections (1997, p. 123).  Although the majority of U.S. 
observers, like their Indonesian counterparts, predicted a Masyumi sweep in the elections, 
there also remained a great deal of concern regarding how the Communists would fare.          
 By the mid-1950s, the political rehabilitation of the PKI and the rising 
success of their recruiting efforts in Java and South Sumatra had begun to set off alarm 
bells within the U.S. administration.  A National Security Council policy statement from 
1953 underscored U.S. wariness regarding Communist intentions in Indonesia and 
affirmed the willingness of the Eisenhower administration to use Islam as a political 
counterweight to further Communist growth (Gardner, 1997, p. 115-116).   The U.S. 
government, though still hopeful of a Masyumi election win, was unwilling to leave the 
outcome entirely to chance.  Consequently, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
reportedly funneled one million dollars to gird Masyumis campaign activities in the 
months leading up to the elections, although apparently without much success (Conboy & 
Morrison, 1999, p. 13).  
 Although revelations of U.S. involvement in Indonesian domestic politics 
during this period would not be revealed until many years after the elections, there was 
148 
little doubt at the time that certain forces within the Indonesian political sphere were 
decidedly anti-West and leftist in orientation.  The PKI clearly fell within this category, 
and by virtue of its economic agenda and its willingness to broker political deals with 
Communist parties, so did the PNI.  Sukarno also was viewed with deep distrust and 
suspicion because of his recent tilt to the left and his increasingly vocal support for an 
expanded PKI role in government.     
 Not surprisingly, the U.S. government came to see Masyumi as the single 
best hope for a democratic Indonesia, or perhaps as the least of all possible evils.  
Unfortunately, as the level of the perceived threat from anti-Western forces appeared to 
be growing, the willingness of the U.S. administration to raise the stakes of U.S. 
interference in internal Indonesian affairs also rose commensurately.  The Eisenhower 
administration had made the decision not to repeat the previous U.S. administrations 
mistakes concerning the preservation of the territorial integrity of China in the face of 
communist advances (Kahin & Kahin, 1995, p. 4; Gardner, 1997, p. 133).  Indonesia 
would be a different matter.  If need be, the U.S. would acquiesce to the territorial 
fragmentation of the Indonesian state in order to preserve democratic enclaves against 
communist expansion.  Less than two years later, the U.S. governments willingness to 
accept the disintegration of the Indonesian state would become translated into the use of 
covert forces to fan the fires of various separatist revolts in the outer islands.  Masyumis 
unfortunate entanglement in these disturbances would provide just the pretext that its 
enemies were looking for to seal the partys fate.  When its leadership became far too 
closely identified with these movements, Masyumi came to be seen as part of the problem 
rather than part of any potential solution.  
 
4. The Fall of Burhanuddin Harahap’s Cabinet 
Despite attempts by the parliamentary opposition to hasten the collapse of the 
Burhanuddin government after the election results had become clear, the cabinet 
managed to hold on until the elected parliament could be seated in March 1956.  The 
cabinets tenure as a caretaker administration was turbulent at best and ineffective at 
worst.  Given the opportunity to establish a government free of corruption, Masyumi 
failed to live up to the challenge.  Its willingness to backtrack on its anti-corruption drive 
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when faced with political opposition, and its hesitancy in dealing with Darul Islam and 
outer island discontent caused senior army leaders to question the partys commitment to 
the very survival of the Indonesian state.  The next PNI-led cabinet would again include 
Masyumi representation, but their participation would be uncooperative, grudging and 
short-lived.   
 The Burhanuddin cabinet would be the last Masyumi-led cabinet in the era of the 
provisional parliament.  In less than a year, it would find itself fighting and loosing a 
rearguard action against a growing cast of enemies as it struggled to preserve the 
remnants of Indonesias first democratic experiment.  Within three years, it would 
become an outlawed organization and its principal leaders would be hunted as criminals. 
 
H. AFTERMATH 
Although it was the first government to emerge from the post-election parliament, 
the cabinet that replaced that of Burhanuddin Harahap was little better than its 
predecessors.  If the elections of 1955 had held the promise of stabilizing parliamentary 
politics, that promise would soon be shattered by reality.  To the horror of many critics of 
parliamentary government, the total number of parties had in fact not been whittled down 
as a result of the elections, but had actually increased from 20 to 28 (Feith, 1962, p. 471).  
Similarly, none of the four main parties that had emerged was sufficiently strong to alone 
withstand strong opposition from a combination of the others.  In short, none of the 
hoped-for stabilizing effects of the elections had come to fruition.  Consequently, when 
the PNIs Ali Sastroamidjojo was appointed once again as cabinet formateur, he set to 
work trying to assemble a government that would have the support not only of his own 
party and Nahdatul Ulama, but of Masyumi, as well.  In that way, he had hoped to mend 
the pre-elections breach between PNI and Masyumi and perhaps give the relationship a 
fresh start.  On April 20th, the Sastroamidjojo cabinet won approval by the parliament by 
an unprecedented victory of 229 votes to none (Feith, 1962, p. 480).    
Sastroamidjojos efforts at inclusiveness were not universal.  It was generally 
believed within the PNIs hierarchy that its own past attempts to use PKI support to 
weaken Masyumi had in large part unintentionally helped the PKI achieve higher than 
expected voter support in both the September and December elections.  It had also 
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contributed to a great deal toward the enmity that had developed between them Masyumi 
and the PNI.  Many thought the relationship was irreparably damaged (Feith, 1962, p. 
466).  Although there were serious misgivings expressed by other senior PNI leaders, 
Sastroamidjojo insisted on Masyumi representation in his cabinet.  Despite President 
Sukarnos lobbying on the PKIs behalf, Sastroamidjojo was decidedly less enthusiastic 
about their possible inclusion.  In the end, the decision was effectively made for him by 
both Masyumis and Nahdatul Ulamas refusal to participate in any cabinet that included 
communist members.     
Much to Sukarnos disappointment, Sastroamidjojo eventually opted to exclude 
the PKI in assembling a PNI-Masyumi- Nahdatul Ulama coalition cabinet.  Masyumi 
received five portfolios, including the powerful Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Justice, as well receiving the post of First Deputy Prime Minister.  Still, relations between 
the three main coalition parties never lived up to the ebullient expectations that had 
accompanied the cabinets formation in March 1956.  While Sastroamidjojos intent for 
including Masyumi in the cabinet had been to ensure stability for the government by 
reducing potential parliamentary opposition, the policy differences between the PNI and 
Masyumi still remained far too wide to be easily bridged.  Not surprisingly, within weeks 
of being seated, the cabinets progress once again became bogged down as disagreement 
over government policies became the norm.   
The central theme for the majority of PNI/Masyumi disagreements concerned the 
governments economic policy, which like that of the previous Sastroamidjojo cabinet 
was oriented toward the indigenization of the Indonesian economy.  The continued 
overvaluation of the Indonesian rupiah in the face of rising inflation hit directly at the 
heart of Masyumis constituency in the seberang.  The outer island communities, which 
were almost exclusively exporters, were disproportionately hurt by the disparity between 
the official value of the Indonesian rupiah and its true worth on the international market.  
They bore the brunt of inflation, while government subsidies to indigenous businesses 
allowed large numbers of Javanese businessmen to profit.  The Javanese, who were net 
importers of seberang exports, benefited enormously from this economic inequity, and 
not surprisingly, they were loath to appreciably alter the economic relationship.  
Regardless of issues of basic economic fairness, devaluation of the rupiah would have led 
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to higher import costs and would have had the most serious consequences for Javanese 
consumers.  The failure of the seberang communities to force the central government to 
devalue the rupiah to a more realistic level is an indication not only of their own political 
impotence, but of the weakness of Masyumi, as well.  The inability of Masyumi to 
effectively rectify the economic imbalances between the center and the seberang would 
eventually contribute to a backlash within the army that would have even more dire 
consequences for the government than that which had occurred almost five years earlier.              
Since the early years of independence, the regional army commanders had always 
been forced to supplement their operating budgets by participation in private business 
ventures.  This intermingling of military and entrepreneurial activities was not only 
expected, but frequently encouraged as a means to reduce the drain on the national 
treasury.  By 1956, however, the central governments policies had brought the economy 
to near-ruin, and the presence of large-scale smuggling operations conducted by regional 
commanders was seen as a potentially vital source of revenue for the government.  The 
central government began to try to reign in smuggling operations in the outer islands, but 
by then seberang resentment over the worsening trade imbalance with Java-based 
importers and manufacturers precluded much sympathy.  A string of smuggling 
operations, which were either led by or ignored by regional commanders, was targeted 
for cessation by the government.  In some instances, the cabinets orders were followed, 
yet in others, they were simply disobeyed.  
The involvement of regional military leaders in smuggling operations was merely 
a symptom of a greater problem that was beginning to develop within the army 
leadership.  The unity of purpose that had emerged after the April 1955 Yogyakarta 
conference was beginning to crack again under the pressure of Indonesias economic 
deterioration.  Nasution had returned to power, but his rivals, notably Generals Simbolon 
and Lubis, were still chafing at having been passed over for the top job.  They viewed 
Nasutions now close working relationship with Sukarno and Sastroamidjojo as a 
betrayal of the 1955 officer pledge to defend the nations interests (if not the armys 
interests) against the machinations of the civil politicians to  (Feith, 1962, p. 502).  
Nasutions efforts to solidify his grip on power by ordering mass transfers of 
commanders from their regional bases of power were met by quiet, determined 
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resistance, but an explosive combination of mistrust and enmity hung in the air, waiting 
only for the inevitable spark that would set it off.    
A confluence of professional jealously, exasperation over unrestrained political 
corruption, and unresolved economic grievances provided the spark that would 
eventually ignite an inferno that would consume Indonesias fragile democracy.  In 
August 1956, military personnel acting under the direction of Colonel Lubis arrested 
Foreign Minster Roeslan Abdulgani on corruption charges.  Abdulganis guilt or 
innocence in this matter is less significant that the governments reaction, or more 
specifically, Nasutions reaction to the event.  At the behest of the Prime Minister, 
Nasution stepped into the fray to overturn Colonel Lubis orders, but his countermanding 
of the arrest warrant set off a dreadful chain of events.  Within days, Lubis resigned his 
post as Assistant Chief of Staff, but he had not yet given up the struggle to demonstrate 
the armys moral authority over corrupt, self-serving politicians, even if (in his eyes) 
Nasution had now become Sukarnos and Sastroamidjojos lapdog. 
In October and November troops loyal to Colonel Lubis attempted two coups 
detat in Jakarta, but their poorly coordinated efforts to invade the city and arrest key pro-
government leaders were easily repulsed by troops loyal to Nasution.  Consequently, 
Lubis was forced to flee to Sumatra, where he was welcomed as a comrade by Colonel 
Simbolon.  A month later, in an event eerily reminiscent of the October 17th 1952 Affair, 
several dozen officers in Sumatra joined together to sign a petition critical of the central 
government, and which demanded greater economic and political autonomy for the 
regions.  This petition also demanded the future limitation of Sukarno's role as President 
to a figurehead status, and it demanded the formation of a new business cabinet under 
both Mohammad Hatta and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta.   
The failure of Jakarta to respond to this list of grievances had an immediate 
consequence.  Within days, the regimental commander in West Sumatra, Lieutenant 
Colonel Ahmad Hussein, seized command of the province of Central Sumatra, and two 
days later, Colonel Simbolon did likewise in the province of North Sumatra.  The rebel 
commanders proclaimed the Pemerintahan Revolusi Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary 
Government of the Indonesian Republic -PRRI).  A similar uprising in North Sulawesi 
erupted not long after, and in February, both uprisings made common cause against 
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Jakarta.  Although the government would be paralyzed by these uprisings, the army under 
Nasution would move relatively quickly to quash the rebels.  These movements would 
effectively last less than a year, but they would nonetheless have very important long-
term consequences for both the government and for Masyumi.                
The Sastroamidjojo cabinets inability to respond to this crisis made it seem weak 
and indecisive, and a groundswell of opposition to the government began to build.  Like 
the rebels, Masyumi lobbied for a Hatta-led business cabinet, but by now the Vice-
President had resigned in protest of Sukarnos policies, and neither Sukarno, nor the PNI 
had any intention of allowing him back onto the stage.  Masyumis response was to 
abruptly advise Sastroamidjojo to return the cabinets mandate, but the Prime Minister 
refused, and in this decision he had the support of Nahdatul Ulama.  On January 9, 1957, 
Masyumi made the fateful decision to cast its lot with the rebel cause and it withdrew its 
five ministers from the cabinet.  The Sastroamidjojo cabinet would be the last cabinet to 
have Masyumi representation. 
 
I. CONCLUSION 
There were several important consequences of the failed rebellions, including the 
forced retirement of many anti-Nasution army officers and the reassignment of Javanese 
officers to leadership positions in the seberang, both of which had the effect of making 
the officer corps more sympathetic and responsive to Javanese interests.  The end of the 
rebellions also solidified Nasutions role as the senior military leader by ridding him of 
his primary rivals, Simbolon and Lubis.  However, Masyumis role in supporting the 
rebellion would also not be forgotten by Nasution, and they would suffer the inevitable 
consequences of their defeat.  Following the collapse of these rebellions, Nasution 
banned local Masyumi branches in those areas of Sumatra and Sulawesi that had failed to 
support the central government.  This ban effectively cut the legs out from under 
Masyumis voter base.  As a practical consequence of their association with the failed 
rebel cause, Masyumis national leaders now found themselves without allies.    
On March 14, 1957, the era of constitutional democracy in Indonesia came to an 
ignominious end with the resignation of the Sastroamidjojo cabinet and the proclamation 
of martial law by President Sukarno.  The years that followed would be marked by 
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increasing authoritarianism as Sukarno and Nasution moved in tandem to stamp out the 
last vestiges of the power of both parliament and the political parties.  In July 1958, 
Nasution would begin to urge President Sukarno to reinstate the 1945 Constitution, which 
provided for a strong presidential system.  On July 5, 1959, Sukarno issued a decree to 
this effect, dissolving the elected parliament, and replacing it with one of his own 
choosing.  This action marked the formal establishment of the era of Demokrasi 
Terpimpin (Guided Democracy); a period of increasingly dangerous political 
brinksmanship between the President, the army and the PKI.  In time, Guided Democracy 
would itself be consigned to the same fate as the elected parliament, and President 
Sukarno would fall from power in the coup that brought General Suharto to power in 
1965.  Masyumi was permitted no role in the era of Guided Democracy, and in August 
1960 it was officially proscribed by Sukarno for failing to adequately renounce its 
members who had participated in the uprisings.  Masyumi was dead.      
This chapter examined five successive cabinets during the era of Indonesias 
provisional parliament with the intent of analyzing Masyumis relationships with other 
key political actors.  The intent is to draw out those relationships and events which 
contributed over time to Masyumis decline and eventual proscription.  A careful study of 
this material indicates that there were several key power dynamics that either enabled or 
constrained Masyumis ability to achieve its political goals, including ensuring its own 
survival.  In Chapter IV, these dynamics will be discussed in detail with the intent of 
extracting those fundamental lessons which may be extrapolated for consideration in a 
contemporary context.  That discussion will help identify markers which may be useful in 
determining whether modern Islamic political parties in Indonesia have learned the 
lessons of their forefathers, or whether they are doomed to repeat the same mistakes that 
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IV. A HOUSE DIVIDED: MASYUMI’S FALL AND 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN 
INDONESIA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Masyumis decline throughout the 1950s and it ultimate proscription at the hands 
of its political enemies seems to have contravened the predictions of many of that eras 
most respected political pundits.  Logically, Masyumi should have been able to derive an 
electoral advantage from the fact that Indonesias population was nearly 90% Muslim in 
1950.  It should also have been able to capitalize on the fact that many of its own leaders, 
as well as many of the leaders of its allied parties, were some of the mostly highly-
educated, politically-astute, and bureaucratically-experienced members of that eras 
Indonesian elite.  Masyumi electoral potential should have also been bolstered by the 
support it received not only from Vice President Mohammad Hatta and from senior 
elements in the Indonesian army, but also from the United States as well.  Yet, the 
question that still begs to be answered is how Masyumi could have begun the period 
armed with such a plentitude of political strengths, and still be unable to fulfill the 
promise of leadership that it had once offered to the Indonesian ummah?  Were 
Masyumis reverses and setbacks the inevitable result of a cultural disaffection for 
political Islam, or were they simply the consequences of poor tactical and strategic 
political decisions made in the context of a unique period in Indonesian history?      
This chapter examines a broad spectrum of political relationships between 
Masyumi and its enemies, as well as between Masyumi and its allies.  The power 
dynamics of these relationships are considered in the context of key political crises in 
order to pinpoint where course changes might have produced different outcomes for the 
party.  In many instances, Masyumis unwillingness to compromise on its core positions 
concerning political, economic and security policies left it increasingly isolated from 
those parties and organizations that were in a position to aid it.  Increasingly, Masyumi 
simply did not have the political capital to sustain its hardline positions, and its 
intransigence in defending its principals was often perceived as obstructionism and as a 
threat to the internal security and stability of Indonesia.  A greater proclivity for 
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compromise, and the recognition that short-term tactical losses do not necessarily 
preclude the attainment of long-term strategic goals, might have yielded a more positive 
outcome for Masyumi, for its leaders, and ultimately for the very survival of Indonesian 
democracy itself. 
This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of how lessons gleaned from an 
examination of Masyumis experience in the period of the provisional parliament may yet 
remain applicable for modern Islamic parties in Indonesia in the year leading up to the 
next general elections.  
 
B. MASYUMI’S POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Masyumi’s Internal Dynamics 
a. Modernist/Traditionalist Schism 
 Until Nahdatul Ulamas disaffiliation in April 1952, Masyumi had long 
been an inherently unstable organization.  Vast differences in socio-political orientation 
between that partys two main membership constituencies ensured that the struggle for 
control of its leadership apparatus would sap the party of its strength and impede its 
collective ability to orient its energies outward towards its political opponents.   The 
origins for this struggle for dominance within the party can be traced back to the very 
roots of Islam in Indonesia.  The long process of Islamization, which has already been 
outlined extensively in Chapter II, produced two very different variations of Islamic 
culture in maritime Southeast Asia.  In commercial merchant communities, such as in 
North Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, and among the Java pesisir (coastal) entrepots, a 
steady and sustained exposure to Islamic trading networks over the course of centuries 
led to the development of a more orthodox manifestation of Islamic culture reminiscent 
of its Indian and Persian influences.  In these locations, Islam was embraced because it 
provided a means to plug the local community into the larger network of Islamic 
commerce in an era when the regional markets where dominated by Muslim merchants.  
Islam became the central framework that defined the development of education, the arts, 
the economy, government institutions, law, and social relations, and it became the lens 
through which these communities viewed the world. 
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 The inner areas of Java, which were the domains of that regions most 
culturally advanced, if not most powerful, kingdoms, received Islam in a manner wholly 
different than that described above.  Because contact with the Muslim-dominated trade 
networks was limited for hydraulic-societies such as these, and because they already 
possessed very mature religious cosmologies, the attraction of Islam was necessarily 
limited.  Mass conversion was brought about only by the determined efforts of itinerant 
proselytizers, the wali songo (nine saints), who were able to successfully bridge the gap 
between Islam and the Hindu-Buddhist culture of court life.  Like both Hinduism and 
Buddhism before it, Islam also was eventually embraced by the interior kingdoms, but in 
a manner wholly consistent with established social, cultural and political institutions.  In 
short, Islam was not so much adopted, as it was absorbed and synchretized. 
   Chapter II discussed at length how the bifurcation of the socio-cultural 
development of the Indonesian ummah on Java and in the seberang became the basis for 
much of the theological tension between Masyumis modernist and traditionalist 
elements, but it does not fully explain the full extent of their tortured relations.  Although 
there were numerous theological disputes between Masyumis Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdatul Ulama constituencies, they were of little importance when compared to 
disputes of a political or economic nature that had been colored by fundamentally 
different cultural perceptions.   
 In terms of their approach to politics, the traditionalist and modernist 
leaders of Masyumi could not have been further apart from each other.  Javanese 
conceptions of power inevitably colored the traditionalist Muslims worldview as much 
as did ideas about Islam (Lanti, 2001, p. 5).  According to Anderson, this Javanese view 
of power is based upon a model of a Buddhist mandala, wherein authority is exerted 
centripetally from the Javanese heartland, and becomes progressively weaker the further 
it extends from the seat of government (1990, p. 42).  Moreover, for the Javanese, ones 
ability to gain, maintain and exercise authority is determined by a finite quality and 
quantity of power, and thus the struggle for authority always constitutes a zero-sum 
game: Every gain in influence by your opponent must necessarily produce a 
diminishment of your own authority (Anderson, 1990, pp. 44-45).  Thus, centralization of 
power indicates strength and reinforces itself, while the diffusion of power indicates 
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weakness and decay.  For traditional Javanese, it was almost always preferable to 
compromise ones ideological principles through musyawarah (deliberation) and 
mufakat (consensus), than to ever yield ones grip on the actual reins of power.    
 In the seberang, conceptions of power, and thus governance, were very 
different.  Communities that emerged through the expansion of trading networks were 
much more attuned to negotiation, compromise, and the decentralization of authority.  
Outer Islanders saw the Indonesian state not as a mandala, but as a family of equal 
members working for the common good.  The concept of local autonomy was a natural 
extension of Islams inherent egalitarianism and provided a safeguard against fears of 
return of historical Javanese domination (Lanti, 2001, p. 22).  Consequently, those of the 
seberang generally viewed the centralizing tendencies of the post-independence 
Indonesian government with alarm, even if the Javanese leaders saw it as a natural and 
necessary expression of Indonesian unity, power and stability. 
 The most fundamental disagreement between Masyumis modernist and 
traditionalist wings generally concerned the centralization of power not only within the 
government as a whole, but also within the party itself.  At the national level, the 
Javanese leaders of the Nahdatul Ulama were far more comfortable with political trends 
that reinforced the concentration of power in the hands of the central government in 
Jakarta.  They were after all steeped in Javanese political and social culture, which had 
for centuries emphasized that anything other than centripetal power led to weakness and 
decay.  Although they may have been sympathetic to the economic and political 
complaints of the seberang communities, they did not see an acceptable alternative to the 
centralizing trend: Diffusion of power from the center to the regions would only serve to 
weaken the whole.  
 The struggle for leadership dominance within Masyumi was a reflection of 
these differing conceptions of power.  For the Nahdatul Ulama leadership, the usurpation 
of their leadership by the modernists at the end of the independence struggle was not only 
a practical blow to their influence, but an emotional one also.  If power was finite, then 
the rise in the influence and authority of modernist leaders like Natsir, Sukiman and 
Prawiranegara could only be viewed as a diminishment of the importance of the Nahdatul 
Ulama leaders.  Wahab Chasbullah, the senior kyai and supreme head of Nahdatul Ulama 
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throughout this period, certainly viewed the growing preeminence of modernist 
leadership as a growing threat to the Nahdatul Ulamas very survival (Barton & Fealy, 
1996, p. 21).      
 The final break between Masyumi and Nahdatul Ulama was precipitated 
by the refusal of the modernist wing to acquiesce to the appointment of a traditionalist to 
the post of Minister of Religion in the Wilopo cabinet.  As noted previously, a Nahdatul 
Ulama member, K.H. Wahid Hasjim, had held this portfolio throughout the tenures of the 
previous two cabinets, but by 1952, Natsirs wing within Masyumi was trying to expand 
its influence within the bureaucracies, and the portfolio of the Ministry of Religion 
seemed ripe for exploitation.  The alignment of senior Nahdatul Ulama leaders with 
Natsirs modernist rival, Dr. Sukiman, perhaps made the assault on this last remaining 
bastion of Nahdatul Ulama influence an all the more attractive prospect, however the 
response by traditionalist leaders was predictable.  They had been warning of the 
potential for a party breach as far back as 1950, when senior kyai had spoken out about 
the possibility of leaving Masyumi to form their own party if their influence continued to 
be eroded by modernist gains (Barton & Fealy, 1996, pp. 21-22).  Regardless, Natsir 
failed to appreciate the depth of their anger and he reached too far.  As a result, Nahdatul 
Ulama reacted as had been predicted and its leadership finally carried through on their 
oft-repeated threats to secede. 
 The further marginalization of Nahdatul Ulama was perhaps part of a 
larger plan by Natsir to consolidate his leadership dominance within Masyumi.  After 
1945, the power balance within Masyumi had alternated between favoring Natsirs 
religious socialists and a more conservative faction of modernists led by Dr. Sukiman.  
Because Nahdatul Ulama leaders had long been more favorably inclined towards Dr. 
Sukiman, Natsirs move was also likely intended to ensure that the balance of power 
within the party shifted decisively in his favor.  Natsirs election as party chairman at the 
sixth party congress in August 1952, and the subsequent marginalization of Dr. 
Sukimans influence, can be seen as confirmation of the efficacy of Natsirs short-term 
political strategy (Lubis, 1952, p. 155); however, the long-term consequences of Natsirs 
struggle for primacy were disastrous for his party.  Even after his involvement in the 
failed PRRI and Permesta rebellions, his influence in Masyumi had become so pervasive 
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and unassailable that Dr. Sukiman was unable to expel him in a last ditch attempt to 




 The loss of Nahdatul Ulama was perhaps the most catastrophic blow 
suffered by Masyumi throughout its entire history.  Besides the practical consequence of 
denying Masyumi seven crucial votes in the provisional parliament, the alignment of 
Nahdatul Ulama with the PSII and several other smaller Islamic political parties under 
the umbrella of the Liga Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim League  LIGA) 
broke Masyumis monopoly on claiming to represent the wishes of the Indonesian 
ummah.  Further, the natural convergence of the worldview of the Nahdatul Ulama 
leaders with those of the leaders of the other Javanese-dominated parties facilitated their 
political cooperation in the years that followed.  Eventually, Nahdatul Ulama would be 
willing to compromise some of its most dearly-held political principles in order to 
preserve its continued influence in the era of Sukarnos Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided 
Democracy).  Conversely, Natsirs commitment to Masyumis modernist agenda and its 
seberang constituency was beyond compromise, even when it became clear that the 
partys inability to carve out middle ground would imperil its very survival. 
 Had Masyumis leadership been more far-sighted, they perhaps might have 
recognized the value of compromise in the short-term in order to achieve their long-term 
political goals.  The alienation of the traditionalist kyai deprived Masyumi of a significant 
share of its grassroots support and organizational capacity in the years leading up to 
elections, and provided a wedge issue to the secular-nationalists that could be used to 
chip away at Masyumis remaining support in East and Central Java.  PKI and PNI efforts 
to cast Masyumi leaders as intolerant religious extremists were made all that much more 
believable by the apparent willingness of Nahdatul Ulama to discard its own political 
principles for the sake of ensuring the stability of central government, if not for 
preserving for themselves a prominent role in it.   
 In 1999, the Nahdatul Ulamas Abdurrahman Wahid was elected to the 
Presidency as a direct consequence of the willingness of several of the major Islamic 
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parties to set aside their internecine squabbles to form a Poros Tengah (Central Axis) 
with the singular goal of providing a third parliamentary bloc to balance against 
Megawati Sukarnoputris Partai Demokrasi Indonesia  Perjuangan (Indonesian 
Democratic Party  Struggle PDIP) and the governments Golongan Karya  
(Functional Groups -GOLKAR) (Barton, October, 2002, p. 275).  The Central Axis did 
not win the backing of the largest of the Islamic parties, the Partai Pembangunan 
Persatuan (United Development Party PPP), nor did it survive long after Wahids 
swearing in, but it provides a tantalizing glimpse of the potential for greater cooperation 
among the Islamic parties when the stakes are high.   
 Already there are efforts underway among the numerous Islamic parties to 
explore potential coalition and vote-sharing arrangements for the upcoming elections.  As 
noted in previous chapters, there remains a great gulf between the agendas of several of 
these parties, if not between their basic political philosophies.  The carving out of middle 
ground upon which all can stand will be a difficult prospect, but the potential rewards are 
great.  As Masyumis experience in the 1950s aptly demonstrates, compromise will be 
fundamental to the success of these efforts.  Similarly, intransigence will only serve to 
keep the Indonesian ummah politically divided and vulnerable to the continued 
domination of the secular parties, which remain bastions of Javanese political culture.  
 
2. Masyumi’s Relationship with Its Political Allies 
Masyumis political support in the provisional parliament came from a two-tier 
system of informal party alliances.  The lower tier of political allies consisted of a myriad 
of smaller parties whose political loyalty and support was inconsistent and usually more 
dependent on access to sources of patronage than any shared political heritage or 
ideology.  The political support of these parties, such as the Persatuan Indonesia Raya 
(Greater Indonesian Union PIR), Partai Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Party 
Parindra) and the Democratic Fraction, was frequently contingent upon what each 
prospective formateur could offer.  The leaders of these parties were well aware that the 
continued existence of their respective parties after the elections was doubtful, and 
consequently the price of their support grew exponentially as the election season 
approached (Lubis, 1952, p. 158).  Consequently, the practice of dagang sapi (cow 
163 
trading) became more prevalent in the later years of the provisional parliament as the 
two main factions were increasingly forced to vie for the crucial support of these second 
tier parties (Feith, 1962, p. 419).    Parties such as these were usually the first to abandon 
a cabinet in trouble if for no other reason than they were confident of their inclusion in 
any follow-on coalitions.  Although their support was usually essential for ensuring 
sufficient parliamentary support for a cabinet to achieve an opportunity to work, the price 
paid for the support of these parties was inherent government instability.     
Masyumis top tier alliances were comprised of long-time political allies, such as 
Sjahrirs Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesia Socialist Party PSI), as well as 
numerous smaller non-Islamic religious parties, like the Partai Katolik and the Partai 
Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party Parkindo).  The relationship between 
Masyumi and its top tier allies was girded by a shared ideological outlook concerning the 
decentralization of state power, measures to achieve economic stabilization and 
development, the process of bureaucratic rationalization, and the conduct of foreign 
relations.  These relationships were both consistent and mutually supportive, even if none 
of Masyumis allies shared its enthusiasm for establishing Islam as the basis for the state. 
 
a. Christian Parties 
 Although their relationship with Masyumi might have seemed counter-
intuitive, the political support of both Parkindo and the Partai Katolik remained 
consistent throughout the 1950s.  Feith has described these two Christian parties as 
permanent minority parties because, unlike most of the other minor parties in 
parliament, their respective constituencies were drawn from distinct minority 
populations, rather than as a consequence of any particularly strong leadership 
personalities or ideology (1962, p. 145).  Their voter base was comparatively solid and 
remained generally unperturbed by the constant machinations of the other parties in 
parliament (Lubis, 1952, p. 21).  More importantly, they had little to fear from elections. 
 In the patterns of their constituencies, we can see the fundamental cause 
for their political alliance with Masyumi.  All three were primarily parties of the outer 
islands with a vested interest in holding the Javanese parties at bay, while pushing for 
greater regional economic and political autonomy.  Throughout this period, both 
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Parkindo and the Partai Katolik were able to work comfortably with Masyumi because in 
most cases their respective political agendas were in consonance, particularly when 
Masyumis agenda was shaped by the influence of Mohammad Natsir.  The elephant in 
the room was of course Masyumis position concerning the establishment of Islam as the 
basis for the Indonesian state, but this was a disagreement that all of these parties 
anticipated would be resolved in the Constituent Assembly through parliamentary debate.  
Thus, the Christian parties felt reasonably comfortable making common cause with the 
Islamists against other dangers that were closer at hand, particularly the threat of 
Javanese domination and the expansion of atheistic Communism.      
 Both Parkindo and the Partai Katolik were relatively small parties.  In 
1951, Parkindo claimed a membership of around 320,000, and most of its membership 
came from the areas around Minahasa and Ambon, as well as from North Sumatra (Feith, 
1962, p. 125).  The Partai Katolik had far fewer members as a consequence of the 
smaller size of the Catholic population in Indonesia, and most of its members came from 
the islands of eastern Indonesia, especially Flores.  On Java, the Partai Katolik could lay 
claim to slightly more than 100,000 Catholics, and the Protestants fared little better there 
(Feith, 1957, p. 63).  The election results of 1955 reflected the seberang quality of these 
parties: Parkindo received most of its support in Maluku (35%), North Sulawesi (21%), 
West Nusatenggara (18%), North Sumatra (14%) and South Sulawesi (11%), whereas 
Partai Katolik polled strongest in the Catholic stronghold of West Nusatenggara (42%) 
(Cribb, 163-164).  Neither received noteworthy support on Java.   
  Regardless of the loyalty of these parties, neither could bring much 
numerical support to the table.  In the provisional parliament of 233 members, these 
parties controlled a mere thirteen seats between them.  After the 1955 elections, that total 
would grow by only one seat, yet the total number of members of parliament would grow 
by twenty-four.  In that period, however, the political capital of both Parkindo and the 
Partai Katolik was dependant less on their numerical strength, than it was on the 
reputation of their members for integrity and ability (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 20).  
Consequently, even if they rarely held portfolios of importance, their participation in the 
respective cabinets of Natsir, Sukiman, Wilopo, and Harahap was greatly valued.  As 
Bone notes, while they did not have top-shelf leaders like Masyumis Natsir and the 
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PSIs Sjahrir, they were often ideal mid-level bureaucrats, who were esteemed for their 
competence and administrative experience (1954, p. 21).       
 The political support offered by Parkindo and Partai Katolik was 
generally quiet, unassuming, and non-confrontational, but on occasion it proved pivotal 
for Masyumi.  In the weeks leading up to the decisive October 17th Affair, the 
steadfastness of both of these parties became critical in demonstrating the Wilopo 
cabinets unwavering support for the beleaguered Minister of Defense, Sultan Hamengku 
Buwono IX.  Both parties threatened to withdraw their ministers from the cabinet if the 
parliamentary opposition succeeded in pressuring the Sultan to resign his post (Feith, 
1962, p. 255).  The support of the Christian parties was all the more critical because this 
crisis occurred only months after Nahdatul Ulamas disaffiliation from Masyumi, which 
had deprived the government of seven critical seats in parliament.   However, both 
Parkindo and the Partai Katolik ultimately paid for their loyalty because neither of them 
was invited to participate in Ali Sastroamidjojos first cabinet (1952-1955), which 
followed the fall of Wilopos government.   
 In the turmoil that Masyumi would face in the years following the 1955 
elections, both Parkindo and the Partai Katolik would unfortunately prove to be of 
precious little help to the Islamists.  The alignment of senior Masyumi leaders with the 
PRRI and Permesta rebellions in 1957 removed the political struggle from the 
parliamentary arena and raised the stakes of the Islamists gamble to unprecedented 
heights.  The Christian parties, though supportive of the goals of the PRRI and Permesta, 
were not supportive of their methods.  It was the constitution that afforded the Christian 
minorities a measure of protection against efforts by Islamists like the Darul Islams S.M. 
Kartosuwirjo and Daud Beureueh to establish an Islamic state by force.  The 
abandonment by Masyumis senior leadership of the very parliamentary procedures that 
had protected the rights of both Parkindo and the Partai Katolik to exist in the first place 
ultimately caused the Christian parties to distance themselves from their former political 





b. Partai Sosialis Indonesia 
 The Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party) was founded in December 1945 as 
a consequence of the merging of Amir Sjarifuddins Partai Sosialis Indonesia 
(Indonesian Socialist Party PSI) and Sutan Sjahrirs Partai Rakyat Sosialis (Socialist 
Peoples Party).  The party that emerged drew its support primarily from young western-
educated intellectuals and students, many of who had been involved with Sjahrir and 
Sjarifuddins anti-Japanese underground movement throughout the dark years of World 
War II.  As Kahin notes, although the Partai Sosialis membership was not as numerous 
as those of either the PNI or Masyumi, its members were far more organized and 
politically conscious (1952, p. 158).  Unlike either of the Christian parties or the post-
1952 Masyumi, the Partai Sosialis was not primarily a party of the seberang: Instead, it 
became the political vehicle of intellectuals, and thus, the heart of its strength lie in the 
major urban areas of Jakarta, East Kalimantan and West Nusatenggara.   
 Sjahrirs political ideology was based on the works of Karl Marx and 
Fredrick Engels, but he had revised and adapted those doctrines to what he perceived as 
unique Indonesian experiences and needs (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 21).  His unique blend of 
Indonesian and Western values was well-suited to triangulate the divisions between the 
three other competing secular ideological models manifest within the revolutionary 
leadership; the radical nationalists, who wanted to sever all ties with the West; the 
accomodationist leadership, who were willing to give away too much of Indonesias 
sovereign rights; and those hardline Marxist leaders, who wanted to establish an 
Indonesian soviet.  Sjahrirs brand of eclectic democratic socialism propounded 
democracy rather than nationalism, and it was equally dismissive of the feudalism 
of the old traditional order, the fascism of the Japanese-inspired collaborationists, and 
the super-nationalism of the hardline Marxists (Kahin, 1952, p. 165).  Although he 
disavowed the necessity of class warfare in Indonesia, he recognized the danger of 
paternalistic authoritarianism ingrained in traditional culture and he was particularly 
vehement in his opposition to the participation in the government of those who had 
collaborated with the Japanese (Sjahrir, 1968, pp. 28-29: Kahin, 1952, p. 321).                 
 As with the Christian parties, the Partai Sosialis informal alliance with 
Masyumi would seem on the surface to be counter-intuitive, however, the reasons for it 
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were very pragmatic.  The Partai Sosialis informal political alliance with Masyumi can 
be traced to an attitude of pragmatism, both in terms of ideological compatibility and 
with regard to its own preservation. 
 With regard to ideology, the agenda of Sjahrirs Partai Sosialis was not 
far off the mark from that of Masyumis religious-socialist wing under Natsir.  In the 
areas of economic development, international relations, regional autonomy, as well as on 
a host of many other major issues, both parties were fundamentally in accord with each 
other.  Although the traditionalist factions of Masyumi may have had little in common 
with the Partai Sosialis urban intellectuals, Masyumis modernist leaders, particularly 
those who were also members of the Muhammadiyah, shared an appreciation for the 
potential that western science, technology and education could and should have in 
solving Indonesias problems (Samson, 1968, p. 1002).  Similarly, both parties espoused 
complimentary views regarding the evils of socially-harmful capitalism and liberalism, 
while upholding the sanctity of individualism and the rights to property ownership 
(Kahin, 1952, pp. 306-311).  There were striking parallels between Sjahrirs political 
tract, entitled Perjuangan Kita (Our Struggle), and one published by senior Masyumi 
leader Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, entitled Politik dan Revolusi Kita (Politics and Our 
Revolution), both of which outlined a pragmatic middle-course for the Indonesian 
revolution.  Consequently, in a political sea of ultra-nationalists, super-nationalists, and 
religious traditionalists, Masyumis religious-socialists and the Partai Sosialis 
democratic-socialists found common cause.   
 While the issue of Islams role in the government remained an unresolved 
issue between Masyumi and its allies, it could hardly be said that Masyumi itself was even 
clear about where it stood on the matter.  While almost all Masyumi senior leadership at 
that time remained in agreement that Islam should provide the basis for the state, there 
was far less consensus concerning what that would actually mean in practice.  Although 
many continued to call for an Islamic state centered on the Sharia, many more among 
Natsirs faction were content to allow secular institutions to operate separate from 
religious  interference  as  long  as  there were no basic contradictions of purpose between 
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the two spheres (Samson, 1968, p. 1003).  In this light, it is easier to see how the Partai 
Sosialis leadership and Masyumis were able to cooperate effectively against their 
common ideological foes.        
 Despite their political compatibility, cooperation between the Partai 
Sosialis and Masyumi was grounded in more than ideological similitude.  The 
strengthening of their informal alliance throughout the later 1940s and early 1950s was 
cemented in accordance with an old Arabic proverb, which wisely cautions us to recall, 
The enemy of my enemy is my friend.  Thus, one can also explain the bonds between 
Masyumi and the Partai Sosialis as a not-unexpected by-product of not only the 
ideological struggle, but also the physical struggle in the face of growing communist 
power.     
 In the years immediately following the Japanese surrender, Stalinist and 
Trotskyite operatives increasingly infiltrated the upper leadership levels of the Partai 
Sosialis.  Many of these pro-Soviet operatives began to gain key leadership positions 
within the party with the aim of wresting control from Sjahrirs more moderate 
democratic-socialist followers.  By 1946, Sjahrirs socialists were becoming 
overwhelmed by hardline factions within the Sayap Kiri (left wing) that were calling 
for class warfare and closer-alignment with the U.S.S.R. (Kahin 1952, p. 258).  This 
divide was exacerbated by the failure of the hardline Marxist factions to support Sjahrirs 
concessions pursuant to the negotiations that had led to the Linggadjati Agreement of 
1947.  When Sjahrirs cabinet finally fell, he was replaced by his biggest rival within the 
Partai Sosialis, Amir Sjarifuddin.  Both he and his Masyumi allies were pointedly 
excluded from the Sjarifuddin cabinet.       
 Sjarifuddins cabinet would fall in much the same way as Sjahrirs had 
after the details of the Renville Agreement became public, and this would precipitate the 
permanent fragmentation of the old Partai Sosialis into two parties.  In February 1948, 
Sjahrir left his old party in order to form a new Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian 
Socialist Party PSI); however, only a relatively small core of western-educated 
intellectuals followed him, and as a result Sjahrir never again achieved the large numbers 
of followers that he had enjoyed while as head of the original Partai Sosialis (Swift, 
169 
1989, p. 26).  From that point on, the PSI became primarily a party of urban intellectuals 
without much rural support (Bone, 1954, p. 21).  
 The remaining factions of the Sayap Kiri remained under the leadership of 
Amir Sjarifuddin, who in August 1948 announced that he had been a secret member of 
the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party PKI) since 1935.  With 
the return of Musso from a twelve-year long exile in the U.S.S.R., the old Partai Sosialis 
was merged into the PKI and Sjarifuddins leadership role subsequently became 
markedly diminished.  In September 1948, the PKI under the leadership of both Musso 
and Sjarifuddin attempted a coup in the city of Madiun in East Java.  Their short-lived 
National Front Government collapsed upon the arrival of the Republican Armys 
Siliwangi Division under the command of Colonel A.H. Nasution, but the intentional 
slaughter of Masyumi members by PKI fighters during the ensuing retreat irrevocably 
hardened both Masyumis and the Army leaderships hatred of the Communists.   
 After the demise of the PKI following their crushing defeat at Madiun, the 
political alliance between Masyumi and the PSI began to stagnate.  Although cooperation 
between the two parties continued apace, the relationship would not again be tested until 
1952.  The events that surrounded the October 17th Affair of that year set the stage for a 
showdown between the two emerging power blocs in the provisional parliament.  On one 
side was Masyumi, the PSI and the Christian parties, while on the other was the PNI, 
which was supported by the President and to some degree Nahdatul Ulama.  The Army, 
as was described in the previous chapter, was split down the middle, and the PKI, which 
had still not fully recovered from Madiun, was proving to be an important background 
supporter of the PNI block. 
 The PNIs political attacks on Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX during the 
weeks leading up to October 17th Affair were widely seen as a proxy attack on Sjahrirs 
PSI, for whom both the PNI and Sukarno held little love (Bone, 1954, p. 18).  Masyumi 
was compelled by the almost rabid nature of the PNIs tactics to come to the political 
defense of both the Sultan and the PSI, and in the weeks that followed, the hardening in 
the divisions between these two blocs became increasingly apparent.  The Wilopo 
cabinet, for which Masyumi, the PSI, Parkindo and the Partai Katolik all fought hard to 
preserve, eventually fell nonetheless, and Ali Sastroamidjojo was subsequently given the 
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next formateurship by President Sukarno.  The absence of members from both Masyumi 
and the PSI, as well as from either of the two Christian parties, was as clear an indication 
as any that the former ad hoc alliance between these parties had been transformed into 
something more permanent.  The no-quarter political tactics of the PNI, PKI and 
Sukarno had hardened perceptions between both the Masyumi and PSI leadership that 
future avenues of cooperation with the PNI had all but been closed.        
 The membership rolls of the PSI never fully recovered from split of the 
Sayap Kiri in 1948, and it remained thenceforth almost exclusively an urban party of 
intellectual elites (Bone, 1954, p. 21).  Still, its influence was greater than might be 
inferred from its size.  As noted previously, its members tended to be more educated, 
worldlier, and more politically-conscious than those of many of the other parties.  It was 
perhaps in recognition of their professional competence that some political observers 
predicted that the PSI would gain seats in the 1955 elections (Lubis, 1952, p. 158).  In 
fact, the PSI suffered a tremendous lessening of its prestige and political power as a 
consequence of those elections, and its presence in parliament was cut by nearly two-
thirds.    
 The PSIs dramatic setback in the 1955 elections has been attributed to its 
leaderships underestimation of the role that traditional loyalties would play among large 
segments of the rural population.  These loyalties in many instances produced voter 
patterns whereby whole villages simply cast their votes in the same way as their religious 
leaders (santri/kyai) or their village headmen (priyayi) (Mysbergh, 1957, p. 39).  
Consequently, any party that could not appeal to traditional bonds of loyalty towards 
leadership figures or to communal social obligations was bound to suffer from poor voter 
support (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 23).  As a result of the PSIs inability to capitalize on these 
loyalties, it went from the fourth largest party in the provisional parliament to the eighth 
largest in the newly elected parliament, and when the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet 
was seated in March 1956, the PSI was not among those parties offered a place at the 
table.        
 When the Permesta and PRRI rebellions broke out in Sulawesi and 
Sumatra, respectively, both Masyumi and the PSI were placed in a difficult position by 
the developing situation.  On one hand, they were strongly sympathetic of the grievances 
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of the seberang against increasing Javanese political and economic domination, but they 
were also reluctant to give support to extra-parliamentary measures intended to change 
the nature or shape of the government, which is after all what the PKI had tried to do at 
Madiun.  These parties took no definitive stance on the uprisings, but Masyumi urged the 
Sastroamidjojo government to seek a negotiated settlement, rather than to pursue a 
military conclusion (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 263).  When Sastroamidjojo failed to take the 
seberang grievances seriously, Masyumi withdrew from the cabinet; which ultimately 
precipitated its fall.  In the end, most PSI and Masyumi leaders steered clear of direct 
involvement of the rebellions, but a notable few who chose to become entangled in the 
rebel cause tainted their respective parties with the stench of sedition (Mrazek, 1994, p.  
445).   
 Upon the inevitable fall of both the Permesta and the PRRI uprisings, both 
the PSI and Masyumi found themselves to be political outcasts in Sukarnos new system 
of Guided Democracy.  When General Nasution moved to ban the parties he deemed 
responsible for giving aid and comfort to the enemy during the rebellions, his sights fell 
squarely on both Masyumi and the PSI, and as a result both of these, along with Parkindo, 
were banned in Sumatra and Sulawesi in September 1958.  Likewise neither Masyumi, 
nor the PSI was included in Sukarnos Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat  Gotong Royong 
(Peoples Representative Council  Mutual Cooperation) when it was established in 
March 1960 to replace the disbanded parliament.  When Sukarno finally proscribed 
Masyumi once and for all in August 1960, the PSI also met the same fate for its vigorous 
resistance of Sukarnos cult of personality (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 268; Heffner, 2000, p. 44).  
By 1962, both Sutan Sjahrir and the Masyumis Mohammad Natsir would find 
themselves occupying jail cells, and neither would again be free whilst Sukarno 
continued to rule.  
 
c. Lessons 
 Masyumis alliances with Parkindo, Partai Katolik and the PSI were 
inherently flawed.  While their cooperation with each other was more consistent, 
ideologically-sound, and less opportunistic than the various combinations of the PNI-
PKI-Nahdatul Ulama coalitions of the same period, Masyumis party allies had precious 
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little political capital to invest to safeguard their own political survival, much less 
Masyumis.  Parkindo and Partai Katolik also represented seberang communities with 
only moderate political clout.  In 1950, the total number of Protestants and Catholics 
made up only a very small percent of Indonesias vast population, and thus they could be 
very easily discounted.  Of a population of some 80 million souls, Christians accounted 
for only about 4 million during the 1950s (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 17).  Further, they 
represented areas that were for the most part not economically critical to the Indonesian 
state. 
 Although the PSI could not lay claim to an ethnic or religious base of 
voter support, it received fairly consistent support from its members, even if the pool of 
PSI membership, like those of Parkindo and Partai Katolik, was necessarily limited.  It 
remained a party of urban intellectuals in a country with few urban areas and a very small 
population of potential recruits.  Prior to 1947, the Sayap Kiri had provided Sjahrir with 
an enormous base of support, but its split in 1948 and the emergence of a PKI alternative 
sapped the PSI of much of its potential rural support.  By 1955, it remained one of the 
few parties that actually had a well-formed political ideology coupled with an agenda, but 
it lacked the political capital to put it into action.  Consequently, it needed Masyumi 
perhaps even more than Masyumi needed it.        
 After the 1955 elections, the PSI ranked as eighth largest party in the 
parliament, and both Parkindo and Partai Katolik fared only a little better, securing the 
6th and 7th positions, respectively (Feith, 1971, p. 65).  Against expectations, the PSI fared 
poorly in these elections and saw its membership in parliament dramatically reduced 
from fourteen seats to five.  Similarly, the Partai Katolik also lost a quarter of its seats, 
dropping from eight to six.  Only Parkindo managed to gain seats, increasing its 
representation from five to eight.  Still, the combined total of these three parties was still 
less than half that of the smallest of the four top vote getters, the PKI, which had won 
thirty-nine seats in the new parliament.  The 1955 election results, and similar results in 
1957 regional elections, obviated more than anything else that time was not on Masyumi 
side.  Their influence in parliament, including their proxy influence through political 
allies, was waning in the face of Nahdatul Ulamas disaffiliation and the re-emergence of 
the PKI as a major actor on the political stage.    
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 Under these circumstances, Masyumis leaders should have continued to 
nurture their traditional political alliances, but they should have also tried to expand the 
top-tier coalition to include greater representation from Java-based parties, perhaps by 
either seeking a rapprochement with Nahdatul Ulama, or by trying to find common issue 
with the PNI by capitalizing on the nationalists growing alarm over the rapid, unchecked 
growth of the PKI.  Masyumi failed to seize any of these opportunities: Instead they 
became more reactionary and belligerent towards the opposition, and as a result set the 
conditions not only for their own political demise, but the demise of some of their allies 
as well.  
 
3. Masyumi’s Relationship with Its Political Opposition 
 The main parliamentary opposition to Masyumi came from both the Partai 
Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party PNI) and the Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party PKI), although the origins of their discontent 
with the Islamists sprang from different sources.  Prior to 1955, the PNI appeared to have 
been the biggest obstacle to Masyumis unobstructed domination in parliament, 
particularly after the PNI established more congenial relations with Nahdatul Ulama in 
1952.  After the results of the 1955 elections had become clear, it became increasingly 
obvious that the PKI had supplanted the PNI as the single greatest threat to Masyumi.  
Even the PNI leadership had belatedly begun to realize that their nurturing of the PKIs 
proxy attacks on Masyumi had only served to strengthen influence of the Communists at 
the expense of both the Islamists and the nationalists.  By late 1958, even the PNI would 
find its own position in parliament eclipsed by the rising power of the PKI.  
 
a. Partai Nasional Indonesia 
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 The first incarnation of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian 
Nationalist Party PNI) was founded on June 4, 1927 as an outgrowth of the Bandung 
Study Club.  The PNI rapidly became an influential organization in the relatively 
immature field of Indonesian politics, but a Dutch crackdown in 1929 led to the arrest 
and exile of its leader (Achmad Sukarno), as well as to the groups proscription.  The PNI 
was reformed on August 22, 1945, but unlike its predecessor, which had been a party of 
young intellectuals, the new PNI was a party of the older generation of pre-war 
nationalist leaders.  The PNIs slate of leadership personalities had not changed 
appreciably in the intervening sixteen years, except that they had simply gotten older.  In 
fact, the leadership of the PNI was on average older than the leadership of any of any of 
the other post-independence parties (Kahin, 1952, p. 155).  The generational gap between 
the PNI and many of the other parties, particularly the PKI, the PSI and the modernist 
wing of Masyumi, created not a little tension among these parties.   
 The PNIs membership was at first drawn almost exclusively from among 
the bureaucratic apparatus of the colonial administration (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 17).  Both 
the older and younger generations that had served in the Netherlands East India 
government now found themselves to be indispensable cogs in the machinery of the 
young Republic of Indonesian state.  They were the only ones with the practical 
experience needed in the day-to-day running of the government, and thus the common 
people viewed them with a sense of respect and awe.  Much of the PNIs strength was 
based on a traditional and habitual response to authority which unconsciously 
influenced the peasants and urban poor to look for political guidance from their 
countrymen who had served in the colonial government (Kahin, 1952, p. 155).  
Consequently, when other traditional bonds, whether they were ideological or religious, 
were lacking, the PNI was in a good position to exploit traditional patterns of authority 
(Mysbergh, 1957, p. 39).  While both Masyumi and Nahdatul Ulama were able to exploit 
the traditional bonds of authority, loyalty and self-identification within the santri aliran, 
and the PKI was able to capitalize of disaffection within the abangan stream, the PNI 
found its strongest support within the priyayi class (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 23).  It essentially 
became a Javanese party, led by Javanese, and representative of Javanese interests (Feith, 
1962, p. 140).    
 The PNIs ideology has been described as Marhaenism or socio-
nationalist democracy, a distinctive blend of nationalism and socialism, with radical 
overtones (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 21).  This ideology opposed liberalism and individualism 
as offshoots of capitalism, but it affirmed the importance of democratic rights and 
collectivist economics (Feith, 1962, 140).  The PNI was a party that tried to be all 
things to all men. (Bone, 1954, p. 22).  Its leaders claimed to be opposed to capitalism, 
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imperialism, and fascism, and on the surface the partys political agenda appeared not to 
differ appreciably from that of either Masyumi or the PSI (Lubis, 1952, p. 157).  The 
similarities of the PNIs agenda with that of the PSI and Masyumi are not surprising in 
light of the fact that political competition during this period was not so much about 
issues, as it was about personalities and the power of particular ethnic, religious, or other 
interest groups.  Indonesian political discourse during the period of the provisional 
parliament had almost nothing to do with ideology, and has thus been described as a 
poker game played by a few thousand people, all of whom have known each other 
much too long and much too well. (Bone, 1954, p. 17).  Although the PNI eventually 
developed a reputation for being ultra-nationalistic and anti-western because of its 
positions on the nationalization of foreign-owned businesses and its leniency towards the 
PKI, it was perhaps more adept than any other party at modifying its positions in order to 
adapt to the exigencies of changing political conditions (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 21).  More 
than anything else, the PNI still seemed to be fighting against the Dutch even after the 
battle had been won (Bone, 1954, p. 22).         
 As noted above, the majority of the PNIs support came from employees 
in the civil administration and among the higher-ranking members of the pamong pradja, 
the colonial administrations corps of native territorial administrators. A large number of 
its supporters also came from the pool of former revolutionary fighters who failed to fit 
into any of the other political categories (Feith, 1962, p. 143).    
 Ideologically, PNI members were generally opposed to Masyumis goal of 
establishing Islam as the basis of the Indonesian state.  The priyayi, which formed the 
core of the PNIs support, were by-and-large nominal Muslims and contemptuous of 
attempts by the santri to enforce religious standards through government policy (Geertz, 
1960, pp. 231-235).  Although not necessarily secularist in the manner of western 
liberalism, they eschewed the use of Islam as the framework of the state, and instead 
favored the expansion of traditional, syncretic Javanese culture (Feith, 1962, p. 140).  
Implied in this expansion of Javanese culture was the mandala model of politics 
discussed above.  Consequently, on the issues of the Jakarta Charter, the Darul Islam 
movement, and regional autonomy, the perceptions of PNI and Masyumi had very 
different points of cultural origin.   
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 Because the nature of Indonesian politics during this period was concerned 
more with power and influence than with ideology, many of the political battles between 
the main parties had almost nothing to do with their ensuring the success of their 
respective visions for the country.  Instead, each party was most concerned with ensuring 
its own access to the most lucrative sources of patronage and using the power and 
prerogatives of office to reward its supporters.  Almost every conflict between Masyumi 
and the PNI had its roots in one, or the other, or both of these parties, trying to increase 
its own share of the power at the expense of the other.  For the majority of their leaders, 
politics was a zero-sum game to be played without the possibility of giving or receiving 
quarter.   
 Masyumis and the PSIs attempts to shrink the size of the army and the 
government bureaucracy throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s was seen by the PNI 
leadership as a direct assault on its main constituency.  Likewise, Sastroamidjojos efforts 
to replace Masyumi and PNI personnel at almost all levels of the civil administration with 
his own supporters during the years leading up to the general elections was seen by 
Masyumi as an attack on its own precarious position in the bureaucracy.  In this light, 
political struggles over issues, such as Regulation 39 and the problems of plantation 
squatters in Sumatra, take on a whole new significance.  Even Nahdatul Ulamas 
decision to disaffiliate with Masyumi and ally itself with the PNI had far less to do with 
ideology, than it did with ensuring the continuation of its own power and influence.  
Clearly, the Islamic vision of the Nahdatul Ulamas Wahab Chasbullah had far more in 
common with that of the Masyumi leadership than it did with that of the PNI, but the 
continued access to the sources of patronage within the Ministry of Religion trumped 
even those lofty goals.   
 Throughout the 1950s, the PNI and Masyumi contested bitterly for control 
of the government, the army and the bureaucracy.  The relationship between the two 
parties had already greatly deteriorated throughout the revolutionary period.  It was after 
all the PNI leaders who had been chosen by the Japanese to supplant the Masyumi leaders 
on the eve of Japans surrender in 1945, and throughout the five years that followed, 
Masyumi had struggled in vain to regain its lost political prominence.  When Mohammad 
Natsir became formateur of the first post-independence government, it was widely 
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expected that he would endeavor to form a cabinet that was as broad-based as possible 
(Feith, 1962, pp. 148-149).  His failure to convince the PNI to join the cabinet, whether 
intentional or otherwise, was an ominous hint of how badly the relationship would 
continue to deteriorate over the following five years.          
 For its part, the PNI was little better at building bridges, though it perhaps 
exceeded Masyumi in the lengths it would go to undercut support for its opposition.  The 
PNI did choose to informally ally itself with the PKI during Natsirs brief tenure in 
government, and notwithstanding Sukimans efforts in August 1951 to roll back PKI 
gains, the communists were able to once again begin their long climb back from the brink 
of oblivion thanks in great part to the PNIs protection and nurturing.  PNI leaders 
believed they could control and use the PKI to weaken Masyumi, while they remained out 
of the fray, but in doing so they were ignoring the possibility of creating a force which 
could someday turn back on them (Bone, 1954, p. 22).  The PKIs vociferous attacks on 
the threat of radical Islam were intended to link Masyumi with the Darul Islam movement 
in the minds of voters and to produce an anti-Masyumi backlash that the PNI hoped to 
benefit from in the voting booth (Vandenbosch, 1952, p. 184).   
 While the PNI-PKI strategy to discredit Masyumi proved moderately 
effective, it was hardly without negative consequences for the PNI.  The repeated attacks 
on Masyumi served to only to unify its senior leadership as never before.  While there had 
always been various competing factions within Masyumi, Mohammad Natsirs re-election 
as the party Chairman as the sixth party congress in August 1952 solidified his role as the 
partys undisputed leader (Lubis, 1952, p. 155).  The disaffiliation of Nahdatul Ulama 
and the eclipse of the Sukiman wing left Masyumi a much more internally-unified party 
than it had ever been before, and much of this can be attributed to the closing of ranks 
that was precipitated by the PNIs and PKIs machinations (Bone, 1954, p. 20).  Of 
course, this homogenizing of the party leadership under Natsir also made Masyumi as a 
whole much more unwilling to cooperate with the opposition parties.  The eclipse of 
Sukimans faction in the Masyumi leadership had removed some of the most vocal 
proponents of compromise from within Masyumis executive council, and exacerbated an 
already latent tendency towards political brinkmanship.            
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 While the PKI was earnestly chipping away at Masyumi from the margins, 
the PNI and Masyumi were battling headlong for control of the bureaucracy and the 
army.  A confrontation over the issue of Government Regulation 39, which dictated the 
rules by which regional government councils were to be selected, was used to bring down 
the Natsir cabinet.  Likewise, a long-simmering dispute over which parliamentary power 
bloc would control the army leadership manifested itself in the October 17th Affair of 
1952, which pitted PNI-sympathetic army leaders against PSI supporters.   
 The October 17th Affair was a decisive point in Indonesian politics 
because the bitter acrimony it produced on both sides of the aisle in parliament served to 
complete the irreversible process of political polarization that had been underway for 
several years.  The PNIs attack on the Minister of Defense, Sultan Hamengku Buwono 
IX, was seen on all sides as nothing less than an attack on the PSI and on its sympathizers 
in both the parliament and the army, and Masyumi was compelled to defend it ally.  The 
dispute was further aggravated by Sukarnos machinations in support of the PNI position, 
which were based as much on his ideological affinity for the PNI, as they were on his 
personal dislike for Sjahrirs PSI (Bone, 1954, p. 20).  When the dust had cleared, the 
army was firmly in the PNI camp, and a new cabinet under Ali Sastroamidjojo gave 
evidence to the final split in parliament between the PSI/Masyumi/Parkindo/Partai 
Katolik coalition and the alliance between the PNI, Nahdatul Ulama and the PKI 
(Budiardjo, 1956, p. 21).    
 Some observers have characterized the PNIs increasingly antagonistic 
stance towards Masyumi and the PSI as a form of reckless opportunism that had its 
roots in the PNI leaderships fears that their party would not fare well in the upcoming 
general elections (Bone, 1954, p. 22).  Their perceived lack of grassroots support and 
rather thin organizational network outside of the government bureaucracy were seen as 
liabilities in the PNIs attempts to compete head-on with the Islamists and the 
Communists (Lubis,  1952, p. 158).  To the surprise of many, the election results placed 
the PNI in first place with 22.3% of the total vote (Feith, 1962, p. 436).  Much of the 
PNIs success in these elections can be attributed to the traditional and charismatic 
influence of feudal heads which determined the voting habits of most ordinary 
Javanese (Budiardjo, 1956, p. 23).     
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 Following these elections, the PNI tried to distance itself from the PKI, 
while tentatively exploring the possibilities of narrowing the breach between itself and 
Masyumi.  The staggering blow that the elections had delivered to the PSI, as well as 
Masyumis own poor showing, seemed to auger the possibility of improved conditions for 
facilitating compromise between the PNI and both Masyumi and the Nahdatul Ulama, if 
for no other motive than to stave off the fourth most powerful party, the PKI.  
Unfortunately, as was described in the previous chapter, the outbreak of the PRRI and 
Permesta rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi derailed any such outreach efforts.  
Masyumi withdrew its support from the second Sastroamidjojo cabinet in January 1957 
and went into permanent opposition until its eventual proscription in 1960.  
 
b. Partai Kommunis Indonesia 
 If Masyumis struggle with the PNI was essentially about power vis-à-vis 
cultural dominance, the struggle against the PKI was far more personal.  Indonesias 
Muslim leaders had vied with their Communist foes since the earliest days of the Sarekat 
Islam (Islamic Union SI).  The attempt by H.J.F.M. Sneevliet to re-mold the 
Semarang branch of the SI into a Communist organization precipitated a showdown 
between that organizations devout Muslim leadership and a growing base of poor 
laborers who were more attracted to the evolving SI for it socialist promises than its 
Islamic message.  When the Communists split off from the SI in 1920 to form the 
Perserikatan Kommunist di India (Communist Association in the Indies - PKI), they 
left behind a significantly weakened SI that would never again be able to regain its 
former influence.   
 If the Communist betrayal of 1920 had not been enough to sour 
Indonesias Muslim leaders towards their Communist brethren, then Mussos and 
Sjarifuddins conduct in the closing days of the Madiun Affair of 1948 would have been 
sufficient to convince them of the treachery and perfidy of the Communists.  The 
intentional slaughter of Muslim leaders during the PKIs retreat also ended any further 
possibility of Masyumi and PKI cooperation, as if the chasm between Islam and atheistic 
Communism wasnt already sufficient to militate against such a counter-intuitive 
partnership.  By the early 1950s, Communism was fighting from a position of weakness 
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against not only Masyumi and the PSI, but also the PNI and the Army; however, the 
exclusion of the PNI from the Natsir cabinet had as Dr. Sukiman had warned forced the 
secular nationalists to seek common cause (at least temporarily) with the PKI.  As a 
result, the PKI was provided with an umbrella of tacit PNI protection and a window of 
opportunity to regroup, reorganize and once again begin to grow.      
 The PKI strategy during the first half of the 1950s was to remain as 
uncontroversial and cooperative as possible in order to mitigate the fears of its detractors 
(Gosnell, 1958, p. 189).  Under a new generation of leaders, such as Aidit, the 
Communists began again to rebuild its cadres, this time focusing its efforts on the 
politically undisputed plantation areas of West Java and North Sumatra, where Masyumi 
held little attraction and the PNI had not yet made significant inroads among the 
peasantry (McVey, 1996, p. 102).  Aidit temporarily set aside orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine and concentrated on building an organization with deep and pervasive roots in 
Indonesian society.  To that end he welcomed all comers to the PKI: peasants, urban 
laborers and even landowners and minor aristocrats (Thomas, 1981, pp. 371-372).  He 
rationalized cooperation with the PNI and the Nahdatul Ulama by masking the PKIs 
heterodox communist strategy with traditional Marxist-Leninist terminology.  For the 
Indonesian communist ones social class no longer was the fundamental determinant of 
ones political orientation: Instead, ones political orientation determined ones social 
class (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 241).  Masyumi and the PSI were labeled as elements of a class 
of comprador bourgeoisie that had sold out to western interests, but the PNI and Nahdatul 
Ulama were only tainted by the native petite bourgeoisie, and thus they escaped the 
PKIs condemnation (Brackman, 1963, p. 171).   
 As a result of the PKIs decision to not pursue a class-conscious recruiting 
strategy, the PKI was eventually able to achieve dramatic gains not only in the former 
plantation areas, but also in East and Central Java as well.  Village leaders and 
landowners who didnt feel welcome in the socio-cultural pigeonholes of the PNI, 
Masyumi, Nahdatul Ulama, the PSI, or the Christian parties were often attracted the PKI 
because of its promise of modernization and economic development (Mysbergh, 1957, p. 
42).  The PKI claimed that their membership had swollen from 165,000 in March 1954 to 
half a million six months later (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 248).  The ironic inclusion of 
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landowners and aristocrats on the PKIs membership rolls finally began to draw attention 
around 1957 when peasant cadres began agitating for their expulsion, but it wasnt until 
PKI leaders began to try to implement radical land reforms in 1964 that the party was 
subjected to a mass exodus of landowners, most of who crossed over to the PNI (McVey, 
1966, p. 103).  By then, however, neither Masyumi, nor the PSI was an effective political 
party. 
 Although the PKI sought to establish informal alliances with the PNI and 
Nahdatul Ulama, as well as many of the other smaller nationalist parties, its leaders never 
tried to mend fences with either the PSI or Masyumi.  The decision to abandon such 
efforts may have been a pragmatic realization that Madiun had close those doors forever, 
but others have suggested that the PKI's leaders simply recognized that the pervasive 
influence of Islam, especially in the seberang, presented the most serious obstacle to the 
expansion of Communism in Indonesia (Vandenbosch, 1952, p. 184).  This observation 
was likely reinforced by Sukimans August 1951 roundup of PKI leaders and supporters.  
Thus, PKI seized every opportunity to exploit the breach between Masyumi and the PNI 
during and after the fall of the Natsir cabinet (Bone, 1954, p. 22).  Particularly onerous to 
Masyumis leaders were the PKIs attempts to link legitimate Muslim politicians with the 
Darul Islam rebels (Feith, 1957, p. 13).  In some respects, the PKI was only giving voice 
to the closely held suspicions of the PNI and the army, both of which resented Masyumi 
leaderships unwillingness to take a firmer stance against the Islamist rebels.         
 The PKIs sniping at Masyumi grew to a fevered pitch during the last few 
months leading up to the 1955 elections.  They broadened their attacks beyond simply 
accusing Masyumi of being complicit in Darul Islam, and as the elections drew near, they 
also began to accuse the Muslim leaders of having been both pro-Japanese during the war 
and pro-Dutch during the period of the revolution (Feith, 1962, p. 427).  The near 
constant campaign activity of the PKI vast organizational apparatus, along with the PNIs 
domination of the civil administration and pamong pradja, had their inevitable impact on 
Masyumis support in the contested areas.  While the weak showing of Masyumi and the 
PSI in the parliamentary elections surprised just about everyone, all parties were equally 
astonished by the dramatic surge in popular support that the PKI had demonstrated in the 
elections.  When the new parliament was seated in March 1956, the PKI had increased its 
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representation from seventeen to thirty-nine members.  As a consequence of these 
elections, the other major parties were compelled to take the PKI much more seriously.  
Within three years, Sukarno would turn to the PKI as the most powerful alternative to 
counterbalance an increasingly strong army.  
 
a. Lessons 
  The PNI and the PKI presented two very different challenges for 
Masyumi.  One was primarily cultural, while the other was political.  Despite efforts by 
the PNI after 1952 to utilize the PKI against Masyumi, this working relationship was not 
based on any real ideological affinity.  The PNI was not by nature inherently supportive 
of Communist ideology.  Even the watered down version of Communist ideology offered 
by the PKI during the 1950s was generally antithetical to the interests of the PNIs voter 
base.  After all, the PNI was essentially the party of the priyayi and the bureaucrats, and 
although the PKI scrupulously avoided talk of class warfare until after 1957, there was 
little in the Communist agenda that appealed to the PNI base.  Still, Natsirs rejection of 
the PNIs demands during the formation of the first post-independence cabinet, and the 
subsequent exclusion of the PNI from the government coalition put the nationalists in 
somewhat of a bind.  Although their strength in the provisional parliament was nearly at 
parity with that of Masyumi, the Islamists could also count on PSI support, as well as 
support from the Christian parties.  Additionally, it was widely expected that Masyumi 
would win decisively should general elections be held in the near future.  The PNI, 
however, was fairly politically isolated.  Consequently, the nationalist leadership began to 
cast about for a suitable ally that could help them joust more effectively with the 
Masyumi political juggernaut.    
 After 1948, the PKI had become the pariah of parliament.  It was weak, 
without allies, and relatively defenseless against the persistent efforts of the other parties 
to minimize Communist influence in the other institutions of the government.  Sukimans 
efforts in August 1951 to arrest thousands of Communists merely at the hint of trouble 
obviated the PKIs complete vulnerability during these years.  Only the army effectively 
spoke out against these mass arrests, but the displeasure of its leadership had less to do 
with the anti-Communist nature of Sukimans actions than it did with the fact the army 
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had not first been consulted.  Without a means to expand its influence in parliament, the 
PKI would have remained politically isolated and subject to the continued efforts of both 
Masyumi and the PSI to stamp it out prior to the elections: Thus, it seemed as if the needs 
of the PNI and the PKI converged at an auspicious moment in Indonesias political 
history.      
 The political alliance of the PNI and PKI was devastatingly effective at 
eroding Masyumis influence in certain key locales, notably East Java, Central Java, and 
parts of Western and North Sumatra.  Likewise, efforts by the PNI to stymie the political 
agendas of the Masyumi dominated cabinets were enhanced by the background support of 
the PKI in parliament.  With the addition of the Nahdatul Ulama after its disaffiliation 
from Masyumi in late 1952, the resultant PNI/Nahdatul Ulama/PKI bloc had become 
sufficiently powerful to go toe-to-toe with Masyumi and the PSI in the struggle to define 
the national agenda.  The Sastroamidjojo and Harahap cabinets together represent the 
nadir in the relationship between the main two wings of the Indonesian political 
spectrum.   
 Following the elections of 1955, the PNI became acutely conscious that 
their efforts to use the PKI for their own political aims had inadvertently strengthened the 
Communists movement.  Although this development had weakened Masyumi 
considerably, it had also damaged the PNI.  Consequently, when the first post-election 
cabinet was assembled under Sastroamidjojo in 1956, he resisted President Sukarnos 
efforts to ensure PKI representation in the government commensurate with their strength 
in parliament.  Ali Sastroamidjojo, though guilty of cynically co-opting the Communists 
for his own purposes during his first tenure as Prime Minister, attempted this time to rely 
on Masyumi and the Nahdatul Ulama to form a cabinet, while pointedly excluding the 
PKI.  However, relations between Masyumi and the PNI had deteriorated so badly by this 
time that this cabinet proved to be weak and unstable.  It lasted less than a year in great 
part because of Masyumis decision to withdraw its members in protest of 
Sastroamidjojos handling of the outer island rebellions.  The series of cabinets that 
replaced Sastroamidjojos were each handpicked by Sukarno, and each included 
prominent Communist representation of one form or another.  Neither Masyumi, nor the 
PSI would ever again participate in an Indonesian cabinet.         
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 The rift between Masyumi and the PNI was never truly unbridgeable.  
Although cultural differences between the Javanese and seberang politicians often 
frustrated policy negotiations, the ideology of the PNI was sufficiently amorphous to 
accommodate much of Masyumis agenda.  The nationalists were primarily what Feith 
has called Solidarity-Makers (Feith, 1962, pp. 113-122).  They were less concerned 
about the nuances of ideology than they were about the symbolism of the revolution.  
Perhaps if Masyumis leaders had understood this better, they would have been more 
capable of accommodating the PNIs symbolic needs without sacrificing their own 
agenda.  Clearly, had Masyumi chosen not to take such a brazen and over-confident 
stance in the formation of the Natsir cabinet, much of their later troubles would have 
never emerged.  Similarly, in light of Masyumi own vulnerability in the wake of its poor 
showing in the 1955 elections, it remains somewhat of a mystery why its leaders failed to 
labor more diligently to ensure that the second Sastroamidjojo cabinet did not fall.  
Unfortunately, they ignored their trouncing in the general elections and continued to act 
as if they retained the political upper-hand.  Their efforts to tie up deliberations in the 
Constituent Assembly over the question of the Jakarta Charter represented delusional 
thinking at its worst.  In the end, it only served to confirm Masyumis political 
unreliability in the eyes of their enemies. 
 Much of the criticism of Masyumis political behavior can also be leveled 
against the PNI, however, Masyumi bears the lions share of the blame for how badly 
poisoned the political discourse eventually became.  From 1950 to 1955, its leaders 
operated from a position of relative political strength, but they had the most to lose from 
the trend of Communist expansion and thus, they also bore the burden for taking the 
necessary measures to curtail the PKIs growth.  The most intuitive of these steps would 
have been to bridge the widening gap between Masyumi and the PNI with the aim of 
depriving the PKI of its umbrella of support and protection.  In the end, Masyumis 
leaders failed to act with wisdom, and they paid the price for it.  More importantly, 
however, the Indonesian people also paid a dear price for Masyumis failings because 
they ultimately had suffer the result of Indonesias decline into Guided Democracy and 
the thirty-two years of the New Order that followed the collapse of parliamentary 
Democracy.   
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4. Masyumi’s Relationship with the Army 
a. Evolution of the Army Leadership 
 Chapter II discussed the role that the army had played in shaping 
Masyumis ability to implement its own policies and to stave off repeated attacks by the 
opposition parties.  It has already been discussed in detail how the army was a highly 
fractious organization prior to 1958.  An internal struggle between the two main 
leadership factions served to keep the army divided and politically marginalized; 
however, because these factions were loosely allied with either of the two main political 
blocs in parliament, the army was compelled to serve as a proxy battleground upon which 
the political parties could contest for primacy.  Throughout most of this period, the 
armys internal factionalism and its inability to collectively agree on a vision for the 
Indonesian state restrained its political influence (Federspiel, 1973, p. 408).  Only after 
those two problems could be resolved would the army emerge as a potent political force.     
 The October 17th Affair was one of the most decisive political events of 
the parliamentary period.  Attempts by the PNI members in parliament to marginalize PSI 
sympathizers within the higher echelons of the army leadership led to a showdown 
between the armys Dutch-trained administrator leadership and its populist, Japanese-
trained competitors.  As the crisis escalated, political parties took clear sides, with the PSI 
and Masyumi lining up on one side, and the PNI, PKI, and Sukarno on the other.  When 
the dust had cleared after several weeks of brinkmanship and political maneuvering, the 
administrator leadership had found itself out-maneuvered and out of power.  
Throughout the archipelago, senior PSI-sympathizers were replaced with commanders 
who would prove to be more malleable to the will of Sukarno and the PNI.  The Army 
Chief of Staff A.H. Nasution, who had played almost no part in the struggle, was forced 
to resign in the wake of this incident, and within a matter of months, even the widely-
esteemed Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was compelled to resign the post of Defense 
Minister.  The reverberations from this incident proved to be so powerful that the Wilopo 
cabinet became too weakened to effectively carry on, and it collapsed soon thereafter.      
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 Following the collapse of the pro-October 17th forces, it seemed as if the 
PNIs rout of senior officers who were sympathetic to the PSI and Masyumi was virtually 
complete, but the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet that came to power in July 1953 attempted 
to overplay its hand.  The overt politicizing of army assignments by Sastroamidjojos 
Minister of Defense, Iwa Kusumasumantri, and the rampant corruption that was 
associated with this cabinet created a great deal of resentment within the ranks of the new 
army leadership.  To many of these military leaders, the armys self-perceived role as the 
apolitical savior and guardian of the state was under assault.  
 A February 1955 reconciliation of pro- and anti-October 17th officers led 
to a renewed spirit of cooperation within the army leadership and a resolve to resist the 
politicization of the army (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, p. 94).  Although intra-
leadership disputes would still be a frequent occurrence in the coming years, the united 
front that emerged as a result of the 1955 Yogyakarta conference resulted in a much more 
cohesive army (Feith, 1962, p. 398).  This new self-awareness was first demonstrated 
by the army leadership when it refused to recognize the Sastroamidjojo cabinets 
appointment of Colonel Bambang Utojo as the new Army Chief of Staff (Crouch, 1988, 
p. 31).  The army leadership was uniformly displeased at the overtly politicized nature of 
the cabinets selection of an officer that was far too junior for the post, and they 
consequently joined together in refusing to recognize his authority.   
 As the army leadership closed ranks to ward off what they perceived as 
unwarranted political interference in ostensibly military matters, prominent officers of the 
anti-October 17th factions stepped forward to denounce their former party allies.  These 
officers demanded that parliament agree to put an end to any remaining investigations 
concerning the October 17th Affair, and to officially recognize it as a closed matter.  
Continued efforts by both President Sukarno and the PNI-dominated cabinet to woo the 
anti-October 17th faction back into their camp failed in the face of the army leaderships 
new sense of self-identity and independence.  The army leadership began to speak with 
one voice, and it began to vigorously resist all attempts to make the army the political 
tool of any particular political faction or party.  The armys crucial role in precipitating 
the fall of the Sastroamidjojo cabinet more than any other event demonstrated that the 
army had begun to take its own corporate interests much more seriously than it had ever 
before.  From that point on, no party of faction could afford ever again to take the armys 
support for granted.   
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 The reappointment of Nasution as Army Chief of Staff in November 1955 
was a critical turning point for both Masyumi and the PSI.  If these party leaders had 
expected the relationship to be like that which they had enjoyed during the tenure of the 
Natsir cabinet, their expectations were proven grossly mistaken.  During his three years 
of political exile, Nasution had used the time to re-think his policies during the months 
before and after the October 17th Affair (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, pp. 91-92).  
Moreover, he had also reexamined his ideas about the nature of liberal democracy and the 
corrosive effect of party politics on the immature Indonesian state.  By the time Nasution 
had returned to active duty in 1955, he had developed a greater appreciation for the 
importance of the revolutionary spirit that had flavored the 1945 Constitution.  
Although he wasnt quite a convert to the Presidents increasingly populist worldview, he 
had come to believe that the heath and security of the nation was increasingly imperiled 
by the political frailty of the parliamentary system and the brinkmanship of the parties.  
 Nasutions willingness to cooperate with the second Sastroamidjojo 
cabinet (March 1956 - March 1957) infuriated many of his detractors among the senior 
leadership ranks of the army, many of who had helped bring down the first 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet.  For some, Nasutions return to power had been a personal blow 
to their own ambitions, but for others, his actions were seen through a distinctly socio-
cultural lens.  His efforts to strengthen the central army leadership in Jakarta at the 
expense of regional commanders seemed to parallel the cabinets increasing efforts to 
economically and politically marginalize the seberang for the benefit of the Javanese-
dominated central government.  By cooperating so enthusiastically with Sukarno and the 
PNI-dominated cabinet, Nasution had unwittingly allowed himself to be politically 
identified with them.  No longer was he seen as a sympathetic proponent of the seberang.   
 A series of failed coup attempts by disenchanted army leaders in late 1956 
highlighted a latent frailty within the army that had been masked for the previous three 
years by pronouncements of army unity.  Efforts by Nasution and the government to 
politically outmaneuver this opposition, rather than addressing their legitimate 
grievances, only exacerbated the situation (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, p. 118).  By 
early 1957, the political conflict worsened in the outer islands when regional 
commanders took matters into their own hands and declared the PRRI and Permesta 
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rebellions.  Within a matter of months, the Panglima (commanders) responsible for 
West Sumatra, North Sumatra, Kalimantan, and East Indonesia had all severed political 
and economic ties with Jakarta.    
 If any one point in the parliamentary period could be considered the point 
of no return for Masyumi and its political allies, it was the first few months of 1957.  The 
cabinets situation had become increasingly brittle, and rather than seeking to listen to the 
complaints of the rebellious Panglima, Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo stonewalled in 
hopes that by stalling for time, the rebels momentum would exhaust itself.  The 
unwillingness of the government to pursue a policy of compromise precipitated a final 
break with Masyumi, which withdrew its ministers from the cabinet in January 1957.  As 
the situation in Jakarta became increasingly intolerable for Masyumi leaders to bear, 
many fled to North Sumatra, where they inevitably became entangled in the PRRI rebel 
movement (Feith & Lev, 1963, p. 35).  With the fall of the second Sastroamidjojo cabinet 
in March 1957, the door was finally opened for Nasution and Sukarno to begin the 
gradual transition from a parliamentary democracy to the implementation of Sukarnos 
concept of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy).  
 Unlike the 1955 Yogyakarta Conference, which had merely reconciled the 
pro- and anti-October 17th factions for the sake of achieving some semblance of internal 
unity, the collapse of the PRRI and Permesta rebellions had a much more palpable, 
profound and long-lasting impact on the army leadership (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, 
pp.  127-128).  Most of the rebel officers were treated benignly: Some were given 
amnesty and allowed to retire, and only a handful of the most senior-ranking officers 
were arrested and prosecuted.  For the most part, however, the army leadership was swept 
clean of those officers who were the most sympathetic to seberang interests, and in their 
place was assigned as whole new slate of Javanese officers.  All of Nasutions most 
radical foes were cashiered from the active rolls, thus consolidating his undisputed 
leadership within the army (Lev, 1963, p. 354).  Within a year, the army had gone from 
an institution that was as socially and culturally egalitarian as any in Indonesia, to one 
that unapologetically pursued Javanese political and social hegemony (Federspiel, 1973, 
p. 410).  The purge of high-ranking seberang leaders produced an army that was 
overwhelmingly colored by the secular and abangan/priyayi values of the now 
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predominately-Javanese officer corps, and it bestowed upon future military leaders a 
legacy of suspicion regarding politicized Islam (Samson, 1971, p. 561).  
 Masyumis abandonment of the cabinet and its offering of both moral and 
military support to the PRRI and Permesta rebellions was the final straw for a far more 
politically-emboldened and institutionally-secure Nasution.  Over the previous years, he 
had grown increasingly weary of western-style democracy, and he had all but given up 
his faith that the existing political structure could be reformed gradually.  The inability of 
the political parties to keep the first post-independence cabinet together long enough to 
pacify the rebellions was the final proof that revolutionary change, not evolutionary, was 
what was needed to preserve the states stability.  Masyumis willingness to disregard the 
rule of law and to support armed insurrection in order to effect what it could not achieve 
through the parliamentary system was all that was required for Nasution to cross his final 
ideological Rubicon.  For him, Masyumi was no longer a legitimate voice of the outer 
island communities.  It had thrown away that right when it sanctioned military action 
against the central government (Feith & Lev, 1963, pp. 36-37).                           
 Masyumis failure to strenuously repudiate the outer island autonomy 
movements when they turned violent, and its willingness to obstruct the progress of 
deliberations within the Constituent Assembly over the issue of the Jakarta Charter, 
irreparably hardened Nasutions opinion toward the Islamist movement.  He had come to 
realize that the Islamists resistance to compromise had doomed the governments chance 
to reform itself through democratic means, and it had necessitated more radical reforms.  
In July 1959 the Constitution of 1945 was re-adopted by Presidential Decree with the full 
support of Nasution, and the Constituent Assembly was disbanded without having 
achieved its primary goal.  Shortly over a year later, Sukarno would also move to ban 
those parties whose ideologies were deemed antithetical to the Pancasila framework 
outlined in the 1945 Constitution.  First among the political casualties were Masyumi and 
PSI.  By this time, Nasution and the army was fully committed to Sukarnos new concept 
of Guided Democracy, and he turned to a blind eye to the extinction of his former 
political allies as a necessary sacrifice for the greater stability and security of the 




 The reversal in Masyumis relationship with the army during this period 
was perhaps one of the biggest blows that the Islamists had to endure.  Certainly, it was 
even more catastrophic for their long-term fortunes than even the eclipse of the pro-PSI 
army leadership in the wake of the October 17th Affair.  In the end, however, the choice 
had been Masyumis to make.  Nasution was neither by temperament nor background 
inherently opposed to Masyumis political agenda.  As a practicing Muslim from North 
Sumatra, he very clearly understood not only the fundamental grievances of the seberang 
concerning the centers economic exploitation of their resources, but he was also 
sympathetic to the efficacy of Islam as a guide for political behavior; however, he could 
not bring himself to support the establishment of an Islamic state because of the negative 
impact it could have in the large areas of Indonesia where religious minorities held sway, 
such as in Christian Flores and Hindu Bali.  By the late 1950s, Nasution had finally 
come to the realization that the constant bickering over the appropriate role of Islam in 
government was beginning to have a paralyzing impact on the ability of the parliament 
and the cabinets to carry out more pressing tasks (Federspiel, 1973, p. 409).  
 Prior to 1952, there was little that Masyumi could do to dramatically 
improve its relationship with the armys leadership, nor was there really much point in 
trying.  Although it was essential for the cabinets to have the armys support, the divided 
nature of the senior military leadership had kept the army politically weak and ineffectual 
(Lev, 1963, p. 349).  Only after the October 17th Affair did the role of the army in politics 
take on new meaning: No longer could the wishes of the military leadership be ignored 
with impunity by a corrupt and ineffectual parliament (Van der Kroef, 1957, p. 49).  The 
armys ability to bring down the first Sastroamidjojo cabinet because of the Prime 
Ministers failure to recognize the armys newfound sense of institutional self-importance 
should have been a clear warning shot across Masyumis bow, yet they failed to heed it.       
 As a party, Masyumi consistently marched to the beat of its own drummer, 
no matter how out of step it was with those to the right or left of it.  When Burhanuddin 
Harahaps cabinet came to power in August 1955, the army had high hopes that Masyumi 
and the PSI would make dramatic efforts to clean up the vestiges of nepotism, corruption 
and favoritism that had sullied the previous Sastroamidjojo cabinet.  Instead, the new 
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cabinet simply began to carry out similar polices for no other reason than to strengthen 
their own constituencies while weakening their opposition in the critical months leading 
up to the general elections.  Masyumis failure to act ethically when it was now in a 
position of authority was seen by much of the army leadership as simple hypocrisy 
(Feith, 1962, pp. 419-420).  The Islamists political tactics were similar to those of the 
PNI and thus seemed to confirm the army leaderships suspicions that the tendencies of 
all of the parties leaned to self-preservation and corruption, whether they called 
themselves Islamic or not.   
 Nasution certainly recognized Masyumis failure to live up to its rhetoric, 
and this certainly must have contributed towards the chilling of his own enthusiasm for it 
and the PSI in the months that followed Harahaps appointment as Prime Minister.  His 
confidence in Masyumi and the PSI was likely also further eroded when the results of the 
1955 general elections obviated the weaker than anticipated public support for both of 
these parties.  By later 1956, it was increasingly obvious to Nasution that the old system 
of party politics was not only contributing to the instability of Indonesia, but that it was 
also one of its most fundamental causes (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, p. 75).  
Expectations that the elections would help stabilize the party system by reducing the 
number of parties to a more manageable slate proved unfounded.  In fact, the results of 
the elections merely reinforced the pre-election political divisions, while giving 
additional legitimacy to the communists.  The subsequent gains of the PKI in the 1957 
provincial elections caused further discomfiture among those in the army who had grave 
misgivings about the dangers of the parliamentary system (Ricklefs, 1993, p. 260).  In 
analyzing the situation, Nasution considered the various actors on the political stage and 
he came to the conclusion that Masyumi had become part of the problem, rather than a 
potential solution (Lev, 1963, p. 354).   
 The final proverbial nail in Masyumis coffin was the participation of 
some of its senior leaders, among them Mohammad Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap, 
Mohammad Roem, and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, in the uprisings of 1957-1958 (Van 
der Kroef, April, 1958, p. 62).  For Nasution, Masyumis corporate unwillingness to 
distance itself from the conduct of its renegade leaders made it collectively culpable for 
their behavior.  In his estimation, Masyumi was no less guilty of betraying the Indonesian 
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state than the PKI had been at Madiun.  Consequently, the regional banning of Masyumi 
and the PSI in 1958, as well as their later proscription in 1960, was perceived as 
necessary and legitimate steps to preserve the internal stability of the state.  After 1959, 
the army would emerge to take Masyumis place as the political counterweight to both 
Sukarno and the emerging PKI juggernaut (Lev, 1963, p. 356).  This would be the 
culmination of Nasutions long desire to fully incorporate the army as an active player in 
the political system (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985, p. 133).  
 
5. Masyumi’s Relationship with the President 
a. Presidential Power 
 Sukarnos personal responsibility in contributing to the collapse of 
Indonesias first experiment with parliamentary democracy is indisputable, although 
history has perhaps unfairly assigned him too great a share of that burden.  While it is 
tempting to cast him in the role of the dalang (puppet master), slyly manipulating the 
various actors on the Indonesian political stage as if it were some sort of grand wayang 
(puppet show), the benefit of almost forty years of hindsight indicates that he was as 
much caught up in the events of the 1950s as he was responsible for directing them.  
Sukarno surely does bear an enormous share of the burden for helping to set the 
conditions that contributed to the coup of September 30th, 1965, but his political behavior 
during that period was not that of an aspiring dictator bent on establishing for himself a 
leadership role such as that enjoyed by Mao and Stalin.  Rather, he acted as the 
consummate Javanese politician, striving, perhaps in vain, to rise above the turmoil of the 
political chaos in order to synchretize competing ideological visions into a singular ideal 
that could be embraced by all Indonesians without regard to cultural background; 
however, that ideal was necessarily shaped by his own peculiar Javanese 
Weltanschauung, which valued societal stability, abhorred confrontation and sought to 
maintain the continuation of centripetal power.     
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 Pancasila, the five-point ideological basis for the Indonesian state as 
defined in the UUD-45, served as the penultimate example of Sukarnos efforts during 
the deliberations of the Badan Pĕnyĕlidik Usaha Pĕrsiapan Kĕmĕrdekaan Indonesia 
(Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence - 
BPUKI) to carve out a middle ground that could find broad-based acceptance among all 
factions.  His subsequent efforts to merge the competing streams of nationalism, religion 
and communism into the single political concept under the heading of NASAKOM 
(Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunisme) also reflect his attitude regarding the necessity of 
harmonizing widely divergent, if not contradictory concepts.  Likewise, the underlying 
modus operandi of Guided Democracy was to provide a vehicle by which competing 
views could be considered and distilled to the least common denominator.  However, 
although the process of musyawarah and mufakat reflected Sukarnos pre-occupation 
with achieving harmony, it also reflected his belief that firm, indisputable leadership was 
required to steer the process.  It logically followed that he saw himself as best suited to 
provide that crucial leadership.    
 According to Dahm, Sukarnos Javanese heritage also imbued in him an 
appreciation for the mythical concept of the Ratu Adil (Just Ruler), a messianic figure 
who would return to rule Java and usher in a new golden age (1969, pp. 17-21).  
Sukarnos preoccupation with Javanese mythology, particularly the legends associated 
with the shadow plays, shaped his political outlook, and colored not only his vision of the 
Indonesian state but also his role in it.   In some respect, Sukarno saw himself in the role 
of the Ratu Adil, whose mission it was to unify and homogenize the different elements of 
Indonesian society in order to achieve tata, the mystical concept of harmony derived 
from Javanese cosmology.  Sukarnos idea of political harmony did not, however, come 
without a price, because to achieve it, he was required to erase the very distinctions 
between ideologies or agendas that gave them their significance and their identity.  Thus, 
parliamentary democracy lacked appeal for Sukarno both because it relied upon clear 
distinctions among parties, it demanded either/or choices among competing visions, 
and it usually produced just the sort of conflict abhorred by most Javanese (Kahin & 
Kahin, 1995, p. 77).  Although, parliamentary debate might lead to harmony and 
consensus, more frequently it produced just the sort of inaction and political 
brinkmanship that had characterized Indonesian politics throughout the years 1950-1957. 
Sukarno greatly preferred the iterative process of deliberation and consensus building, 
which he claimed to have been the traditional mode of village leadership (Sukarno, 1965, 
pp. 278-279).           
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 The major Java-based parties, especially the PNI, Nahdatul Ulama and the 
PKI, could appreciate and in varying degrees embrace Sukarnos efforts, but Masyumi 
and the PSI steadfastly resisted them because they would have inevitably lead to the 
washing out of the political or religious principles to which these parties clung.  As 
Sukarno himself once said, the process of musyawarah is like putting a little water in 
the wine. (Sukarno, 1965, p. 278).  After enough iterations, the wine becomes less and 
less wine, and more and more water, until very little of the original can be detected.  
Sukarno was not necessarily opposed to any particular religious or political impulse, for 
he could in part embrace all.  He even once described himself as the Gemini Twins 
because of his ability to embrace both sides of every issue, belief or problem (Van der 
Kroef, 1968, p. 255).    
 The other driving impulse behind Sukarnos political maneuvering during 
this period was his preoccupation with the power of both mass movement and semangat 
revolusi (revolutionary spirit).  Sukarno was what Feith has described as a solidarity 
maker, a type of political leader who viewed the substance of ideology as inherently less 
important than the symbols and imagery of nationhood (1963, pp. 113-122).  This group 
sought to build a sense of shared vision and solidarity among the polity in hopes that once 
critical mass had been achieved, all the problems of the state could easily be solved by 
sheer willpower alone.  For leaders such as these, ideological principles played almost no 
role, and consequently they could be bent, exchanged or discarded as the conditions 
demanded.   
 Throughout the early 1950s, the political discourse was determined by the 
two main blocs in parliament, led by the PNI and Masyumi/PSI respectively.  Sukarnos 
political influence had waned significantly since the establishment of a parliamentary 
system in 1945, but he had adapted admirably to the prevailing conditions.  Despite the 
fact that his hand was no longer on the wheel of state, Sukarno continued to wield 
significant moral influence by virtue of being the father of the nation.  However, the 
President could not act without support, and so he began to cast about for allies.     
 The Natsir cabinet was the starting point for Sukarnos reawakened enmity 
toward Masyumi.  He had given the formateurship to Mohammad Natsir in expectation 
that a cabinet would be formed that would be representative of all of the major parties, 
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but Natsirs inability or unwillingness to make sufficient concessions to the PNI had 
ruled out its participation in his government.  Consequently, the cabinet that was 
eventually formed was imbalanced and lacking in the harmony that Sukarno demanded.    
Moreover, the President had been greatly disappointed in Natsirs unwillingness to 
aggressively pursue a solution to the problem of Irian Jaya, and he was disturbed by the 
governments repeated efforts to reduce the size of the army and the civil bureaucracy, 
not least because these planned cuts would significantly undermine his influence in these 
organizations.   
 Sukarnos relations with the Sukiman cabinet were much better than they 
had been with Natsir.  This change had less to do with ideological compatibility that it 
had to do with mutual respect and shared experiences.  As noted previously, Sukimans 
relationship with Sukarno began in the 1920s, and the lasting bond of friendship between 
them had been cemented by the support that Sukiman, as head of the pre-war Partai 
Sarekat Islam, had given Sukarno in his attempt to create a pan-Indonesian nationalist 
movement.  The PSIs participation in the Pĕrmufakatan Pĕrhimpunan-pĕrhimpunan 
Politik Kĕbangsaan Indonesia (Agreement of Indonesian Peoples Political 
Associations  PPPKI) was to be short lived (1927-1929), however, Sukimans personal 
and professional relations with Sukarno continued to be cordial in the years after.  It must 
also be remembered that Sukiman was not part of the Natsir religious-socialist faction 
within Masyumi, and that this was a time of struggle for leadership within Masyumis 
executive council.  Thus, by supporting Sukiman, Sukarno was simultaneously serving to 
undermine Natsirs efforts to achieve leadership primacy within his own party.  
 The Wilopo cabinet, though ostensibly headed by a PNI politician, was far 
more aligned with Natsirs policies than it was with those of Wilopos own party, and 
thus Sukarno was predisposed against it.  For its part, the Wilopo government did little to 
repair the relationship.  Instead, Wilopo continued Natsirs policies of attempting to 
marginalize Sukarno by limiting the Presidents office budget, which produced the 
desired effect of curtailing his travels about the country and limiting his exhortation of 
the virtues of Pancasila and the dangers of political Islam.  Despite the cabinets efforts 
to sideline him, Sukarno remained very active behind the scenes, and was able to strike 
effectively when the conditions and timing suited him.   
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 The October 17th Affair served to immensely strengthen Sukarnos 
position, and he moved quickly to take advantage of the instability that it produced in the 
army.  By fomenting the overthrow of regional commanders unfriendly to him, Sukarno 
was able to buttress his support within that army leadership, which had previously served 
as a counterweight to his machinations.  From 1952 until mid-1955 the army was a 
politically marginalized, and thus Sukarno had a free hand to agitate more overtly than 
before, and to coordinate the development of an increasingly close relationship between 
the PKI, the PNI and Nahdatul Ulama (Gardner, 1997, p. 115).   
 The army reconciliation of April 1955 presented mixed blessings for 
Sukarno.  He had no interest in seeing the return to power of his former enemies in the 
army leadership; however, neither did he have any interest in seeing an ideologically 
homogenous army under a unified leadership.  For the latter reason, the President 
acquiesced to the efforts of the army leadership to put the October 17th Affair behind 
them, although he had hoped that continued squabbles between the pro- and anti-October 
17th forces would serve to keep the armys leadership divided and politically weak.  It is 
unlikely, however, that Sukarno foresaw the disastrous consequences that the armys 
efforts to put its own house in order would have for Ali Sastroamidjojos government, 
which was ultimately brought down after the Prime Ministers failed attempts to reassert 
the cabinets political influence over the army.   
 Following the appointment of the Harahap government, Sukarnos 
political activities became much more overt and confrontational.  Almost all political 
observers and participants believed that Masyumi would dominate the elections, but 
Sukarno took to the campaign trail nonetheless to harangue the masses in support of 
Pancasila and those parties that supported it.  The results of the 1955 elections, which 
obviated the weakening of Masyumis public support, seemed to support Sukarnos 
contention that the Indonesian masses yearned for a secular government.   
 During the second cabinet headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo, President 
Sukarno began to grow increasingly disillusioned by the relative ineffectiveness and 
instability of the Indonesian parliamentary structure defined by the provisional 
Constitution of 1950.  This cabinet had been a great disappointment to the President 
(Gardner, 1997, p. 126).  Although, Sukarno had tried to impress upon Prime Minister 
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Sastroamidjojo the importance of assembling a cabinet that was truly representative of 
the post-elections parliament, the refusal of both Masyumi and the Nahdatul Ulama to 
serve in a cabinet alongside the PKI made such a coalition impossible.  The fall of the 
second Sastroamidjojo cabinet as a consequence of its inability to deal with the problems 
of regional rebellion finally offered Sukarno the long awaited opportunity to craft the sort 
of government he had long desired.  Because of the army leaderships increasing support 
for any measures that would restore even a modicum of stability to the government, the 
conditions were finally right for Sukarno to begin to implement what he termed his 
Konsepsi (Conception).  This conception was a political system that would be based on 
input from all sectors of society and which would be able to release all the vital 
energies of the people. (Abdulgani, 1958, p. 99).  It would be a system in harmony with 
the soul of the Indonesian people wherein all members of the family sit at the 
table  at the eating table and at the working table. (Van der Kroef, 1957, p. 113).    
 From 1957 until 1959, Sukarno, with the support of the armys Nasution, 
began a process of transforming the parliamentary system back into a presidential system.  
He made incremental adjustments, and at first only tinkered with existing institutions.  
After Sastroamidjojos fall, and the fall of a short-lived interim working cabinet, Sukarno 
directed that the next cabinet include all the major parties and be based on the principles 
of Gotong Royong (Mutual Support and Assistance).  Masyumi refused to participate, 
but the Nahdatul Ulama proved more pragmatic and swallowed the bitter pill of serving 
alongside the PKI in order to maintain its own political survival.  Sukarno was further 
emboldened by the political sidelining of Masyumi and the PSI as a result of their 
complicity in Permesta and PRRI, and he began thereafter to make more sweeping 
alterations in the political institutions.   
 In May 1957, the President formed the Dewan Nasional (National 
Council), which was comprised of forty-one representatives from functional groups 
from throughout Indonesian society.  This extra-political institution was intended to 
tender policy advice to the cabinet whether they asked for it or not (Abdulgani, 1958, p. 
100).  By appointing himself chairman of the Dewan Nasional, Sukarno had given 
himself a means to effectively circumvent the constitutional constraints placed on him in 
his capacity as President.  Supporters of the Presidents efforts to re-make the political 
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system denied that these first steps were only the first in a larger scheme to eliminate the 
parliamentary system, but that is exactly what happened (Abdulgani, 1958, p. 101).      
 On July 5, 1959, Sukarno signed a decree that ended the parliamentary 
system, and reinstated the more authoritarian 1945 Constitution.  By March of 1960, the 
President had dissolved the elected Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat  Gotong Royong 
(Peoples Representative Council  Mutual Cooperation), and appointed his own 
handpicked parliament in its place.  In that same year he banned the only major political 
party that had the will and courage to defy him, and thus he forced the conclusion of 
Masyumis long decline.  
 
b. Lessons 
 Masyumis rocky relationship with President Sukarno was as much about 
personality conflict as it was about political and cultural differences.  There were of 
course a variety of issues about which Sukarno and the Masyumi leadership saw 
differently, but Sukarno had the capacity to conveniently overlook ideological nuances, 
and so these differences need not have precluded a closer working relationship.  The 
insurmountable obstacle was Masyumis inability or unwillingness to participate in 
Sukarnos watering down of ideological divergences for the sake of achieving political 
harmony.  For Natsir and his followers, their political principles served as the cornerstone 
of their partys aspirations, and could not simply be cast aside simply to create the 
illusion of political unity.   
 It would be a mistake to presume that Sukarnos willingness to dispense 
with ideological substance for the sake of style demonstrated a lack of political sincerity 
on his part.  His cultural background had shaped his political priorities, and although his 
was a perspective shared by a majority of the leaders of the other major political parties, 
it was an alien concept to those who came from the outer islands.  It was this same 
cultural divide that militated against a rapprochement between Masyumi and Nahdatul 
Ulama, and that hampered the repair of the breach between Masyumi and the PNI that 
was caused by Natsirs ill-advised exclusion of the PNI from his cabinet.  Still, it was 
neither the cultural nor the political differences that prevented Masyumis leadership from 
reaching out to Sukarno.  Neither was it Masyumis commitment to the political system 
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provided for in the 1950 Constitution.  In 1957, Masyumi had considered the possibility 
of attempting to postpone the 1960 elections out of fear that the PKIs support would 
grow even further.  Certainly, the roles played by Natsir, Roem, Harahap and 
Prawiranegara in the seberang rebellions suggest a fragile commitment to parliamentary 
process.  Rather, it was their political immaturity and a self-deluded overestimation of 
their own political strength that led Masyumis leadership to overplay their hand and to 
take stands when compromise might have been more appropriate.  
 More than anything else, Sukarno was interested in the rhetoric and 
imagery of the revolution.  For him, the mechanics of governance was less important than 
the sense of unity and harmony that comes from sharing a common cause.  Sukarnos 
1957 political Konsepsi was a blend of egalitarian mass democracy tempered by the twin 
harmonizing principles of musyawarah and mufakat (Van der Kroef, 1957, p. 114).  Until 
both Nasution and Sukarno became convinced of the impotence of the parliament system 
and of the necessity for ending it, there were numerous opportunities for Masyumi to 
reach out to mend fences with both the Javanese-dominated political parties and Sukarno, 
if for no other reason than to safeguard their own political influence.   
 There was no element of Natsirs agenda that suggested a prima facie 
reason why political compromise could not have been more forthcoming on behalf of 
Masyumi.  Rather, as noted above, the Islamists overblown sense of their own political 
strength led them to stall and stonewall in hopes than the general elections would reaffirm 
their political leadership and provide them an unimpeachable mandate to pursue their 
political goals unencumbered by the need to make the sorts of compromises that might 
have saved them.  The election results did not, however, give Masyumi their expected 
landslide victory, but rather indicated just how divided the polity really was.  Although 
Masyumi had far less leverage with which to bargain, the opportunity still existed in 1957 
for them to cooperate with the PNI for the sake of preserving the parliamentary system.  
Their refusal to support the Sastroamidjojo cabinet in good faith in a time of national 
crisis proved to be a crucial link in the chain of events which not only deprived Masyumi 
of Nasutions support, but which also convinced Sukarno that both the parties and the 
parliamentary system had to go.  
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6. The Influence of the United States on Political Discourse 
The role of the United States in shaping Indonesias domestic political conditions 
cannot be underemphasized, nor should the effect that U.S. policy had on poisoning the 
political discourse at a time when the stability of the Indonesian political institutions was 
at its nadir be underestimated.  A string of ill-advised and heavy-handed attempts by 
successive U.S. administrations to alternately woo and coerce the Indonesian government 
in hopes of prompting it to acquiesce to a more clearly defined and binding security 
relationship had the unintended effect of weakening those political parties most 
supportive of U.S. interests, while conversely strengthening the hand of their opposition.  
The willingness of successive Indonesian governments to play the major powers off of 
one another in order to extract increasingly greater economic or military aid packages 
merely exacerbated an already tense international situation (Friend, 2003, p. 75).  Both 
sides played a dangerous game of duplicity and brinkmanship that would in the end have 
disastrous consequences for Masyumi.  Ultimately, the failure of the governments of both 
the United States and Indonesia to fully appreciate the motives and/or constraints for each 
others own domestic and international two-level game contributed to the destabilization 
of the latter and helped usher in the collapse of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia. 
The Yalta Conference of February 1945 is generally regarded as the starting point 
for the ideological struggle (if not the military and economic one as well), which would 
within the span of only a few years eventually engulf the whole world.  This Cold War 
would be waged not only in post-World War II Europe, but also in those areas of Asia 
where the surrender of Japanese forces had left a power vacuum ripe for exploitation by 
Communist insurgency movements under the direct or indirect inspiration of their Soviet 
mentors.  Since Marxist ideology had first gained a discernable foothold in Indonesia in 
1914 with the establishment of the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging 
(Indonesian Social Democratic Union), the archipelago had become contested ground 
for the Communists.  In 1926-1927, the Perserikatan Kommunist di India (Communist 
Association in the Indies - PKI) had staged numerous, short-lived revolts against the 
Dutch, and despite the exile of many of its senior leaders, the PKI survived both the 
closing years of the Dutch colonial regime and the Japanese military occupation.  During 
the aftermath of the Japanese surrender, the PKI reemerged to contest for political power.  
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At first, the PKI pursued its political goals peacefully, but with the return to Indonesia of 
hardline Communist leaders from their exile in China or the Soviet Union, the 
Communist movement began to grow increasingly radical and worrisome for U.S. policy 
makers.    
During the late 1940s and 1950s, U.S. policy towards the newborn Indonesian 
state was guided by two fundamental and interrelated concerns.  Perhaps the most 
pressing post-war concern of the United States was the timely and orderly rebuilding of 
the numerous devastated European countries that remained under the imminent threat of 
Communist expansion.  Among those nations requiring a significant amount of 
reconstruction was the Netherlands, which having suffered greatly under Nazi occupation 
remained on the verge of collapse.  Consequently, the desire of the indigenous 
Indonesians for independence was effectively trumped by the U.S. imperative to 
safeguard the Netherlands from an economic collapse that could only facilitate 
Communist infiltration (Gardner, 1997, p. 24).   
Because a significant amount of Dutch revenues came from the Netherlands East 
Indies, there was little sympathy within the U.S. administration for forcing the Dutch to 
grant independence to the colonies until such time that the homeland was made solvent.  
The Dutch effectively bolstered their case by pointing to the threat of Communist 
expansion in Asia and suggesting that a newly independent Indonesia would be highly 
susceptible to Communist influence.  The ambivalence of the Truman administration 
towards the repeated pleas for assistance by the Indonesian government was eventually 
worn down less by their own intrinsic merit and appeal to Americas own Democratic 
values, than it was by the abhorrent and duplicitous behavior of the Dutch in their efforts 
to reintroduce colonial authority throughout the archipelago.  The brazenness of the 
Dutch police actions of July 1947 and December 1948 hardened U.S. perceptions toward 
the Netherlands and precipitated an incremental shift in U.S. policy.  Critical mass was 
finally achieved when the Indonesian government successfully and unhesitatingly 
crushed of the Communist uprising at Madiun in 1948, thereby decisively demonstrating 
their anti-Communist credentials, while effectively disproving Dutch claims regarding 
the susceptibility of the archipelago to the Communists.  Subtle threats regarding the 
continuation of Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands was sufficient to force the Dutch 
202 
back to the negotiating table, where ultimately they relented and gave in to Indonesian 
demands for independence.   
 
a. Irian Barat 
 By 1949, the U.S. government fully supported the transfer of sovereignty 
for the former NEI territories to the interim Indonesian government, but with one small 
exception.  The Dutch insisted on retaining the territory of West Papua (Irian Barat), and 
the Truman administration gave its acquiescence.  The rationale behind this decision was 
simply to ensure a secure base of operations in the unlikely event that Indonesia did in 
fact go Communist, as well as to insulate Papua New Guinea from further Indonesian 
territorial ambitions (Gardner, 1997, pp. 90-91).  Regardless of the pragmatism of the 
U.S. position, the exclusion of Irian Barat from the final agreement of the Round Table 
Discussions of 1949 would continue to haunt U.S.-Indonesian relations for the next 
thirteen years.   
 The issue of Irian Barat proved to be increasingly emotive for the 
Indonesian people, and progress (or lack thereof) in solving this dilemma was frequently 
used by the all of the political actors to either bolster their own nationalist credentials or 
demean those of their opposition.  Despite the fact that its population was of a different 
ethnic and racial stock than that of Java, most Indonesians considered Irian Barat an 
inviolable part of their nation.  While U.S. policy makers sympathized with Indonesian 
claims, they also were all too well aware of the tenuous nature of Indonesian democracy.  
Maintenance of the territorial status quo of Irian Barat provided the most pragmatic way 
to hedge strategic bets and ensure a foothold in the region should democracy need to be 
forcibly re-introduced to the archipelago (Kahin & Kahin, 1995, p. 92).  The Indonesians, 
however, perceived the presence of their former colonial oppressors on their doorstep as a 
likely base of operations from which secessionist movements could quickly spread to 
other parts of the archipelago.  The Irian Barat issue repeatedly served as a lighting rod of 
nationalistic sentiment, and was frequently manipulated by Sukarno and the PNI to divert 
attention away from their own domestic policy failures.  This crisis tended to breed anti-
American sentiment, and ultimately led to a severe strain on Indonesian confidence 
regarding U.S. commitments to anti-colonialism.     
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 Although none of the Indonesian cabinets was able to make much 
headway in finalizing the transfer of these territories, Masyumi and the PSI were both far 
more susceptible to criticism than the other parties because of their perceived pro-West 
policies.  These parties repeatedly bore the harshest of denunciations because of their 
expressed confidence that the matter could be resolved through both bi-lateral and multi-
lateral negotiations with the West.  When those efforts repeatedly failed to produce 
results, the pro-West parties were forced to take more dramatic action: The decision of 
the government of Burhanuddin Harahap to unilaterally repudiate the Indonesian-
Netherlands Union in 1955 was in great measure driven by their need to appear as 
fervently nationalistic as both the PNI and the PKI during campaign season.     
 It was no secret during this time that U.S. political sympathies lay with the 
PSI and Masyumi:  That much had been demonstrated by U.S. financial contributions that 
had been funneled through the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the election 
campaign coffers of Masyumi in May 1955 (Smith, 1976, pp. 210-215).  Still, the 
intransigence of the United States government in not supporting Indonesias claims to 
territorial sovereignty over Irian Barat continued to put both Masyumi and the PSI in the 
difficult position of having to defend their pro-West policies in the face of both the 
unwillingness of the Netherlands to negotiate a solution to the impasse in good faith and 
the unwillingness of the United States to intervene to force progress.  While Irian Barat 
had tremendous symbolic value to the Indonesian people, it held little economic value.  
Consequently, the pro-West parties in Indonesia were generally loathe to jeopardize their 
economic agendas, which depended on the improvement of relations with both the United 
States and Europe, simply for a bit of useless land on the periphery.  They did, however, 
pay a great price for their pragmatism, because they ultimately had to answer for this 
matter both to their constituencies and to the opposition, both of which seemed to be 
seduced by symbolism over substance.      
 Dutch retention of Irian Barat remained an important element of U.S. 
policy towards Indonesia in the 1950s, but the Truman administration and its successors 
lacked an appreciation of the passion with which this issue was held in Jakarta.  The 
failure of the United States to support Indonesian attempts to raise the Irian Barat issue in 
the United Nations in August 1954 didnt weaken the latters resolve, but it did serve to 
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edge the Indonesian nationalist even further out of the U.S. sphere of influence, and 
deeper into the camp of other third world nations (Gardner, 1997, p. 118).  The agenda of 
the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in April 1955 included a list of items that 
surely must have antagonized U.S. officials, as they were specifically intended to 
capitalize on Cold War tensions, rather than resolve them.  The Bandung conferences 
public goal of establishing a new power bloc of emerging Asian and African nations had 
the effect of fanning nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiment during the 1955 Indonesian 
general elections, and as a result, both the PKI and the nationalist party (PNI) fared 
exceptionally well. 
 The shift in U.S. policy towards the transfer of Irian Barat in 1962 was not 
predicated by any shift in the fundamental political ground truth of the situation in 
Indonesia.  If anything, the susceptibility of Indonesia to a Communist takeover had only 
worsened in the years since Masyumi and the PSI had been rendered politically impotent 
by their support of the PRRI and Permesta rebellions.  The involvement of the United 
States in supporting those uprisings had soured U.S.- Indonesian relations, and the 
Kennedy administrations concern over Sukarnos rapid tilt towards the Maoist 
leadership model seemed to necessitate some grand gesture of good will in order to return 
some semblance of normalcy to U.S.-Indonesian relations.  The relative military and 
economic unimportance of Irian Barat seemed to militate against a continuation of the 
policy of the previous thirteen years.  The question of Irian Jaya was finally solved in 
August 15, 1962, when a plan negotiated by U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker paved 
the way for the transfer of sovereignty for Irian Barat to the United Nations for a period 
of one year, after which time the territory was then passed to Indonesia.  Neither 
Masyumi, nor the PSI would be around to enjoy this long-awaited diplomatic triumph, for 
both had been banned two years earlier in the wake of the PRRI and Permesta rebellions. 
 
b. Cold War Tensions 
 A second major point of friction between the United States and Indonesia 
concerned the role of Indonesia in the greater scheme of the Cold War.  Following the 
loss of China, the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese invasion of 
Tibet, and the escalation of Communist insurgency in Vietnam, U.S. officials became 
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increasingly sensitive to the vulnerability of the South East Asian basin to Communist 
expansion (Kahin & Kahin, 1995, pp. 8-12).  U.S. foreign policy under Secretaries of 
State Dean Acheson (1947-1953) and John Foster Dulles (1953-1959) were in great part 
shaped by the realities of this emerging ideological struggle with both the Soviet Union 
and the Peoples Republic of China.  In light of both its proximity to geo-strategic lines 
of shipping and its abundant natural resources, Indonesia was seen as a critical link in the 
defensive chain stretching from Japan, through Taiwan, the Philippines, and onwards to 
New Zealand, Australia and British Malaya.  A Communist foothold in the archipelago 
would not only present a backdoor for Communists to enter the South East Asia 
mainland, but it would also permit them to threaten both Japan and Australia.  The 
Domino Theory, which was first postulated by Eisenhower in 1954, came to be used to 
succinctly illustrate the U.S. governments worst fears regarding the Communist menace 
in Asia.    
 The Eisenhower administrations attempt in 1957-1958 to provide covert 
support to the PRRI and Permesta rebellions grew out of the perception that Indonesia 
was slipping irreversibly into the Communist sphere.  This perception was reinforced by 
the Indonesian governments tendency to play the Soviets against the United States for 
foreign aid commitments, and it was exacerbated by the unwillingness of successive 
Indonesian cabinets to unambiguously choose sides in the Cold War.  The intransigence 
of the Indonesians to commit to the sorts of binding security relationships advocated by 
successive Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations reinforced 
misguided perceptions in Washington, D.C. that the ideological loyalty of the Indonesian 
government was being won by the Soviets and the Communist Chinese.   
 Indonesian governments, irrespective of where they fell on the ideological 
spectrum, generally followed a policy of politik bebas dan aktif (independent and active 
politics), which was often characterized as strict neutrality in foreign relations.  Still 
stinging from the yoke of three and a half centuries of Dutch colonization and another 
three years of Japanese military domination, the Indonesian people were loathe to enter 
into any binding relationships that could be perceived as a compromise of their hard-won 
sovereignty.  Deep suspicion over what was viewed as neo-colonial and neo-imperialistic 
motives underlying U.S. support for French forces in Indochina, Republic of China 
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(ROC) forces in Burma, and British efforts to establish an independent Malaysia fueled a 
sense of nationalistic paranoia.  That wariness motivated the Indonesians to scrupulously 
avoid any appearance of leaning too closely toward either side in the emerging Cold War 
standoff.  The collapse of the Sukiman government in February 1952 in response to 
parliamentary furor over some provisions attached to U.S. economic aid pursuant to the 
Mutual Security Act aptly demonstrates the acute sensitivity toward this issue.   
 On 1 January 1950, Dean Acheson was in the third year of his tenure as 
U.S. Secretary of State.  For the next three years, the foreign policy he helped develop 
and implement was shaped overwhelmingly by the Truman administrations commitment 
to re-building Europe and halting the advance of Communism.  Trumans Four Point 
Program was specifically intended to woo uncommitted nations to the U.S. side with the 
three carrots of equipment, training, and financial aid, however the defining crisis of 
Secretary Achesons tenure was undoubtedly the escalation of U.S. involvement in the 
Korean War (1950-53).  The shock caused by this event reverberated throughout Asia, 
and caused U.S. officials to take stock of their strategic position in the region.  In the eyes 
of U.S. officials, the cancer of godless Communism was spreading in dramatic fashion 
and it was poised to consume and waste away many of the newly liberated nations of 
Asia.   
 Within weeks of Indonesias independence, the U.S. had offered a 
substantial economic aid package of $100 million through the U.S. Export-Import Bank.  
This was quickly followed by the arrival of a technical survey team tasked with 
evaluating further aid requirements.  Because of the Indonesian governments 
unwillingness to acquiesce to contingent security commitments, U.S. officials greeted 
requests for specific military aid with far less enthusiasm.  Indonesias first two cabinets, 
under Mohammed Natsir and Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo respectively, were built on 
coalitions that either did not have a decisive parliamentary majority, or which were 
politically fractious.  Both of these cabinets shared a distinctly anti-communist bent, yet 
in spite of their ideological affinity with the United States, most top Indonesian leaders 
within Masyumi and the PSI were not necessarily supportive of U.S. activities on the 
Korean peninsula.  Moreover, U.S. strategic commodity controls on rubber and tin 
exports had had a profoundly negative impact on the Indonesian economy at a time when 
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it could least tolerate it.  The PSIs newspaper lamented that U.S. efforts to stem the tide 
of Communism in part through commodity controls was in fact helping the Communist 
movement by weakening the economy (Gardner, 1997, p. 105).   
 Efforts by the U.S. Congress to strong-arm uncommitted foreign nations 
with the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 merely served to tie the hands of 
those Indonesian leaders who wanted to work closely with the United States.  In good 
faith, the Sukiman cabinet had attempted to finalize the details of a U.S. military aid 
package drafted by Dr. Hatta prior to the formation of the Republic of Indonesia in 
August 1950, but his coalition was so unstable because of its PNI membership, that the 
mere hint of establishing a mutual security arrangement with the United States was 
sufficient to bring it down.   
 The Wilopo and Sastroamidjojo governments that followed Sukimans had 
no PKI members in their cabinets; however, they were the first to gain the tacit support of 
the Communists, and thus this period signaled the latters re-emergence on the political 
scene.  The Indonesian leaders as a whole learned a valuable lesson from Sukimans fall; 
Straying from the path of foreign policy based on politik bebas dan aktif was political 
suicide.  U.S. officials, distracted as they were by the events in Korea, in Indochina, and 
across Europe, can hardly be faulted for overlooking this nuance of Indonesian political 
thought.  It would, however, contribute to a widening rift over the next decade, and add 
fuel to the PKIs drive to establish its political primacy.              
 Irrespective of the composition of the government, the concepts of 
independent and active had consistently served as the touchstones of Indonesian 
foreign policy since the nations inception (Anak Agung, 1973, p. 178).  First proposed 
by Dr. Hatta in 1948, and then reaffirmed by each successive government, this policy 
would survive relatively intact until eventually abrogated by Sukarnos suspension of the 
1950 provisional Constitution, and his rapid tilt towards the Communists in 1956.  Based 
on the non-alignment politics championed by Prime Minister Nehru of India, Indonesians 
saw this path as the only safe one to tread between the two emerging power blocs, both of 
which had former colonial powers at their core.  As the old Chinese proverb warns, 
When two elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled..  U.S. officials consistently 
underestimated the depth of Indonesian commitment to these principles, and tried 
208 
repeatedly to lure them into the free world camp by alternately wooing them with the 
carrot of aid, and threatening them with the stick of economic isolation.  Neither of 
these approaches was particularly effective at weakening the Indonesian resolve; 
however, such heavy-handiness did serve to cast a pall of mistrust over U.S.-Indonesian 
relations, and provide a campaign issue for the PKI and PNI to use as a wedge issue 
against both Masyumi and the PSI.   
 The Sastroamidjojo government that came to power in July 1953 faced a 
rising tide of frustration from the U.S. administration.  The Berlin Blockade of 1948, the 
stalemate in Korea, ongoing Communist insurgency in Indochina, and the sobering 
realization that the Peoples Republic of China was not going to be a passing 
phenomenon, all added to the growing sense of the utter seriousness and non-transitory 
nature of the Cold War.  When Dwight Eisenhower assumed the U.S. Presidency in 
January 1954, standing policy towards Asia changed only in terms of emphasis (Gardner, 
1997, p. 112).  Under the leadership of John Dulles, the Department of State undertook 
efforts to tighten the web of security commitments in Asia.  Following the course set 
down by the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951, the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) 
defense security pact of 1951, and the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, the United 
States also negotiated the Manila Pact of September 1954, which paved the way for the 
establishment of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).  
 The Manila Pact was specifically intended to counter Communist 
ambitions for the region, and it was ratified by the ANZUS allies, as well as by France, 
Britain, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan; however, absent among the signatories 
were the regions most fervently non-aligned nations, notably India, Burma and 
Indonesia.  While Indonesia had previously, albeit reluctantly, signed the Japanese Peace 
Treaty, Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo was well aware that it had contributed to 
poisoning of the domestic political climate and had helped bring down the Sukiman 
cabinet.  The presence of multiple former colonial powers among the SEATO signatories, 
allied with the undisguised aim of propping up the French colonial legacy in Indochina, 
was not lost on the Indonesians.  No cabinet that supported a treaty with such blatant neo-
colonial underpinnings could have survived for very long in the fractious Indonesian 
parliament.  Still, the Eisenhower administration proved to be less than patient or 
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accommodating of Indonesian domestic political constraints.  Dulles himself believed 
that neutralism was fundamentally immoral and ultimately benefited Soviet aspirations 
(Sukarno, 1965, p. 277).  The strained relationship between the United States and India 
during this period can also be traced to the Eisenhower administrations displeasure with 
Prime Minister Nehrus similar policies of non-alignment (Carpenter, 1985, p. 3).  A 
November 1953 National Security Council (NSC) policy statement had advised the 
administration that the loss of Indonesia to communism would have serious security 
implications for the United States and the rest of the free world. (Gardner, 1997, p. 115).   
 Secretary Dulles visited Jakarta in March 1956, and he likewise invited 
President Sukarno to the United States in the hope of initiating a fresh start in U.S.-
Indonesian relations.  Sukarno did visit in May 1956, but much to the dismay of U.S. 
officials, he almost immediately followed this trip with a visit to the Soviet Union in 
August, and then to Communist China in October.  While Sukarnos initial impressions 
of the United States were generally favorable, over time his recollection of meetings with 
President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles grew increasingly negative (Sukarno, 1965, 
pp. 277-278).  In contrast, his experiences in China had made a much more positive and 
profound impression on his political philosophy, and as a result, his vision for Indonesia 
had begun to undergo a significant alteration (Friend, 2003, p. 67).  Contrasting society in 
the United States with what he saw in the Peoples Republic of China, Sukarno drew the 
conclusion that the latter provided a more appropriate model for Indonesian social, 
economic and political development (Anak Agung, 1973, p. 191).  The embryo of 
political philosophy conceived during these visits would ultimately become mature in the 
publication of his Konsepsi in February 1957, and so it is fair to conclude that the seeds 
for his Guided Democracy were planted while Sukarno was visiting Beijing.  The 
Eisenhower administrations oft-repeated complaint that non-alignment was immoral 
perhaps had the unintended consequence of finally edging Sukarno closer to picking a 
side, albeit not the side the United States had hoped for (Sukarno, 1965, p. 277). 
 What Eisenhower had viewed as the Truman administrations loss of 
China shadowed every foreign policy option his administration weighed (Conboy & 
Morrison,  1999, pp. 12-13).  With the benefit of hindsight, he viewed the previous 
administrations insistence on maintaining Chinas territorial integrity as a colossal 
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mistake that had only served to benefit the Chinese Communists.  Secretary Dulles had 
warned in-coming Ambassador Hugh Cummings in 1953, that Trumans mistake need 
not be repeated, and, As a matter of general policies, dont tie yourself irrevocably to a 
policy of preserving the unity of Indonesia. (Gardner, 1997, p. 133).  Ongoing separatist 
agitation in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Ambon, seemed to 
present the administration with a golden opportunity to reverse or delay an ominous 
political trend that they perceived in the rising political power of the PKI, which had been 
obviated in the 1955 general elections, as well as in the 1957 provincial elections in 
Yogyakarta (Kahin & Kahin, 1995, pp. 83-107).  Despite analysis from U.S. officials 
living in Indonesia that indicated that the army leadership remained staunchly anti-
Communist, senior State Department and CIA officials clung to the perception that 
Sukarno had become increasingly allied with the PKI and China, and that all was about to 
be lost if something was not immediately done to arrest the deterioration of Indonesias 
domestic political environment.  As Eisenhower himself suggested, The best course 
would be to hold Sumatra if Java goes Communist. (Gardner, 1997, p. 137).  By 
September 1957, the decision had been made, and the CIA was busily supplying financial 
and material aid to the PRRI and Permesta separatists (Kahin & Kahin, 1995, p. 120-
121).      
 In spite of the participation of the CIA, the U.S. Navys 7th Fleet, and an 
ad-hoc American air force, the success of the PRRI and Permesta rebels was both limited 
and short-lived.  An American pilot shot down over Ambon and captured by Indonesian 
forces in May 1958, was all the evidence that Sukarno, the PKI and the Indonesian 
military needed to confirm their long-held suspicions that the United States had played a 
role in fomenting these uprisings (Sukarno, 1965 pp. 269-271).  The PKI and Sukarno 
had their political fortunes strengthened by this revelation, and whatever allies the United 
States did have among the military were immediately marginalized as quislings.  By 
August, recognizing that the operation had been a dismal failure, and hoping to win over 
whatever fence sitters were left in the Indonesian leadership, Secretary Dulles switched 
course.  He ordered the end of covert support, and then approved a substantial package of 
economic and military aid to the Indonesian government (Feith & Lev, 1963, p. 41).  The 
rebels, who had been emboldened and encouraged by U.S. support, were simply left to 
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wither on the vine (Kahin & Kahin, 1995, p. 18).  This was to be the Eisenhower 
administrations last substantial overture towards Indonesia.  In May 1959, Secretary 
Dulles passed away, and despite a last hopeful meeting in Washington, D.C. between 
Sukarno and Eisenhower, the former came away more determined than ever to steer a 
different course for Indonesia. 
 
c. Lessons 
 U.S.-Indonesian relations from the 1950-1958 were tortuous at best.  The 
pressures of the emerging Cold War, and the central role of the United States in that 
conflict, clearly colored the perceptions of the successive U.S. administrations and 
constrained their options.  Despite these factors, the United States often took steps that 
were decidedly counter-productive to policy objectives.  Failing to fully understand the 
unique colonial experience of the collective Indonesian leadership, and its impact on their 
worldview, successive U.S. administrations attempted to implement foreign policies that 
were perceived by the Indonesians as supportive of the old colonial establishment.  The 
pressure tactics characteristic of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations served only 
to embolden Sukarno and the PKI, while alienating and marginalizing those few 
Indonesian leaders in Masyumi and the PSI with pro-United States leanings (Kahin & 
Kahin, 1995, p. 217).            
 The ill-advised and ill-fated covert interference in Indonesia by the CIA 
would seem to be the obvious choice for the nadir of U.S. foreign policy towards 
Indonesia, but the seeds of that debacle were planted back in the pre-1949 period with the 
rather lukewarm support the United States had given to the notion of Indonesian 
independence.  The failure of the United States to rally international support for the 
transfer of sovereignty for Irian Barat to Indonesia in the post-1949 period only 
confirmed suspicions that the United States was a fair-weather friend and a politically 
unreliable partner.   
 Despite initial setbacks in U.S.-Indonesian relations, all need not have 
necessarily been lost.  Had U.S. officials shown themselves to be perhaps a little more 
accommodating to the need of the Indonesians to appear independent in thought, word 
and deed, greater progress might have been made in extracting security guarantees that 
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were mutually acceptable to all concerned parties.  Prior to 1956, the Indonesian 
government was decidedly pro-democratic, and only after Sukarnos failed attempt to 
establish a rapport with President Eisenhower, did he move closer to the Soviet Union 
and China.  Distasteful as Sukarnos personnel behavior was to the U.S. President, the 
latters rather cold and stand-offish behavior towards a man who had flown half-way 
across the world to meet him must have seemed intolerably unacceptable.  Conversely, 
the receptions Sukarno received in Moscow and Beijing by Khrushchev and Zhou Enlai, 
respectively, were specifically designed to foster that sense of equality and solidarity that 
Sukarno craved, but had found so lacking in the West.  Simplistic as it may seem, the 
competition for financial one-upmanship may have ultimately been won by a handshake 
and a red carpet. 
 It would be purely speculative to suggest that the subsequent U.S. 
Kennedy administration had been on the right track to achieve a significant improvement 
in relations.  By 1960, Sukarno was deeply and perhaps irreversibly wedded to both the 
Maoist model and to his role as the helmsmen of Indonesias Guided Democracy.  Had 
the United States seized the opportunity to shore up anti-Communist factions within the 
Indonesian government, such as those within Masyumi and the PSI, without 
compromising their nationalistic and anti-colonial credentials in the process, the 
deposition of Sukarno and the PKI might have turned on his increasing irrelevancy, rather 
than in the massive and wide-spread rampages that occurred in the aftermath of the 
September 30th coup attempt of 1965.  Sadly, by 1963, the Johnson Administration, 
which took over in the wake of President Kennedys assassination in 1963, had very little 
material with which to work with in order to return U.S.-Indonesian relations to an even 
keel, and the rising storm across the South China Sea understandably relegated 
Indonesian affairs to a decidedly secondary tier of importance.   
 The great potential for U.S.-Indonesian relations that had seemed so 
promising in the immediate post-war years, ultimately proved to be illusionary.  While 
both nations shared common hopes for friendship and cooperation, neither could 
reconcile the nuanced terms of that relationship.  Despite its position as a superpower, it 
was the United States that had the most to lose from its failure to cement the bonds of 
mutual respect and friendship with Indonesia.  The fact that Indonesia ultimately did not 
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fall to the Communists does not necessarily validate U.S. policy for the region.  Although 
Indonesia did emerge from the era of Guided Democracy without a Communist 
takeover, it did instead succumb to a thirty-two year dictatorship under General Suharto.  
Had the United States government been more perceptive of Indonesias cultural 
proclivities and the domestic political constraints of both Masyumi and the PSI, it might 
have been able to more successfully (and overtly) support the beleaguered proponents of 
parliamentary democracy.  As it was, ill-informed and ill-conceived efforts by the United 
States intended to manipulate the domestic political environment within Indonesia helped 
destroy that nations truly democratic political parties, while simultaneously facilitating 
Indonesias slide towards despotism. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Paulker has noted that much of the political history of Indonesia during the period 
of parliamentary democracy revolved around attempts by other political actors to weaken 
Masyumi (134).  As has been demonstrated above, some of the credit for Masyumis 
failure to live up to its political potential can indeed be attributable to the machinations of 
the nationalists, the Communists, and even Sukarno and Nasution.  These threats, 
however, were not insurmountable, and could have been overcome through more 
politically astute politicking on behalf of Masyumis leaders.  Much of Masyumis 
failings can instead be traced back to its own doorstep and to a string of bad choices 
made in the context of the political discourse peculiar to this era.  When one looks at the 
broad sweep of Indonesian political history during this period, one can easily identify 
four factors that negatively influenced not only Masyumis political fortunes, but the 
fortunes of the whole democratic system as well.  Each of these factors will be briefly 
summarized below. 
 
1. Persistence of Socio-Cultural Cleavages 
a. A Divided Ummah 
 The political parties during this period reflected more than anything else 
the cultural and ethnic cleavages that defined Indonesian society in the early 20th century.  
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Chapter II explained the origins for the terms abangan, priyayi, and santri.  It also 
discussed the differences between the Islamic-entrepreneurial and Javanese-
aristocratic worldviews and how these different weltanschauung shaped antagonistic 
perceptions of both the problems facing Indonesia and their potential solutions.   
 Despite the fact that Indonesias population was roughly 90% in 1950 and 
that Masyumi was widely seen as the voice of the Indonesian ummah, the Islamic voting 
public (and its leadership) was far more fragmented than most might have imagined at the 
time.  The traditionalist/modernist schism divided Masyumi at its very core and produced 
a power struggle between Natsirs religious-socialist faction and the base Nahdatul 
Ulama constituency that ultimately produced a mass defection of the traditionalists from 
Masyumi three years before the general elections.  The loss of the traditionalists 
organizational networks among the kyai and pesantren of East and Central Java was a 
tremendous blow to Masyumis campaign efforts in 1955, and it was one of the factors 
that prompted one of Masyumis own leaders to refer to his party as an elephant with 
beri-beri. (Paulker, 1958, p. 134).  Although its size in 1955 had been estimated at 
around one million members, it never developed the organizational framework to 
effectively mobilize those members after the loss of Nahdatul Ulama.     
 Another related issue is that Masyumis claim to speak for the entire 
Indonesian ummah was itself highly suspect.  Islam in Indonesia was not, nor is it now a 
monolithic political, ideological or theological entity. The majority of Indonesians are 
statistical Muslims, who are more apt to fall into the abangan category than that 
defined by the santri aliran.  The orthodox version of Islam practiced by the santri, both 
traditionalist or modernist, was in fact a minority religion throughout much of Indonesia 
in this era.  Consequently, a great many Muslims in Indonesia during the 1950s did not 
view Masyumi, or the Nahdatul Ulama for that matter, as their voice in parliament.  
Many, in fact the majority, apparently were just as comfortable giving their support to the 
nationalist parties, and to a lesser extent to the Communist parties as well.  This was a 
key point that Masyumis leaders failed to appreciate, which in some respects explains the 
hardline positions they frequently took.  Their overestimation of Masyumis own political 
appeal to both orthodox and statistical Muslims alike perhaps convinced them that their 
strength was far greater than it actually was, and they behaved accordingly.  The elections 
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of 1955 obviated just how overblown their own predictions and the predictions of most 
other observers had been with regard to their voter base, but by then, the die had been 
cast and Natsirs faction within Masyumi had become enamored with its own mythology. 
 
b. The Javanese-Seberang Divide 
 The cleavage between Java-centric political culture and seberang political 
culture also was a point of friction that disadvantaged Masyumi more than the other 
parties.  Javanese political culture, which greatly shaped the political ideology of both 
Sukarno and the PNI, grew out of a historical framework that was completely alien to the 
seberang-based leaders.  Political power on Java had historically been exercised through 
a patrimonial bureaucratic state designed to maximize the efficient utilization of capital 
resources, such as people and land, to generate maximum benefit for the society and its 
rulers.   
 In this type of political framework, hinted at by Wittfogel in Oriental 
Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (1957) as a hydraulic-society, top-
down power was essential to ensure that society was well-ordered and productively 
engaged in the large-scale agricultural efforts required to sustain the state.  Society 
becomes structured so as to be capable of supporting massive work projects designed to 
benefit the state as a whole, rather than the individual.  In the case of historical Java, such 
political power was understood in terms of a patron-client relationship by which the 
patron, the bapak (father), was owed deference and obedience by his subordinates in 
return for benevolence.  This benevolence often became manifest in the form of 
economic benefits or prestige, but it was always dependant on obedience to the traditional 
leadership hierarchy based on the centripetal model of the mandala and guided by a 
desire to maintain a sense of harmony and social order.  Geertzs study of the Balinese 
state in Negara: The theatre state in nineteenth century Bali (1980) more fully explores 
the political implications of this model.       
 Seberang political culture developed in a radically different fashion than 
that exhibited by Javas interior kingdoms.  Communities throughout the Javanese pesisir 
and the outer islands were not dependent on the revenues from massive agricultural 
projects, and they had no need for rigid top-down systems of governance.  These were 
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commercial communities dominated by merchants and highly influenced by orthodox 
Islamic ideals.  Consequently, they generally developed political systems that lacked the 
despotic quality of interior empires and that demonstrated more laterally diffused 
political power.  Government policies were not obeyed as a consequence of blind 
deference to the leader, but rather because such policies were deemed to benefit the 
various constituencies they affected.  This is not to suggest that seberang governance was 
Utopian by any means, but only that some amount of adaptability and flexibility was 
required by leaders to ensure the continued support of the key elements within their 
communities.    
 The friction between these two political cultures put a tremendous amount 
of strain on Masyumis relations with the Javanese-based parties.  The moderating effect 
that Nahdatul Ulamas leadership might have been able to have on Masyumis seberang 
leaders was lost with the disaffiliation of the traditionalists in 1952.  After that, the 
political cultural cleavage between Masyumi on one hand, and the PNI, PKI and 
Nahdatul Ulama on the other, became increasingly more pronounced.  This cleavage was 
further exacerbated by the voting patterns of the 1955 elections, which for the most part 
reflected these same cleavages among the general population, and which reinforced the 
trend of political parties merely representing socio-political culture, as opposed to a 
particular ideology or agenda.  With nearly 70% of Indonesias population living on Java, 
this was a trend that could only severely disadvantage Masyumi in the long-run. 
 
2. The Weak Parliamentary System 
Much of the blame for the political chaos of the 1950s can be laid at the feet of 
the political system provided for by the provisional 1950 Constitution.  The provisional 
parliament sworn in to office in August 1950 was reflective of the geographical and 
political divisions that had characterized Indonesia during its nearly five-year long 
struggle for independence.  Of its original 246 members, 177 came from the two houses 
of the federal parliament established by the Dutch for the territories that were not 
included  in  the  original  Republic of Indonesia.  The remaining 59 members came from 
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the wartime Republic of Indonesia.  None of these members owed their positions in the 
provisional parliament to popular election, having been appointed by their parties or 
regional governments.   
In the case of the wartime Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno simply apportioned the 
seats in the parliament to registered political parties based on his own estimation of the 
relative strength of their constituencies.  In some cases, Sukarnos estimates may have 
been overly generous, while in others they may have fallen short.  Prior to the Nahdatul 
Ulamas disaffiliation in 1952, Masyumi controlled fifty-two seats in the provisional 
parliament, which likely was far more than they actually deserved based on their weak 
organizational support.  Perhaps something can be said for the primordial sentiment 
upon which they could rely for votes, but as has been noted above, the great majority of 
Indonesians were statistical adherents of Islam, and they generally were rather less 
attracted to Masyumis Islamic message than they were to the basically secular agenda of 
the PNI or the PKI.  The inflated sense of their own political support handicapped 
Masyumis leaders during this period by convincing them that it wasnt necessary to 
cooperate with those parties with which they might have points of contention.        
Masyumi was not the only party to benefit from the system of apportionment in 
the parliament.  At the time of its dissolution, the provisional parliament had twenty-one 
distinct parties, while another twelve seats were apportioned to non-party affiliated 
parliamentarians.  The large number of parties had the effect of weakening parliament 
and the cabinets by making it almost impossible to achieve a decisive majority on any 
issue.  This situation was further complicated by the realization among the smaller 
parties, many of whom had no real constituencies, that they would lose their seats if and 
when general elections where ever held.  As the elections drew near, the price of their 
support in the formation of cabinets grew exponentially, as did the importance of dagang 
sapi.  Political observers generally lamented the debilitating role that the smaller parties 
played in destabilizing the political system for their own benefit, and most critics eagerly 
looked forward to elections in the hope that the number of parties would be winnowed 
down to a more manageable slate.    To  the  surprise  of  most,  however,  the  number of  
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parties elected to the post-election parliament actually grew to twenty-eight, although 
there also emerged a more distinct differentiation between the important parties and the 
minor parties. 
Two different criticisms emerged concerning the parliament by the mid-1950s.  
Masyumi and its allies generally supported in the system of parliamentary democracy, but 
they also began to push for the creation of a second house, which would provide a voice 
for regional representatives.  By this time, the seberang parties were growing immensely 
frustrated at Javanese domination of the bureaucracy and within parliament.  Many of the 
parties that were ostensibly regarded as national parties had their parliamentary 
delegations heavily weighted with Javanese delegates, and thus the voice of the seberang 
constituencies was effectively marginalized.  Proponents of a regional house of 
representatives believed that it would afford the outer islands with a platform to influence 
government policy more effectively.   
Sukarno, the Javanese-parties and Nasution were generally opposed to the 
concept of a bicameral parliament.  Most of the Java-based political parties opposed the 
idea of a regional house of representatives because they correctly foresaw that its 
establishment would have a deleterious impact on their own political and economic 
fortunes, as well as having the effect of eroding their traditional hegemony.  Nahdatul 
Ulama was itself split on the issue: Its branches in Sumatra generally favored the idea of 
a second house, while its Java-based branches resisted the idea.  Although it is only 
speculative, the author believes that the establishment of a second house would have gone 
a long way towards satisfying the grievances of the seberang constituencies, even if the 
governments policies failed to change appreciably.  The problems of the PRRI and 
Permesta rebellions might have been prevented had such as forum existed in which to 
debate the seberang grievances.  
Nasution and Sukarno were also sanguine on the issue of a bicameral house, 
although for more ideological reasons than the parties.  Both had come to the conclusion 
by 1956 that parliamentary democracy was ill-suited for the Indonesian people.  The 
fractiousness of the multi-party system had shown itself to ineffectual and counter-
productive towards satisfying the basic needs of the state.  For this reason more than any 
other, Nasution pressed Sukarno for a return to the 1945 Constitution.  Likewise, 
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Sukarnos concept of Demokrasi Terpimpin was born of the fundamental belief that 
western-style democracy was inappropriate for Indonesia and alien to the political 
proclivities of its people.  In the end, Masyumi would be proven right, but it would take 
almost another half-century before the idea of a bicameral legislature would come to 
fruition.  In August 2002, the Indonesian government accepted a Constitutional 
amendment, which in effect established a Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional 
Representatives Council), consisting of two hundred elected members.  This body will 
come into effect after Indonesias 2004 general elections.   
 
3. Response to Internal Instability 
Masyumis response to crises of internal instability within Indonesia in great part 
shaped their image within the military and among the Java-based parties, as well as 
among Javanese voters.  As previously noted, Masyumi often found itself in the difficult 
position of supporting the political aims of various insurgency movements, even if it 
disagreed in principle with the violent methods being used to achieve them.  Masyumis 
sympathy for the aims of the Darul Islam movement, which began in West Java in 1948, 
but which later spread to South Sulawesi and Aceh, is an important case in point.  Both 
West Java and Aceh were important bases of support for Masyumi, and its leaders were 
understandably reticent about jeopardizing their influence among these critical 
constituencies by undertaking too harsh a response against the insurgents.  The political 
situation was further complicated by the fact that many among these populations 
themselves had a difficult time distinguishing between Darul Islams message and 
Masyumis call for an Islamic state.  
Masyumis attempt to balance its sympathies with Darul Islam against the 
expectations of the Army and the other non-Islamic parties repeatedly called Masyumis 
commitment to the state and to the rule of law into question.  The army wished to pursue 
a military solution to the insurgency, but Masyumis insistence on a negotiated settlement 
via diplomacy extended the life of Darul Islam far longer than it otherwise might have 
survived.  Meanwhile, state resources were expended staving off the movement that 
might have otherwise been used for more constructive purposes.   
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The PNI and PKI were able to capitalize on Masyumis soft stance towards Darul 
Islam, and they used it to support their accusations that Masyumi was a party of radical, 
intolerant Islamists bent on destroying Indonesias democratic system.  Of course, 
Masyumis position was far more nuanced than that, but to the simple voters of Java, 
most of whom were nominal Muslims with little affinity for the orthodox strain of Islam, 
it was enough to sway their votes to Nahdatul Ulama, or even to the PNI or PKI.   
Concern within the army over Masyumis unwillingness to respond vigorously to 
the problem of Darul Islam also began to erode the leaderships confidence in Natsirs 
commitment to the internal security and stability of the state.  As the self-proclaimed 
saviors of the nation, the army was very sensitive to the unwillingness of Masyumis 
leaders to take a decisive stand against the insurgents.  In many respects, this pattern is 
being repeated today.  Accusations that many modern Indonesian political leaders have 
failed to act decisively or speak up convincingly against radical Islamic elements for fear 
that they may alienate potential voters sounds strangely reminiscent of similar complaints 
lodged against Masyumi in the 1950s.  It should be noted, however, that the Darul Islam 
movements in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi were finally stamped out by a 
combined political and military approach undertaken by the army and the government 
after the banning of Masyumi.       
Masyumis ambiguous position concerning the PRRI and Permesta rebellions 
would also prove disastrous for their political credentials as a legitimate political party.  
As noted above, Masyumi did not take a collective position on the merit of the regional 
rebellions that began in 1957, but neither did they strongly repudiate them as illegal and 
anti-democratic.  If anything, Masyumis withdrawal of its members from the second 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet in January 1957 at a time of national crisis indicated a tacit 
approval of the actions of both the PRRI and Permesta.  Further, the involvement of 
several of its top leaders, including two former Prime Ministers (Natsir and Harahap) and 
the former President of the wartime emergency government (Prawiranegara), was never 
fully disavowed by Masyumis leadership in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
rebellions.  Sukimans attempt to save the party by expelling Natsir and his followers 
from the party was repulsed, and the whole party was banned as a result. 
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Like with the Darul Islam, the PRRI and Permesta rebellions put Masyumis 
leaders between their own Scylla and Charybdis.  On one hand, they sympathized with 
the grievances of the regional civilian and military leaders.  In almost every point of the 
PRRI and Permesta manifestos, one can see a reflection of Masyumis agenda, but the 
failure of Masyumi to condemn the anti-constitutional methods of the rebels, even as they 
continued to actively work within the parliamentary system to ensure a peaceful (and 
constitutional) rectification of the seberang grievances, was the cause of their final 
undoing.  No longer could Masyumi claim to be the champion of democratic values and 
the system of parliamentary democracy.  They had proven themselves to be no more 
principled than the Communists had been at Madiun in 1948.  The 1955 elections had 
disabused them of their illusion of being the sole voice of Indonesian ummah, and their 
implication in these revolts likewise erased their claims of moral superiority.  In the eyes 
of their critics, they had become just another political party looking out for their own 
interests.  
 
4. The Impact of Communism and the Cold War 
There is no doubt that the exigencies of the Cold War had a profound impact on 
Indonesias domestic political environment.  Even without the added pressure of the 
subversive threat of a grand international Communist conspiracy looming over Indonesia, 
Masyumis leaders were faced with a domestic political crisis in the form of the PKI.  In 
retrospect, much of the PKIs growth during the mid-1950s can be attributed to 
Masyumis own role in pushing the PNI into a political alliance with the Communists; 
however, the PKI itself was a dangerous threat not only to Masyumi, but also to 
Indonesian democracy itself.  Despite their watered-down agenda during the first three-
quarters of this period, the PKI leaders were every bit as ideologically fervent as their 
Soviet and Chinese mentors.  After 1957, the pragmatism of Aidits earlier program 
began to be incrementally replaced by more hardline Marxist doctrine reflective of class-
conscious warfare.  It is likely safe to assume that this alteration reflected only the second 
phase of the PKIs long-term strategy to gradually weaken Indonesias parliamentary 
democracy from within, since attacks from outside had repeatedly provide ineffective. 
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The PKI was equally wary of Masyumi, if for no other reason than that Islam 
continued to present the biggest obstacle to Communist expansion throughout Indonesia.  
Unlike most of the other political forces in Indonesia during this period, both Masyumi 
and the PKI had relatively well-formed ideas about what they represented and what their 
vision was for Indonesias future.  The real struggle revolved around co-opting the 
support of the various other parties in order to achieve the critical mass necessary to tip 
the scales in favor of one side or the other.  As has already been noted above, Masyumi 
had an over-inflated sense of its own political importance and, as a result, it leaders were 
loath to compromise their own political principles in order to forge working relationships 
beyond their traditional political alliances.  Had Masyumi been able and/or willing to 
distinguish where the real threat was, its leaders might have been more circumspect in 
their attacks on the PNI.    
Conversely, the PKI began this period in a position of weakness.  They were more 
willing to compromise and tolerate incremental gains, even if those gains were marred by 
occasional setbacks, if it meant they could achieve their long-term goals of political 
rehabilitation and acceptance as a legitimate party.  They did not abandon the attack 
when necessary to preserve their own interests, but they became far more adept at the art 
of nipping at their political enemies from the oblique.  While Masyumi exhausted itself 
throwing itself against the ideological ramparts of the PNI in parliament and in the 
bureaucracy to no effect, the PKI was quietly, but resolutely attacking them in East Java, 
Central Java and Sumatra by expanding its own voter base.   
The United States had come to recognize the criticality of this struggle by the 
mid-1950s, but the failure of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to 
recognize the unique character of Indonesian domestic political constraints underscored 
the heavy-handedness of their approach to shaping the outcome of that struggle.  As the 
most pro-West of the many parties in parliament, both Masyumi and the PSI were the 
most susceptible to criticism that they had become the servile running dogs of the western 
imperialists.  Efforts by the United States to coerce successive Indonesian governments to 
join in the greater Cold War struggle took the form of increasingly binding aid 
agreements, covert funding of political campaigns, and even direct action in the support 
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of rebel activities; however, none of these efforts proved successful, and cumulatively, 
they only served to further tarnish Masyumis foreign and domestic credentials. 
One can hardly fault the U.S. administrations for the sincerity and vigor with 
which they attempted to contain Communism in the 1950s, even if their actions were 
often ill-informed and counter-productive in the long run.  The threat was real, and 
Indonesia remained very vulnerable to Communist machinations until 1965.  Indonesias 
fate vis-à-vis the survival of democracy was not simply an internal matter to be decided 
by Indonesians: It was also was of importance for the security of the entire region.  The 
interest of the United States in helping to determine a positive outcome is understandable, 
but the impact of their efforts helped doom Masyumi and the PSI to the dustbins of 
political history.  Even today, the lingering effects of the 1957-1958 covert interference 
by the CIA in the PRRI and Permesta regional rebellions continue to negatively influence 
Indonesian perceptions regarding the legality and morality of foreign interventions in 
sovereign countries (Van der Kroef, May, 1958, pp. 76-80). 
 
5. Back to the Future 
This analysis indicates that the failure of Masyumi to rally the Muslim vote in 
1955 and become the preeminent political forces in Indonesia during the 1950s has a 
multiplicity of causes.  It cannot be simply explained away as reflecting a certain cultural 
tendency among Indonesian voters to shy away from political expressions of Islam.  
While it is true that the lack of homogeneity among the Indonesian ummah limited 
Masyumis ability to speak for all people at all times, the divergent interests between 
traditionalist and modernist, and between santri and abangan were not too great that they 
could not have been bridged by effective politics.  Masyumis tent in 1950 was certainly 
big enough to accommodate a whole range of positions and interests, but by 1957 a string 
of poor tactical and strategic political decisions had eroded Masyumis support among the 
voters, the army, the President, and among the other parties.  If the Indonesian people had 
become disenchanted with Masyumi, it was because Masyumi had failed to understand 
the political ground truth and adapt accordingly.         
There are lessons from Masyumis fall that can help observers better understand 
the possible role of Islamic parties in Indonesias future political discourse, or more 
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importantly, for determining those factors which could prevent a greater role.  If one 
scrutinizes the four factors discussed above, one can see that similar challenges face 
Indonesia today.  There continues to be tension between the seberang and the Javanese-
dominated central government, as well as between traditionalist and modernist elements 
of the Indonesian ummah.  Indonesias modern Islamic parties continue to reflect these 
various strains, and consequently, they have been unable to effectively work together to 
advance their respective agendas.  The one exception was the formation of the Poros 
Tengah in 1999 to ensure the election of Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency over 
Megawati Sukarnoputri.  
Currently, the Islamic parties continue to be personality driven, that is their voter 
base in generally drawn to them because of who their candidate is, rather than for what 
the party advocates.  Until these parties mature their respective agendas, they will find it 
difficult to find points of similarity among themselves that can be exploited as the basis 
for greater cooperation.  There seems to be some progress in this area, but these parties, 
as well as the entire democratic system in Indonesia, are still very young and immature.  
How quickly the Islamic parties will develop coherent platforms will in great part depend 
on how quickly they are forced to by the changing political conditions.  The 
establishment of a regional House of Representatives will likely spur this development 
because the parties will be required to compete more vigorously at the local level, and 
candidates will be forced to respond with more concrete ideas about what they wish to 
achieve for their constituents.  
The inherently weak nature of the parliamentary system of the 1950s has in great 
part been rectified by recent amendments to the 1945 Constitution, which has remained in 
effect since its reinstatement in July 1959.  Direct elections of the President and Vice 
President, as well as the provision of a second house of parliament will rectify many of 
the deficiencies of the current system.  These changes will help stabilize the government 
and mitigate the effect of factional politics on the ability of the government to carry on 
the day-to-day tasks of government.  It is hoped that these changes will also encourage 
more earnest discussion of government policies by narrowing the opportunities for 
political maneuvering simply for the sake of gaining a political leverage over the 
President and the cabinet.  With a more disciplined discussion of policies, we may find 
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that the Islamic parties have something of value to add to the discourse, particularly in 
light of the negative association of both Golkar and the PPP with the Suharto era, and the 
PDI-Ps lackluster performance under President Sukarnoputri.   
The future of the Islamic parties will hinge in great part also on their ability to 
learn from Masyumis mistakes regarding Darul Islam and the other regional rebellions.  
Since September 11, 2001, and the Bali bombing of October 2002, the international 
community and the Indonesian people have both taken far more interest in the prospects 
for the reemergence of radical Islamic forces in Indonesia.  To date, Indonesias political 
leaders, including those of the Islamic parties, have been generally hesitant to speak out 
too forcefully against those in their midst who incite violence against non-Muslims.  Like 
Masyumis rationale during the 1950s, much of this hesitancy is grounded in a certain 
political pragmatism combined with a measure of self-delusion.   
Regardless of the cause for their hesitancy in condemning the radicals, there is 
only a narrow window of opportunity for these parties to demonstrate the quality of their 
moral convictions, if in fact they have any.  Indonesian history is strewn with examples 
of one political entity attempting to co-opt and manage another for the sake of political 
expediency.  Whether it was the PNI co-opting the PKI, Sukarno co-opting the PKI, the 
PNI co-opting the anti-October 17th faction, or Masyumi co-opting the rebels  all 
ultimately suffered the consequences of having becoming the victim of their own 
machinations: Unstable forces are inherently uncontrollable.  The unwillingness of Vice 
President Hamzah Haz of the PPP to sever his cordial relations with Abu Bakar Bashir of 
the Jemaah Islamiyah is indicative of the attempt by some among the Islamic leadership 
to continue to play both sides of the Muslim street.  Such leaders would be wise to 
investigate the consequences of Masyumis failure to repudiate Darul Islam.        
Finally, U.S. officials would benefit from a careful study of the conduct of the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations towards Indonesia during the 1950s.  There are 
many parallels between todays worldwide war on terrorism and the Cold War of that era.  
The You are either with us or against us mentality of the current U.S. administration is 
eerily reminiscent of the anti-neutralism stance espoused by John Foster Dulles during 
the mid-1950s.  Consequently, it would be wise for the U.S. government to take heed of 
the effect that Eisenhowers policies had on souring U.S.-Indonesian relations, while 
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effectively marginalizing its own allies within the Indonesian government.  Indonesian 
political culture is different in many respects from that of the United States, and a 
different approach is often required than that which is intuitively American.  Since the 
proscription of Masyumi on August 17, 1960, the fifteenth anniversary of Indonesias 
independence, Indonesian political discourse has remained dominated by the Javanese 
political culture, which has its own peculiar way of dealing with conflict and dissent.  
The subtle nuances of this Javanese approach seemed to have been lost on the previous 
U.S. administrations.  With luck and wisdom, perhaps the current administration will 
come to understand more fully the Indonesian way and adapt U.S. policies accordingly. 
The future of Indonesian politics is difficult to read, but the upcoming elections in 
2004 will surely be unlike any other in Indonesian history.  The Indonesian people were 
blessed in 1999 with a second chance at democracy after forty-two years of despotism 
and oppression.  Whether they merely repeat their own bleak history, or are able to open 
a new chapter full of promise, will be entirely dependent on their ability to distill and 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
228 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abdulgani, R. (1958, June). Indonesias National Council: The First Year.  
Far Eastern Survey 27 (7), 97-104. 
 
Anak Agung, I. A. (1973). Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy (1945-1965). 
The Hague: Mouton. 
 
Anderson, B. R. (1990). Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia.  
Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Barton, G. & Fealy, G. (1996). Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in  
Indonesia. Clayton: Monash UP.  
 
Barton, G. (2002). Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President.  
Honolulu: U Hawaii P. 
 
Barton, G. (2002, October). Assessing the Threat of Radical Islam in Indonesia.  
Australian Policy Online [On-line]. Retrieved on May 2003. Available:  
http://www.apo.org.au/  
 
Benda, H. (1955, December). Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-45. 
Pacific Affairs 28 (7), 350-362. 
 
Benda, H. (1958). The Crescent and the Rising Sun.  The Hague: W. van Hoeve LTD. 
 
Bone, R. (1954, February). The Future of Indonesian Political Parties. 
Far Eastern Survey 23 (2), 17-23. 
 
Bone, R. (1955, December). Organization of the Indonesian Elections. 
The American Political Science Review 49 (4), 1067-1084. 
 
 Brackman, A. (1963). Indonesian Communism: A History. New York: Praeger.  
 
Budiardjo, M. (1956, February). The Provisional Parliament in Indonesia. 
Far Eastern Survey 25 (2), 17-23. 
 
Carpenter, T. (1985, August). The United States and Third World Dictatorships: A Case 
for Benign Detachment. Cato Institute [On-line]. Retrieved on January 2003. 
Available: www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa058.html 
 
Coedès, G. (1968). The Indianized States of Southeast Asia. Honolulu: U of 




Compton, B. (1954, May). The Indonesian Election Law II. Far Eastern Survey 23  
(5), 74-77. 
 
Conboy, K. & Morrison, J. (1999). Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia  
(1957-1958). Annapolis: Naval Institute P. 
 
Cribb, R. (2000). Historical Atlas of Indonesia. Honolulu: U Hawaii P. 
 
Crouch, H. (1980). The Trend towards authoritarianism: The post-1945 period.  
In H. Aveling (Ed.), The Development of Indonesian Society. (pp. 166-204).  
St. Lucia: U of Queensland P. 
 
Crouch, H. (1988). The Army and Politics in Indonesia.  Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Dahm, B. (1969). Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence.  
Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Dhofier, Z. (1999). The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of  
Traditional Islam in Java.  Tempe: U of Arizona P. 
 
Dudden, A.P. (1992). The American Pacific: From the old China trade to the present.  
Oxford: Oxford UP. 
 
Federspiel, H. (1973, Autumn). The Military and Islam in Sukarnos Indonesia.  
Pacific Affairs 46 (3), 407-420. 
 
Federspiel, H. (1995). A Dictionary of Indonesian Islam. Athens: Ohio UP. 
 
Feith, H. (1954, September). Toward Elections in Indonesia. Pacific Affairs 27  
(3), 236-254. 
 
Feith, H. (1957). The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Feith, H. (1962). The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia.   
Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Feith, H. & Castles, L. (1970). Indonesian Political Thinking: 1945-1965.  
Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Feith, H. & Lev, D. (1963, Spring). The End of the Indonesian Rebellion.  
Pacific Affairs 36 (1), 32-46. 
 
Friend, T. (2003). Indonesian Destinies. Cambridge: Harvard UP. 
 
Gardner, P. (1997). Shared Hopes, Separate Fears: Fifty Years of U.S.-Indonesian  
Relations. Boulder: Westview P. 
230 
 
Geertz, C. (1960) The Religion of Java.  Chicago: U of Chicago P. 
 
 
Geertz, C. (1963). The Integrative Revolution; Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics 
in the New States. In Clifford Geertz (Ed.), Old Societies and New States.   
(pp. 105-157). Glencoe: Free P.  
 
Geertz, C. (1980). Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali.  
Princeton: Princeton UP. 
 
Gosnell, H. (1958, May). Indonesians Go to the Polls: The Parties and their Stand  
on Constitutional Issues. Midwest Journal of Political Science 2 (2), 179-190. 
 
Heffner, R. (2000). Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia.  
Princeton: Princeton UP.   
 
Kahin, A. & Kahin, G. (1995). Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower 
Debacle in Indonesia. Seattle: U Washington P. 
 
Kahin, G. (1950, November). The New Indonesian Government. Far Eastern Survey 19 
(20), 209-213. 
 
Kahin, G. (1952). Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell UP.   
 
Kattenburg, P. (1946, September). Political Alignments in Indonesia.  
Far Eastern Survey 15 (19), 289-294. 
 
Kelabora, L. (1976, March). Religious Instruction Policy in Indonesia.  Asian Survey 16 
(3), 230-248. 
 
Kell, T. (1995). The Roots of the Achenese Rebellion (1889-1992). Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Lanti, I. (2001, April). Back to the (Slightly Different) Future: Continuity and Change in  
Indonesian Politics. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [On-line]. Retrieved on 
December 2002. Available: www.iseas.edu.sg/vr22001.pdf 
 
Lev, D. (1963, Winter). The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia. Pacific Affairs 36 
(4), 349-364. 
 
Lubis, M. (1952, October). Party Confusion in Indonesia. Far Eastern Survey 21  
(15), 155-158. 
 
McVey, R. (1996). Nationalism, Revolution, and Organization in Indonesian  
Communism. In Daniel Lev & Ruth McVey (Eds.) Making Indonesia: Essays on 
Modern Indonesia (pp. 96-117).  Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
231 
 
Mrazek, R. (1994). Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Mysbergh, J. (1957, March). The Indonesia Elite. Far Eastern Survey 26 (3), 38-42. 
 
Newland, L. (2000). Under The Banner of Islam: Mobilizing Religious Identities in  
West Java. The Australian Journal of Anthropology 11 (2), 199-222. 
 
ORourke, K. (2004). Political Islam in 2004. Van Zorge, Heffernan & Associates  
[On-line]. Retrieved on May 2003. Available: http://www.vanzorgereport.com/ 
 
Paulker, G. (1958, September). The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia.  
Far Eastern Survey 27 (9), 129-142. 
 
Peacock, J. (1978). Purifying the Faith: The Muhammadijah Movement in Indonesian 
Islam. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings Publishing. 
 
Penders, C.L.M., & Sundhaussen, U. (1985). Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political  
Biography. St. Lucia: U Queensland P. 
 
Pridham, G. & Lewis, P. (Eds.). (1996). Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing 
New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. 
 
Ramage, D. (1995). Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of  
Tolerance. New York: Routledge.   
 
Reid, A. (1967, February). Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Journal of Asian Studies 26 (2), 267-283. 
 
Reid, A. (1975, November). The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites:  
Northern Sumatra in 1942. Journal of Asian Studies 35 (1), 49-61.   
 
Reid, A. (1993). Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, Vol. 2.   
New Haven: Yale UP. 
 
Ricklefs, M.C. (1993). A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300. (2nd ed.). 
Stanford: Stanford UP.  
 
Samson, A. (1968, December). Islam in Indonesian Politics. Asian Survey 8  
(12), 1001-1017. 
 
Samson, A. (1971, Winter). Army and Islam in Indonesia. Pacific Affairs 44 
(4), 545-565. 
 
Schwartz, A. (2000). A Nation in Waiting: Indonesias Search for Stability.  




Sjahrir, S. (1968). Perjuangan Kita. Trans. Benedict R. OG. Anderson.  
Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Smith, J. (1976). Portrait of a Cold Warrior. New York: Putnam. 
 
Sukarno. (1965). Sukarno: An Autobiography, As Told  to Cindy Adams.  
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril. 
 
Suryadinata, L. (2002). Elections and Politics in Indonesia. Singapore:  
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  
 
Swift, A. (1989). The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948.  
Ithaca: Cornell UP.  
 
Taufik, A. (2002). The Padri and the End of the Minangkabau Monarchy. Indonesian  
Heritage [On-line], Available: http://www.indonesianheritage.com 
 
Thomas, R. M. (1981, March). Indonesian Education: Communist Strategies (1950-1965)  
and Governmental Counter Strategies (1966-1980). Asian Survey 21 (3), 369-392. 
 
Tinker, I. & Walker, M. (1956, July). The First General Elections in India and Indonesia.  
Far Eastern Survey 25 (7), 97-110. 
 
Vandenbosch, A. (1952, December). Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia.  
Far Eastern Survey 21 (18), 181-185. 
 
Vandenbosch, A. (1953, October). The Indonesian Political Scene. Far Eastern Survey 22  
(11), 145-149. 
 
Van der Kroef, J. (1952, July). Society and Culture in Indonesian Nationalism.  
American Journal of Sociology 58 (1), 11-24.  
 
Van der Kroef, J. (1953, September). Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia.  
Far Eastern Survey 22 (10), 121-125. 
 
Van der Kroef, J. (1957, April). Instability in Indonesia. Far Eastern Survey 26  
(4), 49-62. 
 
Van der Kroef, J. (1958, April). Disunited Indonesia. Far Eastern Survey 27 (4), 49-63. 
 
Van der Kroef, J. (1958, May). Disunited Indonesia II. Far Eastern Survey 27 (5), 73-80. 
 





Van Dijk, C. (1981). Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia.  
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Van Niel, R. (1980). From Netherlands East Indies to Republic of Indonesia, 1900-1945.  
In Harry Aveling (Ed.), The Development of Indonesian Society.  (pp. 106-165).  
St. Lucia: U of Queensland P, 1980. 106-165. 
 
Verdoon, J.A. (1946, December). Indonesia at the Crossroads. Pacific Affairs 19  
(4), 339-350. 
 
Von der Mehden, F. (1958, September). Marxism and Early Indonesian Islamic  
Nationalism. Political Science Quarterly 73 (3), 335-351. 
 
Von der Mehden, F. (1993). Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia  
and the Middle East. Gainesville: U of Florida P. 
 
Ward, K.E. (1970). The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
 
Wittfogel, K. (1957). Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power.   
New Haven: Yale UP.  
 
234 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Major Robert E. Lucius, USMC 
Dracut, Maryland  
 
4. Dr. Glenn Robinson 
Carmel Valley, California  
 
5. Ms. Ina Nasution-Mustofa 
Silver Spring, Maryland  
 
6. Dr. Gaye Christoffersen 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
235 
